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# þÿ The Consequences of Western Intervention in Burkina Faso

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**DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
STRATEGY AND SECURITY**

**A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED FOR OBTAINING A  
DISTANCE POSTGRADUATE DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS STRATEGY AND SECURITY AT NEAPOLIS  
UNIVERSITY**

**TITLE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WESTERN STATES'  
INTERVENTIONS IN BURKINA FASO**

**BY**

**SAMUEL KOFI MCLARSON-GRIFFITH**

**JANUARY 2023**

# VALIDITY PAGE

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**Title:** The Consequences of Western States' Intervention in Burkina Faso.

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## **STUDENT’S DECLARATION**

I, Samuel Kofi McLarson-Griffith, being fully aware of the consequences of plagiarism, declare responsibly that this paper entitled “The consequences of western states’ intervention in Burkina Faso”, is strictly a product of my work and all sources used have been duly stated in the bibliographic citations and references. Where I have used ideas, text, and/or sources of other authors, they are mentioned in the text with the appropriate citation, and the relevant reference is included in the bibliographic references section with a full description.

### **The Declarant**

Samuel Kofi McLarson-Griffith

.....

## ABSTRACT

Burkina Faso, a West African country with a population of about 18.6 million is currently in a state of punitive security and economic hard times as a result of intermittent political instability and draught. As a result, many people have migrated to neighboring nations like Ghana. Some have questioned the role of western states in the politics of Burkina Faso. The study aimed to investigate the consequences of the western states' interventions in Burkina Faso. The study was conducted using a case study research design and data collected from quantitative secondary sources. The study found that western states' interventions in Burkina Faso have had wide security implications. The security of Burkina Faso has become fragile. While preventing terrorist attacks has been the primary goal of western states' interventions in Burkina Faso, the country has witnessed several extremist attacks and coups in recent years. Western states' interventions in Burkina Faso are producing troops who launch military coups against duly elected democratic governments. Western states' foreign policy in Burkina Faso is too militaristic and it's partially to blame for the current level of violence, death, and displacement in Burkina Faso. Since the counterterrorism policy is the driving force behind the conflict in Burkina Faso, the author urges hegemonic powers or western powers to adopt a new perspective of what it means to preserve civilian life both at home and abroad.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I wish to express my utmost gratitude to God for everything during this process. Without the sacrifice, direction, and aid of several people who in some way contributed and extended their important support in the preparation and execution of this study, this effort would not have been possible. I would like to express my profound gratitude and gratefulness to my supervisor Dr. Marios Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos, for his significant help, comments, exceptional guidance, and supervision.

I am also indebted to my family and friends especially Leah, and all institutions especially Griffith International Consulting (GIC), and individuals who in their diverse ways contributed to the success of this objective.

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to the Lord God Almighty, my family, Brandon, Leah, and all the heroes of Africa especially Ghana and Burkina Faso, who are striving hard at the verge of their lives for peace, democracy, security, development, and the advancement of human rights.

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## ACRONYMS

AU.....	African Union
ECOWAS.....	Economic Community of West African States
USA.....	United States of America
UN.....	United Nations
GA.....	General Assembly
LT. ....	Lieutenant
COL.....	Colonel
CIA .....	Central Intelligence Agency
USAID.....	United States Aid
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
AFRICOM.....	Africa Command
SOCAFRICA.....	Special Operations Command Africa
ACLED.....	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
JNIM.....	Jama'at Nasr Al-Islam Wal Muslim
IED.....	Improvised Explosive Devices
ISS.....	Institute of Security Studies
SAM.....	Security Assistance Monitor.
SIPRI.....	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background Of The Study

Burkina Faso, a West African country with a population of about 18.6 million gained independence from France in 1960 <sup>1</sup>. The landlocked nation shares a border with Ghana, Togo, Benin, Niger, Mali, and Ivory Coast. The nation also has a significant amount of mineral resources like the other West African countries <sup>1</sup>. The former French colony is currently in a state of punitive security and economic times as a result of intermittent political instability and draught. This has resulted in a vast number of Burkinabes migrating from rural areas to urban within Burkina Faso and its neighboring countries like Ghana as of January 2023. This situation has plagued the nation and West Africa, where people are constantly crossing borders in search of security and greener pastures. This has opened up channels for illegal activities like terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates taking advantage of the porous West African borders.

The Map of Burkina Faso



Figure 1.1

Source: Mappr.co, available at <https://www.mappr.co/political-maps/burkina-faso/>. (Accessed: 11 November 2022)

Additionally, following many military takeovers in the 1970s and 1980s, multiparty elections were held beginning 1990s<sup>2</sup>. Burkina Faso's long history of a coup has resulted in porous security in the country<sup>2</sup>. Sankara was a Burkinabé military officer, Marxist–Leninist revolutionary, and Pan-Africanist who served as President of Burkina Faso from his coup in 1983 until he and twelve government officers got assassinated in 1987, in a coup d'état headed by Blaise Compaoré, a former colleague of Sankara<sup>3</sup>. Blaise Compaore led Burkina Faso from October 1987 to October 2014.

In 2014, widespread demonstrations and rebellion led to the ousting of Blaise Compaore. Protests against President Blaise Compaoré, who looked prepared to change the constitution and prolong his 27-year tenure, started on 28 October in the capital Ouagadougou<sup>4</sup>. On October 30, a group of demonstrators set ablaze on fire in the parliamentary building. The MPs postponed the vote on amending the constitution, which would have allowed President Blaise Compaoré to contest for the 2015 presidency. Amid the chaos, military officer Lt. Col. Isaac Zida who briefly served as Burkina Faso's acting head of state in November 2014 staged a coup and overthrew the government.

General Gilbert Diendéré who served as head of the Regiment of Presidential Security (RSP) during President Blaise Compaoré's tenure and was a longtime adviser to the president and the Chairman of the National Council for Democracy staged another coup in 2015 and declared The National Council for Democracy as the new national government<sup>4</sup>. Again on January 24, 2022, Roch Kabore, the president of Burkina Faso from 2015-2022, was deposed by a military coup headed by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Henri Damiba and served as an interim president from January 2022 to September 2022.

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Henri Damiba cited porous security as the cause for staging the coup<sup>4</sup>. He argued that former President Kabore was unable to contain the Islamic radicalism that is rapidly spreading throughout Burkina Faso<sup>4</sup>. On September 2022, Captain Ibrahim Traore also overthrew his predecessor Lieutenant-General Damiba in a coup and was sworn in as president on October 6, 2022. Traore, an interim leader of the country as of January 2023 also cited Damiba's alleged incapacity to tackle the ongoing Islamist insurgency in the north of Burkina Faso as the justification for the coup.

**Ibrahim Traoré was sworn in as Transitional President**  
**Figure 1.2**



**Source:** DW.Com, available at <https://www.dw.com/pt-002/burkina-faso-ibrahim-traor%C3%A9-empossado-como-presidente-de-transi%C3%A7%C3%A3o/a-63521112>. (Accessed: 11 Nov. 2022)

These soldiers behind the coups in Burkina Faso in one way or the other have had military training by the United States <sup>5</sup>. Since the early 2000s, the US has frequently sent out small commando teams to provide advice, help out, and support the military. The US intervenes in the security matters of Burkina Faso to push primarily its counter-terrorism agenda<sup>6</sup>. In the heat of battles, the US provided ammunition, weapons, accouterments, and aircraft, and provided numerous training programs, such as Flintlock, which is run by Special Operations Command Africa and is aimed at improving weak states' counterterrorism capacities <sup>5</sup>.

Lieutenant-General Damiba Traore is the most recent as of 31<sup>st</sup> January 2023 in a succession of coup leaders who have been trained by the American military. Lieutenant-General Damiba took part in at least six American training drills. He took part in the annual Flintlock exercise, a special operations training program, organized by the US in 2010 and 2020 <sup>5</sup>.

Between 2013 and 2014, Lieutenant-General Damiba attended the United States' financed Military Intelligence Basic Officer training program <sup>5</sup>. He also took part in activities with the United States Defense Department Civil Military Support Element in 2018 and 2019 <sup>5</sup>. Just like Lieutenant-General Damiba, Lt. Col. Isaac Zida was also a U.S.-trained military officer, who before staging the coup had attended a counterterrorism training program at MacDill Air Force Base which was financed by the U.S. government <sup>5</sup>. The narrative suggests that the western state's interventions in Burkina Faso have security implications. As such the study explores the consequences of western states' interventions in Burkina Faso. The author selected Burkina Faso as the case because of the consequences it has on its border nations like Ghana where I come from. This research might help Burkina Faso, the regional bloc, and Ghanaian policy makers in their decision-making regarding security and foreign interventions.

## **1.2 Problem Statement**

The security situation in Burkina Faso started to deteriorate after the exit of President Blaise Compaoré in 2014. The once-stable African state began to experience one security crisis after the other. In February 2016, 30 people were killed in a terrorist attack that took place at the Cappuccino café-bar and Splendid Hotel <sup>7</sup>. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the terrorism attack<sup>7</sup>. Attacks by terrorism groups have occurred frequently in the country's northern and eastern parts. For example in October 2019, a terrorist attack occurred at a mosque in the town of Salmossi close to the Mali border, killing 16 people and leaving several others injured <sup>6</sup>. In northern Burkina Faso, where the military is fighting terrorists, mass graves containing at least 180 dead people were discovered on July 8, 2020, <sup>7</sup> Issaev, Andrey, and Daria reported that on June 4, 2021, at least 100 people had been slain by gunmen in Solhan, in the northern part of Burkina Faso, close to the Niger border <sup>8</sup>. Hundreds of houses, as well as markets, were put on fire <sup>8</sup>. On December 2022, there was an attack by suspected jihadists supported by civilian volunteers in northern Burkina Faso killing 10 people <sup>9</sup>. Again on January 16, 2023, 50 women in the north of Burkina Faso were kidnapped by the terrorist group. Fortunately, all the victims were safe when recovered. Some scholars have blamed the Burkina Faso crisis on the interventions of western states <sup>6</sup>. Meryl Demuyneck and Julie Coleman also add that terrorist groups and Jihadists attack the government of Burkina Faso to spite the US <sup>10</sup>. This claim has

not been empirically verified as there is a dearth of knowledge on the consequences of western states' interventions in Burkina Faso. Previous scholars have focused on Nigeria, Guinea, and Mali <sup>10</sup>. However, there's a lack of research attention on the interconnection of the great power interventions and related consequences on Burkina Faso. This study, therefore, is to seal the literature gap by investigating the consequences of the western state's intervention in Burkina Faso and suggesting recommendations to policy makers on issues of security interventions.

### **1.3 Significance Of The Study**

The study is significant from a policy perspective. In terms of policy, the recommendations of the study could be adopted by the government of Burkina Faso, regional bodies, and Africa at large to minimize western states' interventions in the affairs of the country, region, and continent. It could help to reduce the number of coups that have taken place in the country and the region for the last decade and thereby enhancing the peace and stability of Burkina Faso and the region as well. It could also be useful to the US in their security policies towards Burkina Faso or Africa at large.

The study is also significant from a research perspective. As stated in the problem statement, there is a dearth of empirical studies on the security implications of the western states' interventions in Burkina Faso, therefore, the study assists to fill the literature crack in this context. Future scholars can use the findings of the study, as the foundation literature to conduct further studies on the topic.

### **1.4 Purpose Of The Study**

The focal purpose of the study is to examine the consequences of the western states' interventions in Burkina Faso. The purpose of the study will be achieved by exploring past and current existing practices and concepts that show western interventions' security implications. Based on the findings of the study, the paper will recommend strategies that could be adopted to minimize western states' interventions in Burkina Faso and also to avoid the security implications of western interventions.



## **1.5 Objectives Of The Study**

Incessant insecurity and growing armed groups in Burkina Faso as a result of the neighboring country's (Mali) conflict and the Western-trained Burkina Faso military in the course of intervention is what has triggered me to fill this literature gap. This is because the implications of western interventions in Burkina Faso do not only do harm to the former French colony under study but also to the neighboring nations and the region at large. This has caused human rights infringement, mass displacement of citizens, and migration of the nation's citizens through porous borders. This makes it easier for terrorist groups to expand their ideology and proliferation of arms and drugs to neighboring countries like Ghana which boasts of being the top democratic and secured nation in the region since independence.

The objectives set for the study are to:

1. To identify if human security is the main reason for the western state's interventions in Burkina Faso. Western states' interventions in Burkina Faso post-independence were minimal but the last two decades have witnessed increased western state activities in the country. The study seeks to explore if human security is the factor influencing the western states' interventions in Burkina Faso.
2. Assess the security implications of the western states' interventions in Burkina Faso. The study seeks to analyze the security landscape in the country. Threats and assaults on governmental institutions by violent armed groups and officials including the military and security forces, as well as chiefs and politicians, have become more frequent in Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso as of 31<sup>st</sup> January 2023 has experienced an increase in the frequency of terrorist attacks. This objective seeks to find out whether the western states' interventions are a contributory factor to the porous security of Burkina Faso.
3. Evaluate strategies that can be adopted to reduce western states' interventions in Burkina Faso. The increasing military interventions by western states in the affairs of Burkina Faso cannot be glossed over. As a sovereign state, the country must be allowed to take political decisions without intervention by western states. This objective seeks to evaluate alternative

courses of action that can be adopted to minimize the western states' interventions in Burkina Faso.

## **1.6 Research Questions**

As outlined in the previous sections, western interventions in Burkina Faso have consequences on the landlocked nation and the region at large. For Burkinabes, the porous security could plunge the majority of the people into abject poverty and mass displacement. In terms of security implications for the region, if the situation is not brought under control, Burkina Faso could become a gateway to West Africa by multiple Jihadist groups. There could be a domino effect especially since West Africa is a vulnerable region plagued by Jihadist activities. Jihadist armed militants could use Burkina Faso as a gateway for expanding their network even into stable democratic nations such as Ghana. For the study's objectives to be achieved the author seeks answers to these research questions to explore the consequences of western states' interventions in Burkina Faso:

1. Is human insecurity the main reason for the western states' interventions in Burkina Faso?
2. What are the security implications of the western states' interventions in Burkina Faso?
3. How can the western states' interventions in Burkina Faso be reduced?

## **1.7 Methodology**

The study was designed as a descriptive study but also an analytical study. A descriptive research design is a study design that describes the present state of a social issue or problem<sup>11</sup>. A descriptive research design is a sort of research design that seeks information to characterize phenomena, situations, or populations methodically.<sup>11</sup>. The justification for adopting a descriptive research design is that the author wants to describe the current security situation in Burkina Faso and how western states' interventions have contributed to the problem. The study was conducted using a case study research design. Using a case study research design was justified because the study was on a specific country, Burkina Faso. According to Lê, Jane Kirsten, and Torsten Schmid, there are five basic approaches to conducting a descriptive study 1) action research, 2) case study 3) experiments, 4) ethnography, and 5) surveys<sup>11</sup>. For this

study, a case study approach was adopted. The justification for adopting a case study is that the research was on a single case country (Burkina Faso). Again data was collected from quantitative secondary sources. In analyzing the objectives set for the study, the author relied on quantitative data from sources such as the UN, ECOWAS, AU ACLED, USAID, CIA, ISS, SAM, SIPRI, Trading Economics, DW-News, MAPPR, USA and Burkina Faso government data.

### **1.8 Limitations To The Study**

The study initially focused on West Africa in its totality. But soon come to realize I needed to specialize in a specification by region and by threat/challenge. Although I spoke to some former and current UN, ECOWAS, AU, and other government officials to complete the questionnaire and general information on the topic according to the questions under study some information I got would be irrelevant concerning Burkina Faso. More time is therefore required to get practical elements and feedback because of all the clearances required to get the appointees to complete the questionnaire. In the meantime, I have spoken to a few politicians, former and current UN, ECOWAS, AU, and other government officials who provided general vital information that made it possible to continue with this research with regards to Burkina Faso and that are considered somehow primary as the source of information used for the optimal quality of this paper.

A limited resource for the study is also another limitation. As already stated, there's less concentration by scholars regarding the consequences of western interventions in Burkina Faso as compared to the other neighbors like Nigeria, Mali, and Guinea. This literature gap and fewer resources made it hard time to complete this thesis. This is because extrapolating the findings from Mali and Guinea to reflect the same for Burkina Faso will be far-fetched. For example, countries such as Nigeria, Mali, and Guinea are other countries in West Africa that have volatile security but to use their findings to imply the same for Burkina Faso will be inaccurate. This is due to the uniqueness and contextual issues that may not be the same and applicable in all contexts.

Regardless of all the challenges, the researcher made all the necessary efforts to get the necessary resources and information with patience and a greater amount of devotion and tolerance to complete this thesis.

## **1.9 Organization Of The Study**

For the objectives set regarding the consequences of the western states' interventions in Burkina Faso to be achieved, the author grouped the study into five chapters. Chapter one establishes the context of the study. It provides the background to the study and elaborates on the reasons why the study is important. Chapter two reviews the existing literature on the study area. The chapter reviews relevant books, articles, journals, theoretical and empirical literature, and other works that have been done by people or researchers on the topic. The aim is to provide an understanding of what is already known about the subject, what is not known, and how the study can contribute to the body of literature. Concepts such as causes of western states' interventions and implications are discussed in the literature review. Chapter three presents an analysis of the findings. The analysis is presented concerning the research questions that were set for the study. Chapter four discusses the analysis of existing literature. The aim is to confirm the existing literature or provide a new perspective on the subject. Chapter five presents the conclusion, provides recommendations, and makes a suggestion for further studies.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1 Introduction To The Literature Review**

Burkina Faso is a non-coastal nation in West Africa and south of the Sahara. It was named the Republic of Upper Volta in 1984 by then-President Thomas Sankara<sup>13</sup>. People from Burkina Faso are called Burkinabé. With a low Gross National Income per capita of 790 US dollars in 2020, Burkina Faso is among the world's poorest countries when compared to the average of sub-Saharan African nations in the same year (1,478 US dollars in 2020)<sup>13</sup>. Burkina Faso was chosen because the nation is projected to play an essential role in maintaining West Africa's peace and stability as well as boosting regional economic integration. The volatile situation in Burkina Faso has the potential of spilling to other nation-states in the region and thus has consequences on maintaining peace in the region and regional integration.

This chapter reviews studies conducted by previous scholars in the area of intervention and its consequences on security. The goal of the literature review is to have a deeper grasp of the existing knowledge and debates relevant to the theme of the study. In this chapter, I will start by explaining terminologies and after discuss western states' interventions in Burkina Faso.

#### **2.2 Theoretical Literature**

##### ***2.2.1 Definitions And Terminologies***

This section explains the terminologies in the study. The terminologies discussed are humanitarian intervention and the UN Charter, humanitarian intervention, absolute nonintervention, restricted interventionism, broad interventionism, securitization, militarization, hegemonic power, and human security.

These terminologies must be explained to provide a better understanding of the issues at stake.

### **Humanitarian Intervention And The UN Charter:**

According to the United Nation, humanitarian intervention is a method of preventing or stopping a serious violation of human rights in a state that is either incompetent or unwilling to defend its people or actively persecutes them <sup>14</sup>. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, states that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the UN” <sup>15</sup>. This serves as the foundation for any consideration of the legitimacy of force under international law. The UN Charter's Chapter VII and Article 51 both expressly acknowledge several specific exceptions to the aforementioned norm. Nothing in the current Charter may limit the innate right to personal or collective self-defense if a member of the UN is subjected to a military attack till the Security Council takes the fitting steps to safeguard that right. The Security Council is given the authority to apply force against any member state that the Security Council determines that actions, other than using force, are insufficient to maintain or restore global security and peace. This is another example of the obvious omission of the non-intervention values provided by Chapter VII of Charter <sup>14</sup>. Does the Charter's Article 2(4) forbid humanitarian intervention? On this issue, theories differ among scholars.

Many people contend that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter can't be construed in a manner that permits humanitarian action <sup>14</sup>. Some even claim the concept of non-intervention has attained the level of jus cogens, or an absolute standard from which there can be no deviation <sup>14</sup>. Instead, proponents of humanitarian intervention assert that it is permitted by the Charter since one of its main goals is the advancement of human rights. Treaty interpretation can be done in one of three ways: the first, known as objective concentrates on the text itself and word analysis. The second, which is "subjective" examines the parties' intentions when they adopted the agreement.

In the third approach, a treaty provision's interpretation is determined by the treaty's goals and purposes. All three approaches-words used, intents and goals of the document are taken into consideration to have a genuine reading of a treaty clause, and it is impracticable to omit any

of them. Aspects of each of the three concepts are covered in Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention. Bailliet, Cecilia, and O'Connor write that the Convention on the Law of Treaties postulates a combination 'textual-intentions-teleological' approach as the overall answer to challenges of overcoming difficulties in comprehending specific treaty clauses<sup>16</sup>. According to the classicists, the Charter forbids the application of force for humanitarian causes. They contend that the use of force is prohibited with just two exceptions: a claim of an individual or collective self-defense and the second is that the Security Council should approve the intervention. The first exemption enables using force in self-defense to counter an armed assault, and the second allows the Security Council to take action as a punitive measure in the discharge of its responsibility to preserve or restore international peace. Bailliet, Cecilia, and O'Connor contend that in Article 2(4) the Charter's drafters would have allowed the force to be used in humanitarian missions if they had desired. Classicists reference two GA Resolutions. The first is Resolution 2625, which stipulates that "no country or group of nations can have the authority to engage, indirectly or directly, for any cause whatever, in the external or affairs of another country"<sup>16</sup>.

The second is the non-binding recommendation to the United Nations Security Council regarding the definition of the offense of violence, General Assembly Resolution 3314. Although not legally binding, the second definition is frequently used to argue against using force. The Resolution states that there is a difference between a war of aggression and aggression. Only a war of aggression is considered a crime against world peace. The GA stated that "no type of justification given whether financial, legal, political and technological or any other reason may pass for justification for armed or military intervention. Aggression is defined as the application of military power by a State against an autonomy state or territorial integrity of another state".

Classicists posit that the right to self-defense is restricted by the Charter and base their assertion on the requirement that states that take action in self-defense promptly notify the Security Council. The right to self-defense is revoked if the Security Council takes an action. Classicists have concluded that humanitarian intervention is categorically prohibited under the UN Charter after taking into account all of the considerations previously discussed.

Realists on the other hand assert that the Charter stresses the right of humanitarian action, contrary to the views of classicists. According to Teson, using force is forbidden "a) when it damages the target state's geographical integrity; b) when it influences its sovereignty or c) when it contravenes United Nations goals <sup>17</sup>. Because "a real humanitarian intrusion does not end in territorial invasion or enslavement," the first two criteria are met. In respect of the last criteria, referred to as the "purpose" test, Teson concludes that humanitarian action is consistent with one of the principal goals of the United Nations Charter, which is the advancement of human rights <sup>17</sup>. Although both realists and classicists offer persuasive justifications for their positions, the classicists' viewpoint is the more widely held one. Classics hold that when anything is specified, all that is not mentioned is excluded; hence the drafters may have included provisions for humanitarian intervention expressly. Realists hold that an interpretation of a provision that may be realistically applied without making any terms superfluous is desirable.

Classicalists contend that the Charter opted for peace above justice as peace is the more essential of the two objectives of the UN. "Whenever there is friction or disagreement between two or more of these ideals, peace must always be the deciding factor. Sanjaume-Calvet, Marc a supporter of the realist viewpoint, asserts that the clauses of human rights were established following a lengthy debate and that doing so creates a legal obligation for governments to uphold those <sup>18</sup>.

Regarding the controversy surrounding the eventual substitution of the phrase promotion of human rights for the protection of human rights in the Charter, Sanjaume-Calvet, Marc insists that this omission is of little practical significance: It is obvious that the authors of the UN Charter intended to put an end to both aggression and the abuse of human rights, but it is unclear what they had in mind when they sacrificed one for the other in the event of a conflict. According to Teson, the next step is to look at article 2(4) in the context of later state conduct if literal analysis and purpose are unable in producing a resolution <sup>17</sup>.

Supporters of humanitarian intervention assert that diplomatic practice has established or upheld an exemption to article 2(4) that justifies the use of force to redress significant violations of human rights. According to critics, ensuing behavior must be understood as prohibiting humanitarian assistance. Because the Security Council is unable to properly carry



out its duties, the failure of the collective security arrangements confirms the realists' theory that states are permitted to maintain their authority to interfere unilaterally when it is required. Teson claims that the complete passivity of the UN to address significant human rights breaches is an application of the principle of *rebus sic stantibus* (basic transformation of condition) <sup>18</sup>. Alternatively, classicists contend that allowing unilateral humanitarian action would be too risky since there is a chance for misuse. Realists contend that the Charter never performed as its creators had intended. The use of veto power has the potential to paralyze the SC. There are several instances where the UN ignored flagrant violations of human rights and did not take action. Realists argue that measures of unilateral use of force are in the best interest of the world if the UN is unable to assist.

According to Said and Yati, humanitarian intervention is the proportionate trans-boundary assistance-including coercive assistance-provided by governments to citizens of another country whose basic human rights are being violated and who would otherwise be rationally inclined to rebel against their repressive government <sup>19</sup>. Clayton Anthony also defined humanitarian intervention as "the use of force for the lawful purpose of defending the citizens of another state against treatment that is so capricious and persistently abusive as to go beyond the boundary of that authority within which the sovereign is perceived to take action with reason and fairness" <sup>20</sup>. Clayton Anthony posits that there are three fundamental views on humanitarian action: absolute non-interventionism, broad interventionism, and restricted interventionism <sup>20</sup>.

### **Absolute Nonintervention:**

According to the UN absolute nonintervention is the peaceful settlement of international disputes among states for peace, security, and justice among the nations. Absolute noninterventionists contend that only self-defense against aggression justifies the use of force. The majority of legal scholars hold this stance. According to Said and Yati, this is the "relativist understanding of justice" <sup>19</sup>. The authors deemed the theory unacceptable: "changes in economic, political, legal factors do not influence the legality of human rights that result

from apt norms of vital morals. Said and Yati posit that this restriction has implications for international human rights <sup>19</sup>.

### **Restricted Interventionism:**

According to the UN restricted intervention is where states intervene in the affairs of another state citing serious violations of human rights in the country. Scanlon, Sean believes that Humanitarian intervention is permitted only in instances where there are grave human rights violations, such as slavery, genocide, and mass murder <sup>21</sup>. Most legal experts who favor humanitarian action agree with this stance <sup>21</sup>. Michael Walzer, one of the pioneers of a pluralist perspective on moral and political life, is one of the most well-known modern political advocates <sup>22</sup>. He revived the just war theory, introduced the concept of multifaceted equality, and argued that justice is largely a moral norm within specific states and communities and thus cannot be produced in a global construct. Only genocidal or comparable acts, in Walzer's opinion, warrant humanitarian intervention. Walzer defines nations as the "union of individuals and government" and contends that military action against states is virtually always illegitimate, even if the objective or result is the establishment of democratic institutions <sup>22</sup>. Walzer distinguishes between domestic authority, which is singular and reflects the democratic values of the people who have the freedom to overthrow dictators, and international authority, which is pluralist in nature and underscores the unique trend of political and cultural improvement.

Said and Yati contends that Walzer's pluralistic principle "shows that there are local moralities and not a set of ethical political values claimed to be applicable for all humans independent of geographical conditions <sup>19</sup>. We must allow the political procedure to unfold naturally; we must not hurry it along. According to Said, and Yati, the process may result in tyranny. Said and Yati claim that Walzer's pluralism does not vary much from plain ethical relativism <sup>19</sup>.

### **Broad Interventionism:**

According to the UN broad intervention is the situation where states intervene in the matters of other states to stop human rights violations before it gets to the level of genocide<sup>15</sup>. Farer Tom believes that when there are major human rights violations occurring but they are not yet

at the level of genocide then humanitarian intervention is appropriate<sup>23</sup>. Farer, Tom argues that military intervention can only be ethically acceptable if it optimizes the respect for the human rights of all those who will be impacted by it<sup>23</sup>.

For Ferer Tom, all just conflicts-including self-defense wars-are battles motivated by respect for human rights. Said and Yati note that such a stance appears to be incompatible with the theory founded on individual rights<sup>19</sup>. In the majority of situations of forced intervention, a nation entering a conflict for what appears to be a worthy cause is unable to prevent causing misery and death<sup>23</sup>.

## **Peace And Security**

According to the UN Charter, Peace and Security is preventing violations and strengthening the protection of human rights, including in situations of conflict and insecurity<sup>15</sup>. The term peace and security are also explained as synergy, a complimentary condition that is absent when conflict and violence are pervasive in a community or a nation<sup>24</sup>. Peace and security are both means to other purposes as well as ends in themselves. This thesis examines the manifestations of peace and security at the national level in Burkina Faso.

## **Securitization:**

Securitization is considered a process through which state actors elevate issues from routine political concerns to security-related concerns, hence permitting the use of extreme measures in the name of security<sup>24</sup>. Problems that are successfully constructed into existential problems are what is represented by concerns that are securitized rather than problems that are fundamental to the objective survival of a state. Theorists frequently cite how terrorism is prioritized in security debates although avoidable sickness and traffic accidents kill much more people than terrorists do<sup>24</sup>. Understanding "who securitizes" (the securitizing actor), "on what problems" (threats), "for whom" (the referent object), "why," "with what effects," and, last but not least, "under what conditions" are the goals of securitizations<sup>24</sup>. The paper

highlights how the US views the jihadist movement as more than a political issue but elevating it to a security concern and thus taking militarization measures to control it.

### **Hegemonic Power:**

Hegemonic power is considered when the power of a single player dominates the international system through coercive and non-coercive ways<sup>25</sup>. This actor is typically thought of as being a single state, such as the United States in the affairs of Burkina Faso. It is also used to describe the domination of a tightly knit political community with access to outside decision-making authority, as in western states. In the paper, the US is seen as a single state interfering in the security matters of Burkina Faso.

### **Militarisation:**

According to the UN, military intervention is where states mobilize their army into the territory of another country to protect the host country's interest or their interest<sup>15</sup>. Burgess and Stephen posit that military intervention is the deployment of troops or forces from one nation into the territory or airspace of another nation, or the use of force by troops from one nation already stationed within another nation, all in the context of a political crisis or conflict<sup>26</sup>. It is therefore a distinct event, or group of discrete events, that continues over time and include the use of military force by armed forces that have been formally designated to affect either internal conflicts or political circumstances in a target state. Verifying claims, determining the beginning and ending dates, evaluating repeated interventions or counter interventions, defining the context in which interventions are carried out, describing political issues and potential motivations, specifying casualties and troop commitments, and contrasting interventions of different actors are all important issues in identifying interventions (e.g. by great powers or major vs. minor regional powers). The US counterterrorism program took center stage as the subject of terrorism became more important in US-Burkina Faso policy following the 9/11 attack on the US<sup>27</sup>.

In addition to providing air support for both conventional military operations and an increasing number of covert military operations in the region, the US made financial

commitments, logistical support, equipment, and training to several countries that it believed were vulnerable to terrorist activities. Defense expenditure has a significant opportunity cost because it diverts funds away from crucial research for human security<sup>28</sup>. Political radicalism was seen to be a prospective spawning environment for impoverished countries. In response, the US attempted to forge military alliances, provide aid in the form of funding and training, and create military outposts in several West African nations. Again, the reorganized development and humanitarian aid programs that were previously managed by civilians were turned over to the Pentagon and the CIA also took over USAID's human security program<sup>27</sup>.

### **Human Security:**

The notion of human security was introduced in 1994 by the UN Development Programme to denote safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease, repression, and protection from harmful disruptions to patterns of daily life<sup>29</sup>. As opposed to the security of nations and borders, human security refers to the daily safety of people and the communities in which they reside<sup>30</sup>. It concerns several forms of security, not merely defense against potential foreign adversaries<sup>30</sup>. It is about avoiding being killed, robbed, or ejected violently from your house<sup>30</sup>. It also involves having enough to eat and drink, being able to see a doctor if you become ill, and not losing your house in a hurricane or a forest fire. It is about having freedom from both fear and wants<sup>30</sup>. By addressing the causes of violence, a human-security strategy prioritizes preventing violence. In Burkina Faso, human security is being defined differently by the west through the concept of the war on terror. The security of western countries is proportionally linked to the security of nations where terrorist threats emerge due to advancements in communications and the growing accessibility of destructive weaponry<sup>30</sup>. Terrorism, insurgency, and insecurity occur as a result of the absence of human security. This is no exception for the Burkinabes due to political hardship, climate change, and food crisis coupled with the compounded after-covid-19 global effect.

### **2.2.2 Historical Context Of Western states' interventions And Insecurity In Burkina Faso**

After explaining the terminologies I will be discussing the historical context of western interventions and insecurity in Burkina Faso. The discussion is based on my readings of the following articles: Eizenga, Daniel. "Military Coups in Burkina Faso." *Democratization and Military Coups in Africa: Post-1990 Political Conflicts*: Haavik, Viljar, Morten Bøås, and Alessio Iocchi. "The End of Stability—How Burkina Faso Fell Apart." Idrissa Abdoulaye, A. "Tinder to the fire: Burkina Faso in the conflict zone.": Abdoulie, S. A. W. O. "The chronology of military coup d'états and regimes in burkina faso: 1980-2015.": Harsch, Ernest. *Burkina Faso: a history of power, protest, and revolution* and Demuynck, Méryl, and J. D. Julie Coleman. "Political Upheaval and Counter-Terrorism in Burkina Faso: Between a Rock and a Hard Place and Stephanie Savell: The Costs of United States' Post-9/11 "Security Assistance": How Counterterrorism Intensified Conflict in Burkina Faso and Around the World.

The factors influencing western states' interventions in Burkina Faso have been revolving. Meryl Demuynck, and Julie Coleman state that the factors are: securitization, democracy, and terrorism<sup>10</sup>. According to Demuynck and Julie Coleman securitization was the main goal of western states' participation in Burkina Faso. In the 20th century, presidents of Western States scarcely ever had shown interest in Burkina Faso politics<sup>10</sup>. The Western States paid little attention to the politics of Burkina Faso. The major objective of western states during the Cold War was to lessen the Soviet Union's influence in Burkina Faso<sup>10</sup>.

Western nations have no desire to colonize Burkina Faso. They thought colonialism would fail, and when it did, they would intervene to further their interests in Burkina Faso. The justification for western interest in Burkina Faso was a geopolitical power struggle with the Soviet Union<sup>10</sup>. Western nations had the view that the Soviet Union may attack at any time and Burkina Faso might be one of the targets<sup>10</sup>. Burkina Faso was considered one of the West African nations that may be used by western governments to lessen the impact of the Soviet Union in the quest for world dominance<sup>10</sup>.

Following the collapse of colonialism and Burkina Faso's independence, western governments' involvement in the region changed from securitization to the advancement of democracy. With the fall of the Soviet Union, Africa and for that matter Burkina Faso lost their strategic importance to the erstwhile Cold War adversaries. As a result, the dictatorship in Burkina Faso was no longer supported financially and militarily by the Soviet Union and its allies. Western states' foreign policies altered to support the development of countries with market-based economic systems and inclusive, open, and accountable political systems. The objective of the foreign policy was to persuade the Burkinabe government to embrace democracy. Burkina Faso was a perfect example of a country that got funding under the new foreign assistance policy adopted by Western powers. Political conditionality was openly acknowledged by the US and other western countries as part of their foreign aid policy. After September 11, 2001, Western powers' interests in Burkina Faso changed. Weak regimes like Burkina Faso's harmed America's security and gave the country more prominence. Due to its failure to provide for the basic needs of its population and lack of total control over its borders, Burkina Faso became both a haven and a breeding ground for terrorist groups<sup>31</sup>. Burkina Faso gained priority status on the US security agenda. Extreme poverty, disease, terrorism, and political unrest have all been reported in Burkina Faso, which poses a severe danger to the security of western governments. To coerce Burkina Faso into doing as they say while they win the fight against terrorism, western powers consequently regarded aid as a powerful bargaining tool. As of 31<sup>st</sup> January 2023, the US had trained Burkina Faso soldiers in counterterrorism drills so that they could combat terrorism attacks back home. The provision of aid to Burkina Faso has been tied to militarization leading to coups.

### **2.2.3 Drivers Of Western states' interventions In Burkina Faso**

Eizenga, Daniel said that western states' interventions in Burkina Faso have primarily been to push their counterterrorism agenda<sup>32</sup>. He claims that as part of Washington's post-9/11 counterterrorism initiatives, the US has been providing funds, weaponry, and training to Burkina Faso's military since 2009. He opines that while the US cannot be wholly blamed for the recent coups in Burkina Faso, the US has paved the way for the country to become more militarized, which eventually led to the coup. The author makes the case that although the

local dynamics were much too complex to neatly line with the U.S. notion that "good" government troops fought "bad" terrorists, the United States had a role in spreading the ideology that terrorism in Burkina Faso demanded a military response.

Haavik, Viljar, Morten Bøås, and Alessio Iocchi also state that not long after George Bush initiated what he dubbed the "global war on terror" in Afghanistan in 2001, the Defense and State departments started to expand this war to Africa <sup>7</sup>. The proactive reasoning adopted by officials claimed that even the slightest chance of an assault called for preventive action, and they concentrated especially on "under-governed" territories in "weak" or "fragile" nations. The U.S. military began to establish a network of bases and training facilities throughout Africa, expanding its presence in Africa since World War II. One of the nations where the US began to establish a network of bases and training operations is Burkina Faso. The result is the training of soldiers who launch an attack on the citizens and the government <sup>7</sup>. The two coups staged in 2022 were led by soldiers that were trained by the US<sup>7</sup>.

Idrissa Abdoulaye also adds that in 2003, the United States launched the Pan Sahel Initiative. The Pan Sahel Initiative, which began by instructing military forces from Mali and Niger, evolved into the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership in 2005 and was extended to cover Burkina Faso in 2009 <sup>33</sup>. The number of terrorist assaults in Burkina Faso started to increase just seven years later, around 2016. Following the 2011 U.S. and NATO-backed revolution in Libya that deposed longstanding Libyan tyrant Muammar al-Qaddafi, the violence from neighboring Mali spread and contributed to the political unrest in Mali in 2012. The political unrest in Mali had a spillover effect on the security of the neighboring country, Burkina Faso <sup>33</sup>. It is believed that some of the soldiers that supported the 2022 coups in Burkina Faso migrated from Mali into Burkina Faso<sup>33</sup>.

Abdoulie, S. A. W. O further notes that the number of funds the United States provided for Burkina Faso's security increased dramatically, from 2010 to 2015 <sup>2</sup>. However, this figure is merely publicly announced financing. The majority of the funds went into supporting military activities and providing Burkinabe troops with weapons and vehicles. The increased funding for the supply of military equipment has led to the proliferation of arms which is used for attacks <sup>2</sup>. The US and Burkina Faso participate in a variety of military exchange and training



programs because fighting terrorism and enhancing border security are very important to the US. Burkina Faso supports US activities in the Sahel. Burkina Faso is a partner of the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program for peacekeeping and also a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Burkina Faso was proposed for a State Partnership with the National Guard of the District of Columbia in 2018. Flintlock, an AFRICOM-led military exercise, was held in Burkina Faso in 2019. The military exercise sought to improve the special operations forces' capability and interoperability with forces from partner nations in Africa and the West. Aids to Burkina Faso is said to build on the Burkinabe government's political commitment and resource commitment to counter the rise of violent extremist organizations (VEOs).

Harsch, Ernest says that Burkina Faso is an illustration of fallout from American anti-terror strategies <sup>34</sup>. This is due to the suspicion that the attacks on the nation were carried out by a now-disbanded special military force that was trained in the U.S. There are several explanations explaining the sudden deterioration in security, and they all center on the revolution of 2014 that toppled ex-dictator Blaise Compaoré and endangered his fearsome presidential guard commanded by Gen. Gilbert Diendéré. The revolution left the nation with a huge security gap by toppling the president, which resulted in the dissolution of military unit <sup>34</sup>. The presidential guard was a specialized force of around 1,300 troops that served to safeguard the interests of the ruling party rather than those of the entire country <sup>34</sup>. It had its living quarters, tools, training, and salary which were not enjoyed by the regular army. The RSP was particularly effective as it had a counterterrorism squad of its own that was trained by the US <sup>34</sup>. The present-day instability in Burkina Faso appears to be evidence that backing an elite group loyal to a corrupt tyrant may fuel further terrorism and unrest. One of the defining characteristics of the so-called war on terror is this kind of mistake.

According to Méryl, Demuynck, and J. D. Julie Coleman the military of Burkina Faso often made matters worse by using a harsh response to Islamic extremists <sup>10</sup>. Several claims of extrajudicial murders, maltreatment of suspects in custody, and arbitrary arrests have been made concerning counterterrorism operations carried out by the security forces of Burkina Faso in 2017 and 2018. A substantial number of these allegations pertain to the Poor ethnic group. Because of the security forces' indiscriminate killing, there is greater lawlessness now

as of 31<sup>st</sup> January 2023, and the local population is less likely to support them in their fight against Islamist organizations.

#### **2.2.4 The Character Of Western Military Intervention In Burkina Faso**

According to Abdoulie, S. A. W. O Burkina Faso's military has received extensive and frequent US training since 9/11 <sup>2</sup>. The US offers sporadic training to Burkina Faso's security forces as well as air assistance, surveillance, and information to the French, who are leading a military effort against Islamist extremists in the Sahel. The emphasis of training is on civilian and military community involvement. The US also provides security personnel in Burkina Faso with training in first aid, border patrol techniques, counter-IED operations, and community engagement. Abdoulie, S. A. W. O reported that since 2015, Burkinabe soldiers have been undergoing training organized by the US. Sessions last for weeks and involve both police and military personnel. The military is instructed on the value of gaining the trust of civilians and counter-IED

According to Idrissa Abdoulaye owing to an uptick in incidents associated with Islamic terrorists, SOCAFRICA's attention has recently turned from the north and Sahel areas to the east <sup>33</sup>. Teams were based in the northern, central-northern, and Sahelian towns of Ouahigouya, Kaya, and Dori. The basic strategy was to integrate civic participation into military training, such as instructing the army to clear highways of bombs, getting the police to put up checkpoints, and then hiring an organization to fill potholes to make it more difficult for armed groups to lay explosives. There has been a reorganization of troops in Burkina Faso in recent months. The US moved part of its logistics and maintenance, along with some of its air support, from Burkina Faso to the US facility in Djibouti in May. The citizens of Burkina Faso are worried that there would be a significant information vacuum if the US presence is decreased. With its international allies, the US shares human intelligence, satellite photos, and video across the tri-border area.

### **2.2.5 The Military Might Of Burkina Faso In Pre/During/Post Intervention**

Abdoulie, S. A. W. O asserts that Burkina Faso's pre-intervention era instability was partially caused by the security force's problematic restructure and lack of adequate equipment after Blaise Compaoré's almost 30-year rule came to an end in 2014<sup>2</sup>. The 2011 mutinies, which resulted in the discharge of more than 500 military personnel, already compromised security and defense capabilities. Also, the regime change and the following coup attempt in 2015 further made matters worse. The presidential security regiment (régiment de sécurité présidentielle, RSP), an elite force that had benefited from the majority of the nation's military resources and equipment at the expense of other forces, was disbanded.

According to Idrissa Abdoulaye, the force also played a significant role in intelligence gathering, a duty that has not been adopted by other national forces<sup>33</sup>. The national army's unbalanced pyramid structure, which includes a disproportionate number of high-ranking officers compared to low-ranking soldiers, was another problem. This resulted in what is referred to as "armée apparat," where only about 18 percent of the Burkinabe forces are exposed to combat situations<sup>33</sup>. This exacerbated intergenerational conflicts between young, low-ranking troops who felt that they were being exploited as human shields and who lack the resources, knowledge, and backing of the officer corps, which was believed to be deeply compromised.

Idrissa Abdoulaye states that the US's military intervention in Burkina Faso both during and after interventionist was corrupted. Faced with an increasing number of attacks on military stations and patrols that have resulted in about 500 casualties over the past six years, tensions have only grown among security and defense troops on the front lines. More than fifty people died as a consequence of an attack on a gendarmerie post in Inata on November 14, 2021<sup>33</sup>. On 24<sup>th</sup> October 2022, 10 people were killed and 50 were injured in an assault in the northern city of Djibo. The "terrorist attack" targeted the 14th regiment army base in Djibo, which had been under a jihadist's barricade for the past three months<sup>35</sup>.

Following revelations regarding the military's living circumstances in Inata, which revealed that they were starved for weeks until the raid, outraged the citizens. The general public also began to more vocally demand that national authorities adequately fund security and defense

forces as military personnel began to openly express their displeasure, complaining about the insufficiency of resources and support to stop the development of violent extremism. Although it appears that the Burkinabe populace who demanded Kaboré's resignation and showed support for the military's long-standing underfunding prevailed in the recent coups, it is still unclear if the new military rulers will be able to solve these structural flaws and internal dissent. Because the security and defense forces are fragmented as of January 2023, not all military personnel may be loyal to the coup leader; in fact, analysts have warned against the possibility of greater disturbance. Dysfunctions in the military establishment, even if adequately addressed, are insufficient to account for the failures of counterterrorism measures. To put it another way, while security sector reform may be necessary as of 2023, it can only be a small element of a larger strategy that pays careful attention to the socio-political reasons that have allowed violent extremist organizations to establish themselves in the nation.

### **2.2.6 Shortfalls Of Western Intervention In Burkina Faso**

As of 31<sup>st</sup> January 2023, Burkina Faso's developments on continuous insecurity and terrorist attacks, throw into question the efficacy of the western states' involvement in Burkina Faso. According to Stephanie Savell contrary to the long-held belief, the rise of violent extremism in Burkina Faso is not just the product of a threat from outside that has spread from Mali <sup>36</sup>. Insular parts of the nation have proven to be a fruitful habitat for terrorist organizations, as they have benefited from deeply ingrained sociopolitical dynamics. Long-standing conflicts over access to land and natural resources, inflexible social hierarchies and socioeconomic divides, complaints about corrupt local officials, and distant links with central powers have all been exploited by violent extremist organizations. Military intervention has not only been ineffective but also counterproductive <sup>36</sup>.

Because security and defense personnel have been regularly accused of egregious human rights violations, there are now more complaints against the central government, which is perhaps why certain terrorist organizations in the area have support <sup>37</sup>. Accordingly, even though one of the main agitations of the mutineers was for more resources and assistance for the military forces battling violent extremist groups on the front lines, this may not produce

great results on the ground, as demonstrated by the situation in neighboring Mali. The security situation in Burkina Faso has not greatly improved despite the deployment of thousands of US forces there<sup>36</sup>. There is reason to believe that military intervention will only make the security situation worse. In addition to the possibility of a power vacuum developing as the junta strives to strengthen its hold on the country, there is a possibility of an absence of a clear plan to combat the violent extremist organizations operating there. The US-Burkina Faso security policy only focuses on the causes (counterterrorism) rather than the effects (human security) of the Burkina Faso crisis<sup>37</sup>. This has contributed to unexpected happenings of mass human rights violations and insecurity in the nation as of 31<sup>st</sup> January 2023.

### **2.3 Empirical Literature**

With continuous insecurity in Burkina Faso as of January 2023, Stephanie Savell examined the effects of U.S. security assistance and the profound costs of “helping” other nations wage their own “wars on terror”<sup>36</sup>. The study examines Burkina Faso, where the United States has been sponsoring and training counterterrorism efforts since 2009. Burkina Faso first started dealing with militant violence related to what locals refer to as "jihadism" in 2016. The focus of this article is on the U.S.'s engagement in the current conflict, which has its roots in complicated regional dynamics and involves several parties that have engaged in acts of violence. The author concludes that although it is not a major player on the ground, the U.S.'s increased grasp of counterterrorism and financial commitment to the cause have fueled the conflict's cascading destruction of Burkina Faso.

Rolandsen, Maggie, and William Reno study security Force Assistance to Fragile States. The authors state that Burkina Faso's approach to the current situation would have been far less military hadn't for the United States' led "war on terror"<sup>37</sup>. The military budget in Burkina Faso, whose growth over the previous few years has coincided with U.S. financial assistance, would have received less financing. Fewer Burkinabe troops and officers trained to fight against people the government labels terrorists would have existed. A lesser amount of machine guns, armored personnel carriers, and other military hardware would have been

present. On a bigger scale, the U.S. counterterrorism narrative has made it possible for the Burkinabe administration to defend assaulting the Fulani and limiting press freedom. The government has probably benefited from U.S. money in secret. As a result, militants have become more violent as a form of retaliation for government oppression, corruption, and inactivity against poverty. As a result of counterterrorism, for example, the Algerian branch of Al-Qaeda has increased, and expanded in Burkina Faso.

Murphy, Kyle's research on security fragmentation in the Sahel found that counterterrorism operations and weak government responses essentially created new combat zones<sup>38</sup>. Agile armed Islamist factions were scattered by Operation Serval from the north into central Mali and eventually to the neighboring countries of Niger and Burkina Faso. Extremist organizations are becoming more prevalent and more powerful in the tri-border region as a result of the US's ongoing military actions. In addition to other strategies, militant organizations use anti-French rhetoric to win over locals by appealing to their anger against the despised former colonizer. Since there is a perception that the West dominates national rulers while acting with blatant duplicity toward democracy and only accepting results that the West chooses, anti-Western sentiment plays a significant part in militant recruitment.

# CHAPTER THREE

## ANALYSIS

### 3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will analyze the security issues in Burkina Faso linking it to the role of the western states' intervention in the crisis over the period 2000-2023. I will start by analyzing the historical context-what are the problems and how did the problem start in Burkina Faso? I will then analyze the current state of affairs in Burkina Faso and then end with lessons for the immediate and intermediate future. The analysis was based on my readings on the topic in the extant literature.


The analysis is based on my readings on Burgess, Stephen's article on Military intervention in Africa: French and US approach compared; Romaniuk, Peter. "Assessing violent extremism: The case of Burkina Faso; Eizenga, Daniel. Military Coups in Burkina Faso. Democratization and Military Coups in Africa: Post-1990; Stephanie Savell: The Costs of United States' Post-9/11 Security Assistance: How Counterterrorism Intensified Conflict in Burkina Faso and Around the World. I also read Kate Mora's "US counterterrorism in the Sahel; James Border. "Counter-terrorism strategies after 9/11:" In Human Rights and America's War on Terror, Roland Bay US training of African forces and Eizenga, Daniel. "Burkina Faso: Military Responses to Popular Pressures.": Atta, Francis Kwabena. "Understanding Africa's terrorism debacle: a critical analysis of counterterrorism in Burkina Faso.": D'Amato, Silvia, and Edoardo Baldaro. "Counter-Terrorism in the Sahel: Increased Instability and Political Tensions; Burgess, Stephen. "Military intervention in Africa: French and the US approaches compared." : Romaniuk, Peter. "Assessing violent extremism: The case of Burkina Faso". The previous chapter helped me to understand concepts related to the topic. Based on the understanding of issues the author in this chapter provided a detailed examination of the security problem of Burkina Faso, how western states have contributed to the problem, how regional bodies have contributed to the problem, how Burkina Faso has contributed to the problem, current state of affairs in Burkina Faso and forecast of the future of Burkina Faso.

## 3.2 Historical Context

### 3.2.1 Problems Of Burkina Faso And How The Problem Started

Burkina Faso in the last few years has experienced coup after coup. The intricate and unpredictable crisis in Burkina Faso keeps getting worse and worse. Almost every region in Burkina Faso is seeing an escalating internal war. The war has displaced several people increasingly focusing on civilians. The two coups that were staged in 2022 made the already unstable security situation worse. The conflict is however most severe in bordering regions in the north and east of the country. As of January 2023, the government estimates that over 1.7 million people have been internally displaced due to conflict, including over 900,000 children. The Burkina Faso crisis continues to worsen. Sida estimates that 1.6 million people have been internally displaced as of 2022 and over 3.5 million people need humanitarian assistance <sup>39</sup>. The situation is getting worse daily with thousands of people losing their lives.

**Figure 3.1: Casualties in the Burkina Faso conflict from 2010-2021**



*Visual produced by José Luengo-Cabrera using publicly-available data by ACLED (2021).*

**Source: ACLED (2021).**


The pervasive violence has an impact on people's ability to meet their necessities and employment. In light of the ongoing hostilities, the authorities impose several restrictions.<sup>14</sup>



of the 45 provinces continue to be under a state of emergency. The Burkina Faso crisis is the outcome of succeeding governments' inability to manage the deteriorating security challenges in the country post-Kaboré took office as president in 2015 and inherited a security system that had deteriorated throughout his predecessor Compaoré's 27-year administration. Within the military, two groups had emerged: the president's security regiment, which under Compaoré enjoyed preferential treatment in terms of pay, benefits, training, and the rest of the military which was generally ignored. The violent uprisings in 2011 revealed that there were divisions between the senior and lower ranks of the army<sup>40</sup>. The highest-ranked officers came under special fire from the soldiers for taking advantage of the pervasive corruption to enrich themselves. Lacking any military training or combat experience and harboring mistrust for a group he believed may undermine his reign, Kaboré was powerless to undo the damage done by his predecessor. In 2016, he started an unending cycle of promotions and firings of top members of his defense ministries instead of reforming the army. Appointments made by the president appear to have been made based more on allegiance rather than aptitude. He relied on the gendarmerie, which increased hostilities and created mistrust among other army units. Due to their devotion to Compaoré, many of the best-trained officers from the previous administration who could have aided the army were forced to serve in other capacities.

President Kaboré used several tactics during his six years in office to stop the expansion of jihadist organizations, but he was unsuccessful. He concentrated on a military response from 2016 to 2019. Armed forces like the army and gendarmerie frequently mistreated and even killed citizens without being held accountable. Because of the brutality against the populace, several citizens joined the ranks of the jihadists, boosting rather than weakening these organizations. The Sahel area was first the exclusive focus of the jihadist threat, which later moved to the Centre-North, and Boucle du Mouhoun regions<sup>40</sup>.

**Figure 3.2: Public satisfaction rating for President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré's actions, on a scale of 0 to 10**



**Source: Institute for Security Studies graph, based on 2020 Présimètre data**

President Kaboré decided to mobilize citizens to combat terrorism in late 2019, in response to the army's signals of tiredness and the increasing number of troops refusing to deploy to the front. He also decided in response to the public's growing requests for increased security. The Koglweogo, village-based militias originally entrusted with combating major crime, evolved into the Volunteers for the Defense of the Motherland which frequently included former Koglweogo. These militias then became a part of the army. These state-armed and -trained people occasionally won battles but were unable to stem the tide. They even weakened societal cohesiveness and made the security situation worse in some regions.

A truce with the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), one of the two jihadist organizations active in the nation, prevented conflicts between this organization and the army from September 2020 to March 2021, leading to peace. In several communes in the provinces of Soum, Loroum, and Yatenga, agreements with JNIM were concluded with the support of local government officials and authorities. The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, which had not taken part in the ceasefire, began its attacks against the army and volunteer organizations

when the national ceasefire came to an end. JNIM, on the other hand, resumed its campaign of terrible brutality.

The jihadist organizations had used the ceasefire to advance farther south, notably in the Cascades region, and to solidify their position in other regions. When large-scale attacks resumed in June 2021, Kaboré decided to start a different program to reform the armed forces while also taking over the defense ministry. But much as December's restructuring to avoid a similar attack failed to prevent the January 2022 coup headed by Lieutenant-General Damiba, this reorganization did not stop the Inata attack. Captain Ibrahim Traore also overthrew his predecessor Lieutenant-General Damiba in a coup. On October 6, 2022, Traore also cited Damiba's alleged incapacity to tackle the ongoing Islamist insurgency in the north of Burkina Faso as the justification for the coup.

### **3.2.2 How Western State Have Contributed To The Problem Of Burkina Faso**

Soon after the 9/11 attack, the U.S. started to focus more on weak states. The Bush administration initially believed that developing military counterterrorism capabilities is the appropriate strategy to safeguard the interest of the US. The US feared that weak states may be home to Islamist extremists who may want to launch future attacks on the US<sup>26</sup>. The United States has kept a minimal military presence in Africa after World War II. However, this changed following the 9/11 attacks when the United States began to send troops to the region.

The United States military established Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 as a symbol of its intention to extend its activities in Africa, which had previously been run out from various command centers<sup>40</sup>. The US held the view that it had to act proactively and that nations where the vicious attack has not yet been recorded it was imported to step in to avert conflict. AFRICOM for example was formed to prevent war<sup>40</sup>. Similar to the active defense theory of the Cold War, which called for the U.S. to be able to strike the first salvo by using armed force at a distance it required that the U.S. act quickly to avert an attack.


This philosophy was described as a preemptive war after 9/11 by authorities, who held that the U.S. may initiate military operations to eliminate an apparent danger before its occurrence<sup>40</sup>.

The Pentagon has invested billions of dollars in its military operations in Burkina Faso over the last almost two decades. The U.S. government supplied the Burkinabe government with guns, ammunition, and vehicles after the country joined the TSTCP <sup>40</sup>. The US has also provided training for Burkinabe soldiers through at least 15 security aid programs: Every year, Burkina Faso received from the US vehicles, body armor, night vision gear, armored personnel carriers, generators, and guns <sup>40</sup>. The assistance from the US helped Burkinabe forces strengthen their peacekeeping capacity.

The military intelligence and counterterrorism training that Burkinabe soldiers and police officers received included leadership lessons which they took at Fort Leavenworth; they also received training on fundamentals of commanding infantry troops at Fort Benning in Kansas, as well as training on counterterrorism at bases in Florida and California <sup>40</sup>. The individual units trained by the United States as well as the training's curriculum vary. For instance, the Pentagon trained 16 soldiers in logistics management and trained 45 soldiers in human rights in 2018. Also, more than 40 gendarmes in battalions in Burkina Faso received undisclosed training <sup>40</sup>.

For advanced strategic training, other Burkinabe commanders were sent to the United States. Unsurprisingly, since 2009, the funding from the US on military gadgets to Burkina Faso has increased dramatically. For instance, the overall cost of training provided to Burkina soldiers by the US in 2018 was in the tens of thousands. Military operations for example surveillance and equipment have accounted for the majority of U.S. expenditure on Burkina Faso <sup>32</sup>. The military budget of the Burkinabe government has increased concurrently. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) data indicate a noticeable rise. The Burkinabe government invested over \$115 million in military equipment in 2009 and by 2019, that figure had increased to \$373 million <sup>32</sup>. The surge in American military aid to Burkina Faso has increased significantly since 2013 along with a sharp increase in the government's own military spending <sup>32</sup>.


**Figure 3.3: United States military spending on Burkina Faso**



Source: Security Assistance Monitor. Economic Aid Data, Burkina Faso, 2001-2019. <http://securityassistance.org/data/country/economic/country/2001/2019/all/Global/>

Before 2013, U.S. security assistance was small in comparison to economic assistance however there was a substantial increase from 2013 (see Figure 3.4, below).

**Figure 3.4. U.S. Security Assistance Compared to Other U.S. Economic Aid**



Source: Security Assistance Monitor. Economic Aid Data, Burkina Faso, 2001-2019. <http://securityassistance.org/data/country/economic/country/2001/2019/all/Global/>

In addition to providing funding to the Burkinabe military, the US has also established a vast network of covert sites, for example, the base at the Ouagadougou international airport. U.S. soldiers have engaged in several combat activities in Burkina Faso between 2013 and 2018.


Reuters reported that an amount of \$158.6 million was earmarked for security assistance to Burkina Faso in 2022 only for the US to withdraw the funding after the January 2022 coup<sup>41</sup>. The US over the years has played an integral role in the funding and training of Burkinabe soldiers regularly in counter-terrorism drills.

U.S. military in Burkina Faso prioritizes providing counterterrorism training rather than seeking to solve the critical structural issues, such as the country's extreme poverty, that fuel instability in Burkina Faso. The Departments of Defense and State have differed throughout the years on whether it was preferable to engage with partner nation military (the view of the State Department) or take direct action against terrorists with troops on the ground (the view of the Pentagon). Both options were in the end chosen. The US agreed on the broad objective to control, dislocate, humiliate, counter, and ultimately eliminate the risk posed by Al-Qaeda and its allies in Burkina Faso<sup>26</sup>. Whatever the case, the TSTCP's strategy was biased towards a focus on military intervention. Eizenga, Daniel compared this strategy to putting a band-aid on a chest wound in the context of a developing nation like Burkina Faso<sup>32</sup>.

Stephanie Savell investigated how U.S. military intervention affected Burkina Faso and other states' efforts to wage their wars on terror. The provision of funds for military purposes is raised in the report to support the claims of paper<sup>36</sup>. Stephanie Savell makes the case that even if the United States is not a major player on the ground, its increased knowledge of counterterrorism and financial investments have fueled the war that is currently wreaking havoc in Burkina Faso. Stephanie Savell asserts that the U.S. counterterrorism narrative and the associated institutional, political, and funding provided to Burkina Faso are used to suppress minority groups, defend authoritarianism, and promote illegal profiteering while ignoring poverty and other structural issues that contribute to dissatisfaction with the government<sup>36</sup>. As a result, what the US calls security support results in the opposite effect, creating a vicious circle. Military assistance by the US makes it possible for American corporations to sell Burkina Faso billions worth of weapons and military hardware<sup>36</sup>. These resources, institutional and political backing, and tools are frequently used by the government

to strengthen its capacity to suppress the populace and enrich small local elites. She further argues that Burkina Faso's approach to the current situation might have been far less militarized if it weren't for the U.S.-led war on terror<sup>35</sup>. The military budget in Burkina Faso, whose growth over the previous few years has coincided with U.S. financial assistance, would have received less financing. Less Burkinabe troops and officers trained to fight against people the government labels terrorists would have been few<sup>36</sup>. The government would have spent far less on guns, armored personnel carriers, and other military hardware. Politicians and high-rank military officers have benefited from U.S. funding of Burkina Faso secretly<sup>36</sup>. As a result, militants have become more violent as a form of retaliation for government oppression, corruption, and inactivity against poverty.

**Figure 3.5: Data On Military Expenditure (USD Million) By Burkina Faso**



**Source: Trading Economics. Burkina Faso Military Expenditure, 2012-2022.**  
<https://tradingeconomics.com/burkina-faso/military-expenditure>.

The article by Kate Mora on US counterterrorism in the Sahel argues that the government of Burkina Faso used the American counterterrorism narrative as justification for suppressing political opponents and restricting free expression in the country <sup>42</sup>. Kate Mora posits that American military training complicates national politics in Burkina Faso and fuels instability. She stated that Lt. Col. Isaac Zida, an army officer who overthrew President Compaoré in a coup in 2014, had participated in two counterterrorism training sessions sponsored by the U.S. government. The Presidential Guard and the 25th Parachute Regiment were two elite military organizations that were widely believed to be loyal to Compaoré and received training from the U.S. military. After its loyalist staged an unsuccessful coup, the Kaboré administration disbanded the Presidential Guard in 2016. Many of these expert fighters have turned renegade and are now taking part in militant bloodshed across the length and breadth of the country <sup>42</sup>. Compaoré, a former soldier himself, was thought to have connections to the army, which led Kaboré's administration to militarize the nation's gendarmes to combat jihadists. The gendarmes were reported to be trained by the US military. According to a Human Rights Watch investigation, gendarmes are accused of committing serious atrocities in Burkina Faso <sup>42</sup>. The Kaboré government used counterterrorism to strengthen authoritarian rule to solidify its grasp on power through undemocratic methods. Any journalism or public speech that might demoralize defense forces or compromise an intervention by security personnel was seen as terrorism, which was enacted by the Kabore government in June 2019. The law created a climate of fear and as a result, many individuals were reluctant to express their opinions openly.

James Border's paper on the US military action in Burkina Faso reechoes the sentiments expressed by the previous scholars similar to that of the earlier researchers <sup>43</sup>. James Border claims that the counterterrorism attack has resulted in "blowback," or the unintended adverse repercussions of clandestine operations, as described by the CIA. Armed strikes on alleged militant targets by countries with U.S. assistance only serve to bolster these organizations <sup>43</sup>. Militants usually find recruits by appealing to their desire for vengeance against the government for attacking their loved ones, friends, and neighbors. Furthermore, the official emphasis on warfare results in a failure to address the structural issues at play, which motivates many people to openly or at the very least covertly support violent organizations <sup>43</sup>.



People are extremely angry about the structural injustice, abject poverty, and public neglect in many areas, particularly rural ones, and this rage fuels the enlistment of militants. The government's persecution of the Fulani has provided jihadists in Burkina Faso with a potent tool for recruitment. Most people who join terrorist organizations do so because their relative was slain by security personnel rather than because they embrace jihad<sup>43</sup>.

Roland Bay adds that US intervention in Burkina Faso is partly to be blamed for the deteriorating security in Burkina Faso<sup>44</sup>. He contends that it is impossible to ignore the part the US counterterrorism campaign has played in Burkina Faso<sup>44</sup>. The Burkinabe government used counterterrorism to further its objectives, including the persecution of minorities, the concealment of the need for services for its citizens, the justification of undemocratic behavior, and the enrichment of the local elite. These injustices have only served to strengthen militant movements. In Burkina Faso, American foreign policy is disproportionately militaristic. Even though American authorities claim to be pushing for the achievement of the sustainable development goal, the U.S. continues to provide Burkina Faso with millions in security assistance each year and offers institutional support to the government to combat domestic terrorism.

Evidence of Burkina Faso adequately exposes the futility of armed U.S. counterterrorism assistance. The United States provided military training to the troops in Burkina Faso who were responsible for the recent coups including September 2022 led by Traore. The US has routinely dispatched small commando groups to assist, advise, and provide support to the Burkina Faso military since the early 2000s. Amid combat, the US supplied accouterments, planes, weapons, ammunition, and a wide range of training programs, such as Flintlock, which is managed by Special Operations Command Africa and aims to strengthen the counterterrorism capabilities of weak governments.

Western states' interventions in Burkina Faso only serve to legitimize tyranny, corruption, and human rights abuses. Burkina Faso's post-9/11 security assistance has to be reevaluated in 2023. The US needs to understand what it means to protect civilian life both abroad and overseas. The strategy of trying to impose control over Burkina Faso by the US must cease.

### **3.2.3 How Regional Bodies Have Contributed To The Burkina Faso Crisis**

Despite Burkina Faso being expelled from the African Union and ECOWAS as well as other sanctions, the crisis keeps getting worse. The sanctions have made Burkina Faso's already hazardous resource shortage worse. More than 2.6 million people are struggling with food security as a result of declining food output. More individuals now require aid as a result of the ECOWAS and AU sanctions. At the 33rd AU Summit in February 2020, the chairperson of the AU Commission informed African heads of state and government that "the continent has not shown solidarity to Burkina Faso <sup>45</sup>". This observation and the underwhelming African support for Burkina Faso were the driving forces behind this statement. The African leaders requested the AU Commission to create a framework for the potential deployment of a force composed of the Joint- Multinational Task Force (JMTF) and 3000 troops for six (6) months, to eliminate terrorist groups in Burkina Faso <sup>45</sup>.

The Peace and Security Council's early discussions on the issue did not have unanimous support among its members. ECOWAS, the G5 Sahel Secretariat, and the African Union Commission's Peace and Security Department have met several times since February 2020 to finalize the deployment's specifics. The AU Peace and Security Council's first discussions on the matter, meanwhile, did not get unanimous approval from all of its members because of apparent disagreements on how to carry out such a decision. The issues that came up were specifically connected to funding and soldier contributions, which would have an impact on the makeup of the force.

In this regard, concerns have been expressed over the African Standby Force's (ASF) utility and the reasons behind its non-mobilization, especially given that it has allegedly been fully operational since 2016. However, Africa continues to organize ad-hoc military operations to address the same circumstances for which the ASF was intended. Ad hoc responses are duplicated, rendering efforts to establish long-term systems ineffective and wasting resources that the continent cannot afford. To date, none of these problems, notably the sustainable funding source have been provided. Due to the uncertainty surrounding its long-term funding, the AU force is only intended to be deployed temporarily.

The AU Peace Fund, which has an estimated US\$150 million in assets, has also been tipped to prioritize funding for less expensive peace initiatives like preventative diplomacy and mediation. The fund was originally intended to finance 25% of African-led peace operations, but due to its being uncertain, it is not currently a viable financial option for any peace assistance operation. Additionally, operational issues with the force's leadership and possible integration into current systems remain unresolved. The AU and ECOWAS' inadequate response to the Burkina Faso situation exemplifies the coups that have occurred repeatedly in Burkina Faso because the coup leaders are not scared of the prospect of international sanctions.

The disjointed policies of regional bodies in the Burkina Faso crisis explain why a solution has not yet been found. For example on October 14, 2022, a new transition charter was agreed upon by Burkinabe political parties, social and religious organizations, and the security force leaders. The charter designated Traoré as transition president upheld the July 2024 deadline for the transition, and forbade the participation of transition officials in the next elections. On October 22, 2022, Traoré appointed Apollinaire Joachim Kyélem de Tambèla as interim prime minister. Shortly after, the new administration made a call for 50,000 citizen volunteers to assist in the war against jihadists. On December 14, 2022, Ghana accused Burkina Faso of working along with the Russian private security firm Wagner Group. While attending the US-Africa Summit in Washington, D.C., Ghana's President Nana Akufo-Addo said that Burkina Faso had "allocated" a gold mine to the Wagner Group as payment <sup>46</sup>. Such pronouncement does not help in finding a solution to the Burkina Faso crisis as it leads to mistrust among players.

### **3.2.4 How Burkina Faso Has Contributed To The Deteriorating Crisis**

As of January 2023, the response to the crisis by Burkina Faso has been at best inadequate and at worst destructive. The government is focusing on the symptoms rather than the root cause of the problem. Violence has a long history. The occurrence of violence is an indication of more serious, unsolved problems, such as inefficient government, a lack of employment prospects, porous regional borders, and abrupt climatic changes. Youth rage over those

concerns serves as a potent motivator for jihadi organizations looking to recruit among the local populace. Additionally, the government is doing the barest minimum and showing little interest in funding community programming or counter-insurgency operations in the country's violent north and east. Government representatives have subsequently disregarded international calls for increased funding to address the crisis' fundamental political and economic causes post-Blaise Campaore regime (2014-2022).

Additionally, the government has permitted security service abuse and ethnic militia expansion, which has helped radicals enlist recruits<sup>47</sup>. A significant aspect contributing to the crisis is the impunity of government employees who abuse citizens<sup>47</sup>. After disbanding the elite Presidential Security Regiment in 2015, which made up around 10% of the whole military, Burkina Faso was forced to rely on the less skilled police force and gendarmes to combat the growing extremist threats. This security personnel is accused of carrying out mass arrests and summary killings. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the majority of victims of security force abuses were ethnic Fulani, and the maltreatment encouraged Fulani people to join extremist organizations. The koglwéogós, local militias supported by the government, also appear to have targeted Fulanis under the presumption that all Fulanis support terrorist organizations.

Furthermore, as of 31<sup>st</sup> January 2023, the government of Burkina Faso instead of having a coherent security force that could be accountable for their activities is rather campaigning for mass recruitment of civilians who get trained in a few weeks with arms to fight terrorists in the country. This undoubtedly will increase the mass displacement population and turn the country into unstoppable attacks since most of the able youth will be trained to shoot and kill in the name of defense both during and after conflict.

Lastly, Burkina Faso's borders are porous and could be passed by easily. This has also led to arms proliferation and terrorists from neighboring countries like Mali where there's incessant insecurity to easily cross the border to expand their ideology and take advantage of the conflict-ridden nation and its neighbors<sup>48</sup>. If there are no stringent measures on the front there would always be diverse security issues in the country<sup>48</sup>.

### **3.3 Current State Of Affairs In Burkina Faso**

On January 16, 2023, the suspected rebels of the country abducted 50 women on the northern side of Burkina Faso but all the victims were later retrieved and safe according to Aljazeera <sup>49</sup>. Intimidation and attacks by violent armed men, which target vulnerable citizens, state symbols, organizations, chiefs, military, and politicians have been more frequent in Burkina Faso <sup>47</sup>. Since 2014, Burkina Faso has experienced an increase in the frequency of terrorist strikes. The country's northern regions, which border Mali and Niger, are especially vulnerable to war spillover. A state of emergency has been imposed in several provinces since 2018, giving the security forces enormous powers and limiting people's freedoms of movement and assembly <sup>47</sup>. The security situation in Burkina Faso has significantly deteriorated as attacks by armed Islamist groups have increased, wrongful killings by government militias and state security forces during counterterrorism operations have persisted, and the humanitarian situation has gotten worse. Over 350 civilians have been killed in the Greater Sahara by Islamist armed groups affiliated with Islamic State (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda since 2016. These militia groups launch assaults on military installations and civilian targets <sup>47</sup>. Many individuals are kidnapped by armed Islamist organizations from villages, buses, and camps for displaced people.

Fighters for Islamist organizations torch towns, marketplaces, and commercial establishments, kidnap and rape many women, enforce their interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) through tribunals that disregard international norms for fair trials, and bar farmers from entering their fields. These armed organizations have mostly been carrying out major human rights violations against civilians and state security personnel, which has resulted in enormous population displacement and inter-communal conflicts. The increased security dangers have caused Burkina Faso to become more militarized as of 31<sup>st</sup> January 2023.

The State is attempting as of January 2023 to make up for its failings by extending the availability of guns for purposes of national civil defense as armed organizations recruit and arm (male) citizens. As a result, Burkina Faso's chances for peace and prosperity are being threatened by regional human security. For instance, the US invested \$5 million in counterterrorism funding to strengthen law enforcement's ability to investigate complex

terrorism cases in 2020 and invested \$2 million in training programs to combat improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to counter the activities of Islamist groups. 2019 saw the US committing \$69 million to Burkina Faso's security, program support, and humanitarian aid.

The US is assisting in equipping and developing the capabilities of the armed forces. This is a dangerous endeavor because management and accountability issues aren't given enough attention in a nation where such issues are seen as being corrupt, politicized, and power-abusive. According to Security Assistance Monitor, almost 13,000 soldiers, or nearly all of the formal active military ranks of the United States, were trained in Burkina Faso. The U.S. weapons industry's ambition to keep making money from the U.S. government's export of its military-industrial security paradigm to new markets is tied to maintaining the flow of military assistance.

A large portion of the U.S. security aid system is structured as grant-purchasing programs, in which recipient nations utilize U.S. taxpayer money to purchase military supplies, training, and other security assistance from American producers and contractors. These militarized initiatives are occasionally the U.S.'s primary means of international cooperation, which strengthens the ties and influence of the militaries of both nations to maintain these initiatives. The United States has frequently participated in state and non-state abuses of civilians by pursuing short-term military objectives that are separated from the needs of the local community.

The Burkinabe military and its conscripted informal militia have been credibly accused of prevalent attacks against civilians, several of them which are targeted killings and joint retribution against the ethnic Fulani people, a community with a majority of the people being Muslim. These allegations are shared by other Sahelian security forces receiving U.S. security assistance. According to some reports, the military is responsible for half of all incidents of civilian killings in 2021. And nearly as expected, a U.S.-trained Burkinabe military commander orchestrated a coup d'état against the country's democratically elected president in 2021, as predicted by the scholarly literature on the effects of American military training abroad. The latest coup in January 2022 and October 2022 were also all organized by soldiers that had received training from the US. The October 2022 coup was staged with the promise to restore security to Burkina Faso however early happenings suggest challenging security time

ahead. On 24th December 2022, 10 people were also killed and several others injured when a bus the victims were traveling hit a roadside bomb in eastern Burkina Faso.

### **3.4 Forecast Of Security Situation In Burkina Faso**

Captain Ibrahim Traore, current interim President of Burkina Faso as of January 31, 2023, is adamant about doing things his way as long as he thinks it's essential and has the public's backing. Traore believes a military officer would be more equipped to address the issue than a civilian leader in the face of growing insecurity. Democracy will not replace security as the foremost priority. Traore is consequently likely to continue in power and delay the country's transition to democracy as agreed by all parties by 2024. If Traore does not provide results in eight to twelve months, he could be sitting on a time bomb as well. A new wave of protests might threaten his reign if the security situation does not improve, which is extremely likely. This is because the people of Burkina Faso are hungry for peace and security, and the military forces are also ready to overthrow Traore if security is not restored as promised him. There's also a huge competition, hungry for power, and distrust among the US-equipped Burkina Faso military who may feel they are competent to restore peace.

Following this, four other situations are possible: First, the Traore regime might be replaced by a civilian government which is less likely. The second possibility is that other senior military officers might take over leading to a never-ending cycle of the coup in Burkina Faso. The third possibility, which is likely, is that Mr. Traore will take a more radicalized position and further solidify military authority. The fourth which is also likely is that Traore will contract the Russian mercenaries to help fight the terrorists and after have solidification for extended military rule.

I believe that the third and fourth possibilities are more likely to occur. Similar geographical changes and winning the trust of Burkinabes as he promised are what lead me to believe this. For instance, the Malian counterpart who vowed to restore the rule of law, contracted Russian mercenaries to fight the rebels, and of which I believe Traore will follow as well looking at the country's incapacitation to fight terrorists. The Malian's ruling authorities have announced their desire to extend the political transition phase by up to five years, postponing the

parliamentary and presidential elections that were originally slated for February 2022. Traore is expected to follow the same line as Mali. Also, a scenario with an established military government would therefore be assumed to be feasible should mercenaries can defeat rebels for the citizens to back an extended rule of Traore. Burkina Faso will likely form an alliance of military regimes with Mali to assist one another against any sanctions imposed by regional and international allies.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

#### **4.2 Is Human Insecurity The Main Reason For Western States' Intervention In Burkina Faso?**

The study found that human insecurity is not the main reason for western states' interventions in Burkina Faso. This is because the human security strategy prioritizes preventing violence by addressing the triggers of violence<sup>30</sup>. Beebe Shannon and Mary Kaldor link the lack of human security to the issue of terrorism and other dangers to global security. They argue that terrorism is a result of a lack of human security. This confirms that the main reason for western states' interventions in Burkina Faso is counterterrorism and not human security. The US believed that developing military counterterrorism capabilities is the appropriate strategy to safeguard the interest of the US. The US feared that terrorist groups could use Burkina Faso as a conduit to attack the US and its interest. Therefore by giving training to Burkina Faso soldiers, the US was convinced that the soldiers could tame terrorist groups operating in the country. However, this training backfired as it rather produced militants and coup makers constantly disturbing the peace and security of Burkina Faso. Stephanie Savell also agrees that the main reason for western states' interventions in Burkina Faso was not on human insecurity but for counterterrorism motive<sup>36</sup>.

Eizenga, Daniel similarly stated that Burkina Faso gained importance as a result of claims that the security of America was threatened by weak regimes in West Africa<sup>32</sup>. Due to its incapacity to provide for the basic needs of its population and lack of total control over its borders, Burkina Faso was seen by the US as acting as both a haven and a breeding ground for terrorist organizations. Burkina Faso became a top focus on the US security agenda. The United States noticed that Burkina Faso was becoming a haven for terrorists. Terrorist organizations took advantage of Burkina Faso, a nation with poor institutions, few resources, a weak military, persistent imbalances in the distribution of income, and a high unemployment rate. Extreme poverty, disease, terrorism, and political unrest have all been reported in Burkina Faso, which poses a severe danger to the security of western governments. Therefore,

Western nations viewed military involvement as a powerful leverage tool that could be used to persuade Burkina Faso to comply with US demands as the US wins the fight against terrorism.

### **4.3 What Are The Security Implications Of Western states' interventions In Burkina Faso?**

The study found that western states' interventions in Burkina Faso have worsened the security situation in the country. The security in Burkina Faso has become porous due to western states' interventions. The recent coups in Burkina Faso are evidence of how precarious the security situation there is. Similarly, D'Amato, Silvia, and Edoardo Balduino discovered that western state meddling has deteriorated Burkina Faso's political system <sup>40</sup>. The struggle against terrorism made western state armed forces more visible in the area. Because it was concerned about national security, the US government focused on nations that are susceptible to terrorist infiltration. Burkina Faso has experienced greater conflict as a result of US participation. D'Amato, Silvia, and Edoardo Balduino argue that the war on terrorism and western powers' participation has worsened hostilities and made natives more violent <sup>40</sup>.

Although the study found that western states' interventions in Burkina Faso have worsened, other scholars disagree and report that had it not been for the intervention of the US in Burkina Faso, the security would have been worse. The proponents of this argument state that the military coup that took place in January and September 2022, was the result of the populace's mounting frustration with the government's inability to find effective counterterrorism measures and that, in the absence of US military intervention in Burkina Faso, terrorist groups would have grown out of control and taken over the entire nation. Terrorist assaults in Burkina Faso have increased dramatically. The existence of many al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations, the Islamic State, as well as the Burkinabe group Ansarul Islam, has undoubtedly presented challenges for the nation. Burkina Faso had the biggest yearly rise (+590%) in terrorism-related fatalities in 2019 globally. Up until 2019, the Liptako-Gourma region along the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso border was generally free of attacks from extremist groups. However, since then, attacks have moved to previously untouched areas of the nation. It supports the claim that if the US had received full assistance from regional organizations and the

international community when it expanded its counterterrorism operations in Burkina Faso, the number of terrorist organizations present there would have significantly decreased by now.

Linger Bats also added that it is not accurate for one to say that western states' interventions in Burkina Faso have led to insecurity in the country <sup>40</sup>. He argues that the training given to the soldiers was normal training given to regular army officers. The same training is given to soldiers from Cote D'ivoire, Ghana, etc. but how come these soldiers have not taken the gun to overthrow the government or the training leading to increase attacks by terrorist groups? The fact that some military officers that have benefited from such training have organized coups in Burkina Faso does not mean that the US can be blamed for volatile security in the country.

Cabot Answell makes the point that rather the US intervention in Burkina Faso should be applauded <sup>51</sup>. He states that the US has been putting pressure on the coup leaders to hand power to an elected government. The US has been putting pressure on the coup leaders to return the country to democratic rule. The US has tied Burkina Faso's economic support to the transition to democratic rule. Western states promote democracy by offering assistance to civil society groups and the media to trumpet the need for military leaders to hand over power.

#### **4.4 Lessons For The Future**

The U.S. has mostly emphasized ideology as the root of violence (just as it did with communism during the Cold War). The inability to take into account the reasons why militants in different contexts see violence as their best option for achieving their political goals frequently results in an incorrect diagnosis of the issue and possible solutions to the current situation. This strategy disregards the social and economic factors that might lead to conflict in Burkina Faso. Rarely do US policymakers consider employing force and coercion to settle disputes a successful strategy. The basic question of whether militarization responses to political violence work should be one that US officials start to take a second look at. The US's counterterrorism policy is influencing coups and instability in Burkina Faso. The latest coups in Burkina Faso prolong the nation's protracted suffering from violent extremism, civil

conflicts, and poor government. US military-led intervention has not been able to end the crisis in Burkina Faso.

The U.S. must have a policy change that focuses on the causes rather than the effects of the Burkina Faso crisis. The United States must see Burkina Faso as one of the worst security crises in the world, with a large area of the nation being destabilized by bad governance rather than some irrational propensity for violence. Generations of US-equipped hungry for power authoritarian rule and corruption have undermined the country's human security policy. These governance failings have given rise to violent extremism, internal displacement, migration, inter-communal strife, and coups. The idea of the "War on Terror" has to be replaced because the vulnerabilities of the twenty-first century cannot be addressed by the state-based security systems of the twentieth century<sup>30</sup>.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### **Conclusion**

Western states' interventions in Burkina Faso have had wide security implications. The security of Burkina Faso as of 31<sup>st</sup> January 2023 is fragile with several civilians migrating to neighboring countries like Ghana to seek refuge, being abducted by rebels, losing their lives, and many others internally displaced. While preventing terrorist attacks has been the primary goal of the Western State's interventions in Burkina Faso, the country has witnessed several extremist attacks and two major coups in 2022. It seems that the western state's interventions are producing troops who launch military coups against the democratically elected civilian-led government in Burkina Faso. The US foreign policy in Burkina Faso is too militaristic. Even though U.S. officials claim to be working on Burkina Faso's development, the US continues to give the country millions in security aid annually and offers institutional support for its domestic fight against terrorist organizations. U.S. counterterrorism activities in Burkina Faso have been unproductive as it rather breeds dictatorship, forced migration, violations of human rights, and coups. Neither the United States nor any western state is there to help Africa or be interested in the affairs of Burkina Faso or Africa unless they have an interest or push their agenda. The U.S. is therefore partially to blame for the current level of violence, death, and displacement in Burkina Faso because it encouraged, supported, and provided funding for the military strategy of Burkina Faso.

### **Recommendations**

The paper recommends that Burkina Faso should promote regional integration. Regionalism is the pursuit of mutual benefit in one or more areas by states in close-knit, geographically defined regions. Most of the successful examples of regionalism defer collective decision-making to mechanisms that support, rather than replace, national institutions. Regionalism will ensure that there are strong partners in political relations (based on complementary and shared principles). The goal of cooperative security is to have Burkina Faso cooperate with other governments in the region to find a lasting solution to the crisis.

Further, western states' interventions can be minimized in Burkina Faso when it is economically independent. Burkina Faso must create a competitive private sector able to create jobs and stimulate growth. Investment in the private sector is the way to go as it will produce the required job opportunities for the youth of Burkina Faso. When Burkina Faso is economically independent, there wouldn't be the need to rely on western states for support. Long-term investments in the private sector, industry, infrastructure, and agriculture will specifically alleviate food insecurity and produce the required job opportunities for young Burkinabes. When the youth has meaningful jobs, terrorist groups will not be able to recruit them for their activities and thus reducing armed attacks in Burkina Faso.

The US should rather intervene in human security aspects like agriculture, health, transportation, humanitarian intervention, education, technology, climate change, mineral resource processing, etc. but not militarily seeing that the result of military intervention yields adverse results not only Burkina Faso but to the entire region. This will help the nation to restructure its system when the young and the ordinary Burkinabe is educated, socially integrated, and stable and has food to eat. As the saying goes, a hungry man is an angry man, if the US rather invests economically rather than military there won't be young-hungry protesters willing to join terrorist groups or overthrow the government to cause insecurity.

Additionally, Burkina Faso and the regional body should invest in border security to prevent terrorist attacks/invasion/expansion and arms proliferation into the country or the region which causes insecurity. With huge investment, education, shared intelligence, etc. by the region, it would be very difficult to be penetrated by unauthorized persons or terrorists to expand their ideologies and violate human rights and human security.

Finally, the Burkina Faso government should not arm civilians or recruit the youth in the name of fighting against terrorists since this will lead to unending insecurity in the nation. As Thomas Sankara said, "he who feeds you controls you", national security should be invested by the Burkina Faso government itself to improve the military might and other security agencies of the country instead of relying on western or foreign private security assistance to keep their nation safe(self-defense).

## **Recommendation For Further Studies**

The health, educational, social, legal, technological, and ecological impacts of western states' interventions in Burkina Faso were not examined by the study. Therefore it is recommended that future scholars should look at the implications of the western states' intervention on these variables of Burkina Faso. The crisis has had impacts on these variables yet there is a dearth of knowledge on the subjects. Conducting further studies in these areas will help to fill the literature gap. It will also help us to know the extent of the Burkina Faso crisis on different facets of life and not just on security.

In addition, while there are empirical and case studies that examine the western states' interventions in Burkina Faso, many do not emphasize how the western states' interventions influence domestic dynamics. The localized nature of the conflict in Burkina Faso needs to be explored. Questions are raised about Burkina Faso's domestic dynamics and aspects of western governmental actions. The mere fact that the US is meddling in Burkina Faso's internal affairs might encourage citizens to embrace terrorist organizations. The level of support that terrorist organizations obtain as well as their capacity to violently defy a state's authority can be influenced by the local population. Future research should broaden its focus to look at how residents contributed to the war in Burkina Faso. It is crucial to consider how non-state actors are involved in the Burkina Faso conflict.

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