2009

Between the Hammer and the Anvil. The Cyprus Question and Greek Foreign Policy from the Treaty of Lausanne to the 1931 Revolt

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http://hdl.handle.net/11728/7388

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THE HISTORY of the Cyprus Question has attracted the attention of international scholarship, both from a local as well as an international point of view. The vast majority of these studies, however, focus on the period after the end of World War II, and mostly after 1950, when the Cyprus Question hit the international headlines. Focus on this context tends to neglect the interwar period, and in particular the years between the conclusion of the Lausanne Peace Treaty (24 July 1923) and the 1931 Revolt of the Greek Cypriots against British rule. This essay, based primarily on research in the archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry, aims to fill part of this gap, focusing on the way Greek diplomacy viewed the issue at a time of transition, both regionally and in terms of Greece's foreign policy aims.

The essay seeks to answer a series of questions. Did Greek diplomacy have a coherent and consistent strategy in relation to the Cyprus Question from 1923 to 1931? If so, what necessitated the adoption of such a strategy? Did the Greek government interfere in the island's internal developments? Did it get carried away by the repeated Greek Cypriot demands for union with Greece, or did it adopt a more realistic approach? And, most importantly, was Athens in favor of a "radical" or did it prefer a "progressive" solution to the Cyprus problem?

The Lausanne Peace Treaty

When the Peace Conference of Lausanne formally opened in November 1922, Great Britain had already been in control of Cyprus for
almost forty-five years. The island had been a part of the Ottoman Empire since the late sixteenth century. In 1878, the Sublime Porte ceded the administration of the island to the British Empire in exchange for London's agreement to help maintain the integrity of Ottoman dominions against Russia. Officially, Cyprus still remained under the rule of the Sultan, but it was obvious that the British had no intention of returning it to the Ottoman Turks. This intention became clear on 5 November 1914, the same day that the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers, when Britain decided to annex Cyprus by Order in Council, thus unilaterally terminating Ottoman sovereignty over the island. A year later, the British government offered Cyprus to Greece in order to persuade the latter to help Serbia against Bulgaria, but the Greek government refused the offer, which was never again officially repeated.

In Lausanne, Great Britain was firmly determined to retain its sovereignty over the island. The conclusion on 10 August 1920 of the Peace Treaty of Sevres, even though never ratified, nevertheless paved the way toward this firm British determination. Greece, the only country that could claim Cyprus on the basis of self-determination for the island's population (four fifths of which was actually Greek), was in no position to assert such a claim. Following the Asia Minor collapse in September 1922, the Greek government not only found itself in almost total diplomatic isolation, but, moreover, it was looking to Great Britain as the only Great Power capable of standing by Greece during the Peace Conference. In this context, it was clear that the Greek delegation in Lausanne, under the guidance of former prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos, had no intention of making any reference to the subject of Cyprus.

From Venizelos's point of view, any Greek claim concerning Cyprus would risk jeopardizing the fate of Greek-British relations at a time when the diplomatic support of London was crucial to Athens. For this reason, he declined the offer made to him by the Greek Cypriots to represent them at the conference, emphasizing the great difficulties of such a mission. Venizelos's message was clear and charted Greek foreign policy on the subject for years to come: maintaining British friendship and support was to Greece more important than the fulfillment of Greek Cypriots' national aspirations. The Greek Cypriots, in other words, should not expect any immediate step on the part of the Greek government. Thus, the dream of enosis (union) of Cyprus with Greece would have to be postponed until more favorable circumstances arose, as the annexation of the island to Great Britain was recognized internationally through Article 20 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, according to which Turkey accepted the 1915 unilateral Act of Annexation.

**Constitutional Reforms (1925)**

The conclusion of the Lausanne Peace Treaty itself did not constitute a change in the status quo of Cyprus, nor did it mark a change in the way Athens dealt with the whole matter. Following Venizelos's policy as set in 1922–23,
the Greek government was not willing to broach again the Cyprus Question and advised the Greek Cypriots to pursue internal changes in the administration of their homeland. The fact, however, that the British—almost immediately after Lausanne—had refused to take into serious consideration the Greek Cypriot proposals for administrative changes that would enable the implementation of a wider measure of self-government on the island, gave little hope that such an approach could bear any fruit. Indeed, when in 1925 the British government decided to reform the 1882 constitutional arrangement, it was made obvious that London was not prepared to grant the Greek Cypriot majority any more privileges than previously. Cyprus became a Crown Colony, and the high commissioner was granted the title of governor. And even though the elected Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council were increased from nine to twelve, while the Turkish Cypriots retained their three seats, the British official members were also increased to nine in order to deny the Greek Cypriots a parliamentary majority.

According to Mihail Sakellariadis, the Greek consul in Larnaca, the reform was nothing more than a change in words, while the provision for the creation of twelve, rather than three, electoral districts seemed an attempt to curtail the national unity of the Greek Cypriots. According to him, it was likely that in the subsequent elections, there would be more than one Greek Cypriot candidate in each of these districts. Some candidates might seek the support of the governor, who would provide it only to those willing to cooperate closely with the British authorities. This would split the united Greek Cypriot front. In other words, Sakellariadis believed that only by avoiding political division, would the Greek Cypriots stand a chance of improving their position within the existing system.

In general, Sakellariadis's views expressed Greek disappointment over the constitutional reforms, even though not everybody agreed with his pessimism. The Greek embassy in London, for example, believed that the new constitution partially satisfied many of the older Greek Cypriot demands, in a way that in reality constituted a firm step to the final union of the island with Greece. In any case, the difference of opinion between the Greek embassy in London and the Greek consulate in Cyprus—obvious in many other cases in the years to come—was a result of the difference in points of view between the two; being in the center of the British Empire, the embassy always looked at the bigger picture and was naturally more interested in maintaining good Greek-British relations; on the other hand, the consulate, closer to the Cyprus problem itself, tended to examine it with a local, and sometimes more sentimental, approach.

Neither of these two views, however, could be used as a summary of Greek foreign policy on the Cyprus problem. A much more detailed and coherent approach to this policy can be found in a long confidential memorandum sent in 15 November 1925 by Greek foreign minister Loukas Kanakaris Roufos to the Greek consulate in Larnaca. In this memorandum, Roufos clearly stated that the total satisfaction of the desires of the Greek Cypriots was so closely related to the strategic conditions in the Mediterranean Sea, that it would be a dangerous utopia to seek any immediate solution which would not take into consideration the general diplomatic situation. In other words, he
believed that as long as the British considered Cyprus vital in their colonial system, and at the same time the international trend after World War I was in favor of the maintenance of the territorial status quo, any attempt on the part of Greece to change the status quo in Cyprus was condemned to failure.\(^\text{10}\)

This approach, of course, did not mean that Athens had completely abandoned its interest in the Cyprus Question, nor that it had abandoned "the hopes of the [Greek] Cypriot people." On the contrary, Roufcs explained that this national goal always remained the final objective of every thought and action on the part of the Greek government. In this context, Roufcs instructed Sakellariadis to take any suitable step, without of course provoking a reaction from the British authorities, in order to convince the Greek population of the island that the Greek government would always stand by their side, and that there were still hopes for a future fulfillment of its national aspirations. In the meantime, however, the Greek Cypriots should take part in the elections, thus achieving little by little a greater measure of self-governance.\(^\text{11}\)

In reality, Roufcs was in total accordance with the basic principles of post-Lausanne Greek foreign policy on the Cyprus Question. The Greek government remained reluctant to intervene, suggesting that the only practical approach, for the time being, was Greek Cypriot cooperation—at least up to a point—with the British authorities, hoping that this would gradually lead to new reforms on the part of London. Enosis was, anyway, out of the question, as the international situation—not to mention British strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea—was not favorable for such a demand. Roufcs's views, in other words, were basically almost identical to those of Venizelos some years earlier: Athens should not let itself get carried away by the sentiments of Greek Cypriot (nor mainland Greek) public opinion and run the risk of jeopardizing general Greek interests by creating problems in its relations with London.

**Appointment of Sir Ronald Storrs as Governor of Cyprus**

The 1925 constitutional reforms, however limited from a practical point of view, were soon followed by a change in personnel. In November 1926 the new governor, Sir Ronald Storrs, arrived in Cyprus. Storrs was known as a Philhelle and admirer of the ancient Greek culture and spirit,\(^\text{12}\) and inspired new hopes for changes on the internal level. Even Sakellariadis did not hesitate to mention that within the very first months after his appointment, the new governor, in an attempt to foster ties with local politicians, had inaugurated a much less obdurate political line toward the natives compared with his predecessor. But Sakellariadis was not absolutely convinced of Storrs's good intentions, suspecting that the objective of the new governor was to silence little by little the national aspirations of the Greek Cypriot majority.\(^\text{13}\)

Regardless of Sakellariadis's doubts and fears, it soon became obvious that Storrs was determined to justify the hopes which were created immediately after his appointment. In this context, his most spectacular achievement was undoubtedly his decisive contribution to the abolition of the Tribute,\(^\text{14}\) an
annual sum of initially £92,800, which was later reduced to £42,800, to pay for the Ottoman debts raised in Great Britain.\textsuperscript{15} The Tribute constituted a matter of great importance for the local population. Thus, the governor managed to further improve his image among the Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish;\textsuperscript{16} and the appeal sent to him on 5 September 1927 by members of the Legislative Council left no doubts about that:

We are most grateful to Your Excellency for the great care and consideration which prompted your appeal to relieve Cyprus from the heavy burden of the Turkish Debt charge. The happy answer of the Imperial Government has fulfilled all Cypriot aspirations concerning this burden, and in the apt words of your Excellency, spring has indeed been restored to the year.\textsuperscript{17}

But the good days were not to last. The year 1928 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the British occupation of Cyprus, and Storrs wanted to celebrate the Jubilee. But the Greek Cypriots, who wanted to manifest their devotion to the ideal of enosis, refused to participate in the celebrations,\textsuperscript{18} whereas the Greek Cypriot press accused the governor of wanting only to promote his personal prestige.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, the Jubilee constituted, in an ironic sense, probably the first important point of friction between Storrs and the Greek Cypriot political elite. The Greek government, taking every precaution not to appear as intervening in the affair, advised the Greek Cypriots to abstain from any riots and to avoid writing offensive articles against the British in their newspapers.\textsuperscript{20} Whether following the advice from Athens or not, Greek Cypriots, indeed, avoided further exacerbating the tension, but at the same time appeared determined to appeal once again to the British government, asking for enosis with Greece.\textsuperscript{21} The result was, nevertheless, the same as in the past: London once again disappointed the Greek Cypriots,\textsuperscript{22} clearly stating that the matter was closed, once and for all.

**Quest for Enosis: Greek Cypriot Deputation to London, October 1929\textsuperscript{23}**

The rejection of the Greek Cypriot demand for enosis with Greece was followed closely by the rise to power in Greece of Eleftherios Venizelos, a fact that caused enthusiasm among the Greek Cypriots. Venizelos, however, was not prepared to encourage the impression that he was willing to bring the Cyprus Question before the British government. On the contrary, when he visited London in October 1928, he not only assured British officials that he would not discuss Cyprus, but also added that the Cyprus Question was an internal British issue concerning London and the Cypriots, not London and Athens.\textsuperscript{24} The message was simple and clear: Venizelos was determined to follow the course he had inaugurated in Lausanne some years earlier, according to which a solution to the Cyprus problem favorable to Greek interests could be achieved only gradually and through cooperation of the Greek Cypriots with the British authorities.
Naturally, this approach caused bitter disappointment for many Greek Cypriots, who would not accept anything less than enosis. In fact, when Storrs returned to Cyprus in 18 October 1928 after a trip to Great Britain, the Greek Cypriot mayor of Famagusta did not hesitate to close his welcome speech by referring to the desires of his compatriots for union with Greece. Greek Cypriot nationalism was on the rise, and almost nothing could be done to silence it. The situation further worsened after the publication of the new Penal Code of Cyprus. The Cypriots reacted against it on the one hand because of its inhuman articles (some of which, for example, permitted tortures like whipping), and on the other as a result of the unilateral way it was implemented, since it had not been adopted by the Legislative Council.

The deterioration of relations between the colonial government and the Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council due to the new Penal Code constituted a great danger to the limited freedoms granted to the Cypriot people by the 1925 constitutional reform, as Dionisios Inglessis, the successor of Sakellariadis in Larnaca, clearly pointed out. It was evident that the Greek Cypriots were determined to stick firmly to their demand for enosis, a fact that was further underlined in January 1929 when Archbishop Kyrillos sent a memorandum to the British Parliament, as well as religious leaders and the British press, asking again for union with Greece.

In this context, the victory of the Labour Party in the British elections of 30 May 1929 seemed to open a window of opportunity for the Greek Cypriots in their quest for enosis. After all, Labour was thought to be less reluctant toward this demand and their leader, the new British prime minister Ramsay MacDonald, had publicly stated during the International Socialist Congress held in Berne in 1919 that he would consent to the self-determination of the Cypriot people if his party were ever to rise to power. Thus, almost immediately after the British elections and the formation of the new government, the Greek Cypriots decided to compile a new memorandum to the secretary for the colonies, asking for union with Greece. For this reason, the bishop of Kition Nikodemos (Mylonas) and the lawyer Stavros Stavrinakis, both members of the Legislative Council, were entrusted to travel to London, where they would act as ambassadors of the Greek Cypriot people.

The compilation of such a memorandum was not, of course, anything new, as similar attempts had been made in the past. For the first time, however, after the conclusion of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, the Greek Cypriots were asking from the Greek government to help them, by recommending the two ambassadors to prominent British personalities, in order to achieve the desired goal. Inglessis was, nevertheless, extremely reluctant toward such mediation on the part of Athens, as he feared that it would be extremely difficult to keep it a secret, primarily because of the tendency of the Greek Cypriot politicians not to keep secrets.

Inglessis’s views naturally affected the Greek government, and so a few days before Nikodemos and Stavrinakis arrived in London, Athens instructed the Greek ambassador, Dimitrios Kaklamanos, to help the Greek Cypriot deputation, transmitting at the same time Inglessis’s fears and doubts. For his part, Kaklamanos seemed willing to offer his help to the deputation, but on condition that he would first be convinced of the discretion of its members.
He also added that the deputation should seek the consideration of all political parties in Great Britain, not just Labour, because, even if the latter were ready to accept some of the Greek Cypriot proposals, it would be almost impossible to do so without the consent of the rest. Finally, Kklamanos underlined that the Greek Cypriot memorandum should be moderate, avoiding remarks that would make a bad impression on the British.35

The Greek government was in full agreement with Kklamanos’s suggestions;36 and when the Greek Cypriot deputation reached London and met with the Greek ambassador, they were also convinced about the necessity to follow his line.37 In the meantime, Venizelos had already avoided meeting the deputation in France in order not to give rise to speculations on the part of London.38 Under these circumstances, the memorandum, which was handed over to Lord Passfield, secretary of state for the colonies and dominions, was indeed moderate, asking Great Britain “to follow her own generous precedent associated with the Ionian Islands” in the form of allowing the “political union” of Cyprus with Greece or, alternatively, of granting a form of responsible governance;39 but the answer was once again negative, leaving little if any hope to the Greek Cypriots even for the possibility of achieving self-governance.40

The rejection of their demands was for the Greek Cypriots another disappointment, which would soon increase because of British efforts to gain control over primary education.41 From London, Kklamanos was still asking for moderation, explaining that the only plausible course of action was the “gradual enlightenment of [British] public opinion.”42 It was obvious, however, that many Greek Cypriots were losing their patience.

**Turning Point:**

**Appointment of Alexis Kyrou as General Consul of Greece to Cyprus**

At this critical juncture, the appointment of Alexis Kyrou as general consul of Greece to Cyprus would prove to be the turning point in the course of events that was about to follow. Kyrou, of Cypriot origin himself and a member of a prestigious and influential family in Athens,43 arrived in Cyprus in mid-July 1930. He so desired to be transferred to Cyprus that he personally asked the Greek minister of foreign affairs, Andreas Michalakopoulos, with whom he maintained a close relationship,44 for the post. Young, ambitious, and probably more sentimental than his mission demanded, Kyrou showed from the very first that he wished to play a major role in the Cyprus Question; his decision to move the seat of the consulate from Larnaca to Nicosia,45 the capital and administrative and political center of the island, offered tangible proof of that.

According to Kyrou, Cyprus was in the middle of an unprecedented economic and spiritual crisis, for which the British as well as most of the native elites were equally responsible. In fact, he believed that the Greek Cypriots were so deeply divided from a political point of view, that not only were they unable to support effectively their demand for enosis, but also that a possible broadening of the political freedoms on the island would certainly
result in the deepening of the schism. For these reasons, Kyrou concluded that the only practical solution for the Greek government was to start a campaign in order to enlighten British public opinion on the Cyprus Question, asking for “enosis and only enosis,” rather than measures that would gradually lead to self-governance. 46

It was more than obvious that Kyrou was absolutely dedicated to the ideal of enosis. But unlike most Greek Cypriots, he tried to add a touch of realism to his proposals: the demand for enosis should be based not on a moral or sentimental, but rather on a realistic approach. According to Kyrou, the Greek government should try to convince the British that enosis was necessary mostly for economical reasons, as the poor financial situation of the island was directly connected with the separation of Cyprus from “its natural economical boundaries,” 47 in other words, from Greece.

Within a few months of his arrival in Cyprus, Kyrou had the chance to test his proposed strategy, which seemed to have the consent of Michalakopoulos. 48 At the beginning of September 1930 Kyrou informed Athens that his methods had already borne some fruit, since for the first time in years the Greek Cypriots had formed a united front, which worked systematically, aiming at specific targets. 49 The victory of the intransigent Greek Cypriot candidates in the October 1930 elections 50 was tangible proof that political radicalism was on the rise, and in this context, the visit to the island—only a few days after the elections—of Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies Sir Thomas Drummond Shiel gave the Greek Cypriots a new opportunity to put forward their demands for enosis.

In the memorandum that was handed over to the British under-secretary, the influence of Kyrou’s proposals was more than evident: in contrast to the past, the Greek Cypriots made no demands for self-governance, which the Greek general consul thought would constitute a threat to Greek Cypriot unity. What is more, the Greek Cypriots insisted that for many reasons, including the economic one to which Kyrou attributed great importance, the union with Greece was the only acceptable solution: “We wish to emphasize,” they pointed out in their memorandum,

that the Greek people of Cyprus, fully conscious of their national and human rights, are convinced that only the acquisition of complete national independence by incorporation with their national stock will open up to them the new avenues of development, advancement and sound prosperity which can never be enjoyed under any foreign, even the most liberal, Government. They have, therefore, only one desire and one request to make: Their Union with their Mother Country Greece. 51

Obviously, Kyrou hoped that by altering the method of approach, the Greek Cypriots were more likely to achieve their goals; but he was wrong. The British answer was the same as previous answers to similar memoranda. Shiel clearly stated that “the question of enosis was closed,” leaving no doubts about the intentions of his government. Moreover, his general behavior, which Kyrou described as prejudiced, only intensified the feeling of bitter disappointment among the Greek Cypriots. 52 In these circumstances, one could
feel the tension in the air, and Kyrou, prophetically, feared that the situation might worsen in the near future, as the Greek Cypriots seemed prepared to resist the colonial government.\textsuperscript{53} The road for the 1931 Revolt had already been paved.

\textit{Revolt (1931)}

The fire was about to be lit. The crisis sparked in September 1931, when Storrs used an order in council to block a decision of the Legislative Council against an increase of taxes to cover a deficit in the budget of the colonial government which had only been made possible because a Turkish Cypriot member of the Council voted together with the Greek Cypriots, thus changing the balance of power in favor of the latter. Responding to the governor's initiative, the Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council decided to resign from their seats, and, on 18 October 1931, one of the deputies, Bishop of Kitio Nikodemos, called on the Greek population of the island to disobey colonial laws and demanded enosis with Greece. Indeed, three days later, thousands of Greek Cypriots attended a huge pro-enosis rally in Nicosia which ended with the burning of Government House.

Apart from its internal results, the most important of which was probably the interruption of parliamentary life on the island, the October 1931 Revolt threatened to affect the cordial relations between Great Britain and Greece. The British accused Kyrou as one of the major instigators of the revolt, and the Greek government did everything it could to convince them that Athens was not involved in any way in the outbreak of violence in Cyprus. Kyrou—who had apparently disobeyed the guidelines of his government, thus placing the latter in a very awkward position—was immediately called back to Athens. At the same time, Greek prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos tried to convince the British of the good intentions of his government; in order not to leave any doubts as to his position, Venizelos publicly declared that “the Cyprus Question does not exist between the Greek and the British Government. It exists between the latter and the Cypriots.”\textsuperscript{54}

In reality, Venizelos tried to keep a low profile on the subject, hoping that in this way he could avoid much of the damage done by the revolt, a tactic shared by Kaklamanos.\textsuperscript{55} As a moderate and clear supporter of the strategy that favored a progressive—as opposed to a radical—solution to the Cyprus problem, Kaklamanos obviously feared that the revolt would add new and probably even greater obstacles to that goal. In a personal letter addressed to Michalakopoulos on 12 November 1931, Kaklamanos did not hide his pessimism: “The patriotic but unenlightened and less than practical [Greek] Cypriot leaders cannot imagine how much harm they did to the Cyprus affair by acting as they did.”\textsuperscript{56}

In this context, and despite the fact that mainland Greek public opinion was more or less sympathetic to the revolt and its leaders, the Greek government under the guidance of Venizelos was determined to hold a firm, realistic line, avoiding the waves of sentimentalism. His decision not to
respond to the repeated demands of Archbishop Kyrillos to send guidelines to the Greek Cypriots, as well as his reluctance even to mention the Cyprus Question to the British government, underlined in the most categorical way this conscious choice. "Please inform the Archbishop," Venizelos instructed the new Greek consul in Nicosia four months after the revolt,

that the Greek government is absolutely against the politics followed by the Cypriots during the last adventure believing that the last revolt averted the day of the fulfillment of the national desires of Cyprus. For this reason I avoided talking about the Cyprus Question during my recent stay in London.

However, the moderate way in which Athens dealt with the revolt was not enough to deter the negative effects of the latter. The Legislative Council was abolished, and a period of autocratic government under the British authorities was inaugurated on the island. As had been pointed out by prominent Greek politicians and diplomats, mainly Venizelos and Kaklamanos, respectively, the revolt was destined to further complicate the already complicated Cyprus problem, weakening the position of the Greek inhabitants of the island and consequently the position of Athens itself. For years to come, little if anything could be done to improve the situation, which, in fact, remained essentially unchanged until at least the outbreak of World War II.

Conclusion

Greek foreign policy toward the Cyprus Question in the years after the Lausanne Peace Treaty was articulated around a fundamental axiom: Athens was neither willing nor prepared to jeopardize its traditionally friendly relations with London by raising any claims over Cyprus. This thesis, based on the calculation that, on the one hand, Greece was too weak to impose its will on Great Britain, and, on the other, that London would not consent to any demands on the part of Athens, was for the first time explicitly formulated by Eleftherios Venizelos during the Lausanne Peace Conference. A prudent realist, Venizelos knew that the only way to keep the door open for a solution to the Cyprus problem favorable to Greek interests would be to avoid offending the sensibilities of British strategic circles. In this context, he believed that the only practical strategy on the part of Athens, and, most importantly, on the part of the Greek Cypriots themselves, was to seek a gradual solution and not a radical one.

Venizelos's legacy proved very appealing and was destined to form the hard core of Greek foreign policy as far as the Cyprus Question was concerned in the post-Lausanne era. Indeed, successive Greek governments during the period under discussion here (1923–1931) followed this strategy with remarkable consistency, avoiding actions that could lead to deterioration in its cordial relations with London. Even during the dictatorship of General Theodoros Pangalos (June 1925 to August 1926), when Greek foreign policy was almost entirely disorganized, Athens retained a moderate position toward the Cyprus
problem, as clearly indicated in the memorandum sent in November 1925 by Greek foreign minister Loukas Kanakaris Roufos.

This tactic was indeed realistic. The only problem was that Athens was not always capable of controlling the actions of either the Greek Cypriots or, in the case of Alexis Kyrou, even its own agents. That was, of course, a major drawback, but it was almost impossible to overcome it, as in many cases the Greek Cypriots tended to make choices without taking into consideration the guidelines of the national center. No matter how moderate or realistic the strategy of the Greek government was, most of the Greek Cypriots were closer to radical and immediate, rather than progressive, gradual solutions. The situation became even more complicated by the fact that the British refused to take into serious consideration Greek Cypriot demands.

In this context, Greek diplomacy, much like a professional acrobat, on many occasions had to balance skillfully between Greek Cypriot idealism—which naturally had a great effect on public opinion in Greece—and British reluctance. In reality, Athens found itself trapped between the hammer of Greek Cypriot radicalism and the anvil of British dogmatism; and when, in October 1931, the former hit the latter, the Greek government tried desperately to minimize the effects of the collision, managing at least to avoid serious injuries itself. After all, as should have been expected—and on the part of Greek diplomacy, actually was—the anvil proved much stronger than the hammer.

NOTES

1. For a detailed account of Cypriot history (mostly from an internal point of view) during the interwar period, see G. S. Georgallides, A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus, 1918–1926 (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1979); and idem, Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1985).

2. For more details on this subject, see C. M. Woodhouse, “The Offer of Cyprus: October 1915,” in Greece and Great Britain during World War I (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1985), 77-97.


4. Diplomatic and Historical Archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter, AGMFA), 1923, 2.1, Hatzivassiou to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 704, Larnaca, 31 October 1922.

5. AGMFA, 1926, 22.3, Hatzioanou to Archbishop Kyrillos, [Athens (?)], 1 January 1925.


10. AGMFA, 1926, 22.3, Roufis to Consulate in Larnaca, no. 15568, Athens, 15 November 1925.
11. Ibid.
15. For more on the issue of the Tribute, see George Hill, A History of Cyprus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4:463-87.
20. Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ (New Cyprus Guardian), 15 August 1928.
23. For example, the Greek Cypriot newspaper Αλήθεια (Truth), 19 October 1928.
24. Αλήθεια, 19 October 1928.
27. AGMFA, 1929, A/22/III, Inglessis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 20, Larnaca, 5 February 1929.
32. AGMFA, 1929, A/22/III, Inglessis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 28, Larnaca, 13 August 1929.
34. AGMFA, 1929, A/22/III, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Embassy in London, no. 9275, Athens, 17 September 1929.
36. AGMFA, 1929, A/22/III, Midtalakopoulos to Embassy in London, no. 10525, Athens, 26 September 1929.
40. The full text of Lord Passfield’s official answer to the Greek Cypriot deputation can be found in *Cyprus Gazette*, 13 December 1929.
43. In fact, his family owned the daily newspaper Εστία (The Hearth).
45. AGMFA, 1930, A/22/3, Kyrou to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 894, Nicosia, 1 August 1930. It should, however, be pointed out that this was not an entirely new idea, as similar suggestions had been put forward by Kyrou’s predecessor, Dionysios Inglessis; see AGMFA, 1928, 51.3, Inglessis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 5, Larnaca, 19 March 1928.
46. AGMFA, 1930, A/22/3, Kyrou to Michalakopoulos, no. 950, Nicosia, 10 August 1930.
47. AGMFA, 1930, A/22/3, Kyrou to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 934, Nicosia, 12 August 1930.
48. AGMFA, 1930, A/22/3, Michalakopoulos to Consulate in Nicosia, no. 9896, Athens, 19 August 1930; and Michalakopoulos to Consulate in Nicosia, no. 10008, Athens, 30 August 1930.
49. AGMFA, 1930, A/22/3, Kyrou to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 1032, Nicosia, 10 September 1930.
51. AGMFA, 1930, A/22/3, Kyrou to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 1125, Nicosia, 30 September 1930.
52. AGMFA, 1930, A/22/3, Kyrou to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 1218, Nicosia, 22 October 1930.
53. ACMFA, 1930, A/22/3, Kyrou to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 1375, Nicosia, 3
December 1930.

54. For more details on the subject, with many references to Venizelos’s maneuvers,
see Constantinos Svolopoulos, “Η στάση της ελληνικής κυβερνήσεως κατά την
κυπριακή κρίση του 1931” (The attitude of the Greek government during the 1931
Cyprus crisis), in Επιστημονική Επετηρίδα της Πανεπιστημίου Αιωνάτης Σχολής
Πολιτικών Επιστημών (1976–77) (Scientific Bulletin of Panteios Higher School of Po-

55. For more details about Kaklamanos’s views in relation to the revolt, see Antonis
Klapsis, “Η ελληνική προσβεία του Λονδίνου και η κυπριακή εξέγερση του 1931:
Ο Δημήτριος Κακλάμανος ενώπιον της κρίσης” (The Greek embassy in London and
the Cyprus Revolt of 1931: Dimitrios Kaklamanos confronting the crisis), Κλειό 4 (2007):
123–37.

56. Andreas Michalakopoulos Archive (Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive),
file 1 (subfile. 1,2), Kaklamanos to Michalakopoulos, London, 12 November 1931.

57. ACMFA, 1932, A/22/III, Antoniadis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 101,
Nicosia, 28 January 1932; and Antoniadis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 167, Nicosia,
11 February 1932.

58. ACMFA, 1932, A/22/III, [Undated telegram written and signed by
Venizelos]; Mavroudis to Consulate in Nicosia, no. 2349/A.22/III, Athens, 24 February
1932.

59. For a further discussion about the radical and progressive schools of thought on
the Cyprus Question, with many references to the interwar period, see Evanthis
Hatzivasiliou, Στρατηγικές του Κυπριακού: Η δεκαετία του 1950 (Strategies of the