



**NEAPOLIS UNIVERSITY**

**DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, POLITICS AND INTER-  
NATIONAL STUDIES**

**A DIVIDED ISLAND IN A UNITED EUROPE:  
EVALUATING THE EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES  
OF THE EU'S ROLE IN THE CYPRUS CONFLICT  
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CYPRUS**

**ARGYRO AVGOUSTI**

**Student ID: 1227610281**

**January 2024**



**NEAPOLIS UNIVERSITY**

**DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

**A DIVIDED ISLAND IN A UNITED EUROPE:  
EVALUATING THE EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES  
OF THE EU'S ROLE IN THE CYPRUS CONFLICT  
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CYPRUS**

**Dissertation which was submitted for obtaining  
a Master of Science degree in International Relations, Strategy and  
Security at Neapolis University**

**ARGYRO AVGOUSTI**

**Student ID: 1227610281**

**January 2024**

## Validity Page

### Copyrights

Copyright © Argyro Avgousti, 2024. All rights reserved.

The approval of the Dissertation by Neapolis University does not necessarily imply the acceptance of the author's views on behalf of the University.

**Student's Name and Surname:** Argyro Avgousti

**Title:** A divided island in a united Europe: Evaluating the expectations and realities of the EU's role in the Cyprus conflict from the perspective of Cyprus

This Dissertation was prepared in the context of the studies for obtaining a Master's degree at Neapolis University and was approved on the ..... by the members of the Examination Committee.

### EXAMINERS' COMMITTEE:

#### First supervisor (Neapolis University Pafos)

Dr. Marios Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos

Head of the Department of History, Politics and International Studies

Signature:.....

#### Committee member

Name, surname: Dr. Eleni Gavriil

Rank: Lecturer in International Economic Law and Human Rights

Signature:.....

#### Committee member

Name, surname: Dr. Ben D. Mor

Rank: Professor in International Relations and Security

Signature:.....

## Student Declaration

I, Argyro Avgousti, being fully aware of the consequences of plagiarism, declare responsibility that this paper entitled “A divided island in a united Europe: Evaluating the expectations and realities of the EU’s role in the Cyprus conflict from the perspective of Cyprus”, is strictly a product of my own personal work and all sources used have been duly stated in the bibliographic citations and references. Where I have used ideas, text and/or sources of other authors, they are clearly mentioned in the text with the appropriate citation and the relevant reference is included in the bibliographic references section with a full description.

The Declarant,

Argyro Avgousti

.....

Το 2024, σφραγίζει μισό αιώνα από τη διχοτόμηση της Κύπρου. Κανείς δεν μπορεί να αγνοήσει το γεγονός ότι η επίλυση του κυπριακού, παραμένει ο ευσεβής πόθος κάθε Ελληνοκύπριου. Η πολιτική πλευρά της ένταξης, ήταν και το κυριότερο στοιχείο που στήριζε και την πορεία της Κύπρου στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Μια επιλογή που στηρίχθηκε κυρίως στην προσδοκία πως μια τέτοια κίνηση, θα ενίσχυε καταλυτικά τις προσπάθειες επίλυσης του Κυπριακού και οι αρχές και οι κανόνες που διέπουν τη λειτουργία της ΕΕ, θα αποτελούσαν σημαντικά εφόδια στη διαμόρφωση της τελικής λύσης. Θα μπορούσε να πει κανείς ότι η αίτηση της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας για ένταξη στη ΕΕ, δεν ήταν μια επαναστατική επιλογή αλλά αντιθέτως, αποτέλεσε μια στρατηγικού χαρακτήρα απόφαση, στον πυρήνα της οποίας βρισκόταν η ανάγκη επίλυσης του κυπριακού προβλήματος, με την Ελλάδα να υποστηρίζει σθεναρά την προσπάθεια της νήσου. Σταθμός στη ευρωπαϊκή πορεία της Κύπρου, ήταν η απόφαση στην Σύνοδο Κορυφής του Ελσίνκι το 1999 όπου και επιβεβαιώθηκε ότι η Κύπρος, θα μπορούσε να καταστεί μέλος της μεγάλης Ευρωπαϊκής οικογένειας, ανεξάρτητα επίλυσης του κυπριακού. Ο στόχος της ευρωπαϊκής ολοκλήρωσης και η ένταξη της Κύπρου στην ΕΕ, επιτεύχθηκε εν τέλει, παρά τις δυσκολίες και τον σκεπτικισμό που επικρατούσε μεταξύ των κρατών μελών. Ωστόσο, οι αρχικές προσδοκίες της Ελληνοκυπριακής πλευράς, δεν εκπληρώθηκαν. Οι όποιες προσπάθειες για επανένωση του νησιού, βρέθηκαν για άλλη μια φορά αντιμέτωπες με την τουρκική πολιτική αδιαλλαξία. Όμως, δεν μπορεί κανείς να αναιρέσει την δυναμική της ΕΕ και το γεγονός ότι η ένταξη, ενίσχυσε τη θέση της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας στην διεθνή κοινότητα. Η Κύπρος, ως κράτος μέλος, για πρώτη φορά από το 1974, κατάφερε να αντισταθμίσει τις επιπτώσεις της εισβολής και της κατοχής, να αισθανθεί ασφάλεια αλλά και να δημιουργήσει τις προϋποθέσεις εκείνες που αναμένεται να θέσουν και τις βάσεις για επανένωση. Η ένταξη στην ΕΕ, αποτελεί αναμφισβήτητο τον μεγαλύτερο σταθμό στην πορεία της Κύπρου με την Ευρώπη να αναγνωρίζει ολόκληρο το σύνολο του εδάφους του νησιού ως έδαφος της Κ. Δημοκρατίας, συμπεριλαμβανομένου και του βορείου τμήματος που βρίσκεται υπό την τουρκική κατοχή. Είναι σημαντικό, ωστόσο από πλευράς της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, να κατανοηθεί ότι ρόλος της ΕΕ, δεν μπορεί να αντικαταστήσει τον ρόλο των Ηνωμένων Εθνών και ως εκ τούτου, πρέπει και να αντιλαμβάνεται. Η ΕΕ μπορεί να υποστηρίξει τα ΗΕ, ενταγμένη στο πλαίσιο της Αποστολής Καλής Γειτονίας του Γενικού Γραμματέα των ΗΕ, παρέχοντας πολιτική και τεχνική υποστήριξη στις προσπάθειες για την εξεύρεση λύσης στη βάση διζωνικής, δι-κοινοτικής ομοσπονδίας και ενισχύοντας οικονομικά τις δύο κοινότητες για την εφαρμογή μιας συμφωνίας επίλυσης όταν και αν αυτή επιτευχθεί. Η ΕΕ, μέχρι στιγμής, έχει διαδραματίσει έναν πολύ σημαντικό ρόλο στην προώθηση της επίλυσης του Κυπριακού ζητήματος και της επανένωσης της Κύπρου κυρίως συμβουλευτικού χαρακτήρα και έχει βοηθήσει στη δημιουργία ενός κλίματος που ευνοεί τις συνομιλίες και τη συνεργασία μεταξύ όλων των εμπλεκόμενων πλευρών. Οι προκλήσεις από πλευράς της Τουρκίας και της ηγεσίας της Τουρκοκυπριακής κοινότητας, ήταν αναμενόμενες. Ωστόσο, η ΕΕ μπορεί να επηρεάσει θετικά τις συνθήκες προς την επίλυση, πλησιάζοντας τους Τουρκοκύπριους με τη φιλοσοφία της ενσωμάτωσης και ενισχύοντας τη σχέση της με την Τουρκία. Προς αυτή την κατεύθυνση, οφείλει να λάβει τα μέτρα εκείνα που θα διαφοροποιήσουν την Τουρκική αδιαλλαξία και η επίλυση του κυπριακού στη βάση του συμφωνηθέντος πλαισίου, να συμπεριληφθεί στις προϋποθέσεις για ένταξη της Τουρκίας στην ΕΕ.

## Acknowledgements

I would like to sincerely take this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude to the following personalities who devoted their precious time and participated in interviews of their own free will for the purpose of this dissertation and to express my heartfelt thanks to all those who have extended support, encouragement and guidance in completing this dissertation. This achievement was not at all possible without one and all of you.

**Dr. Andreas Mavroyiannis**, Ambassador (ad Hon) Greek Cypriot diplomat and politician, former Ambassador to the UN and negotiator of the Greek Cypriot Community in the Cyprus reunification talks. His readiness to share expertise and give valuable insights on the issues greatly enriched this dissertation with his profound knowledge.

A profound debt of gratitude to **Demetris Papadakis**, Member of the European Parliament from Cyprus, for his insights and highly valuable perspectives shared. His view enabled this project to achieve quality work that had an altogether different dimension.

To the respected Government Official directly related to the Cyprus problem that we shall refer to as **J.D**, touching on his request for anonymity, for his contribution and willingness towards the research. His input has been valuable.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor **Dr. Marios Panayiotis Efthymiopoulos** for his unwavering guidance, support, and expert knowledge throughout the process of completing my dissertation. His timely advice, constructive criticism, and encouragement have been instrumental in inspiring me during the writing phase.

I would also like to extend my deepest appreciation and gratitude to **Valentinios Fakontis**, Member of the Cyprus Parliament, for his invaluable support in the completion of this dissertation.

To my loving partner **Constantinos**, whose unwavering support, understanding and encouragement throughout this whole journey, has fueled my determination to complete this dissertation. His love and belief in me have been my pillar of strength, allowing me to finish this blessing.

To my dear daughter **Georgia**, your understanding, patience and love have truly been remarkable. You have not only supported me in every step along the way but also brought lots of joy to my life. This has always motivated me to put more effort on everything that I do. Thanks for your existence.

Lastly, I would like to extend a heartfelt thank you to my exceptional twin sister **Evi**, for her unwavering support, encouragement, and belief in me in every step of the way during this academic journey.

## Dedication

**To my beloved parents Demetra and Christodoulos,**

*As I stand on the precipice of completing this academic journey, I am filled with an overwhelming sense of gratitude and bittersweet nostalgia. Though you are no longer physically present with me, your unconditional love and unwavering support have been the guiding lights that have illuminated my path every step of the way. Your sacrifices and unwavering belief in my potential have shaped me into the person I am today. Your love, continues to fuel my determination and remind me of the importance of compassion and perseverance in everything I do.*

*Though you may no longer be physically present to witness this momentous occasion, I dedicate this thesis to you both, with all my love and gratitude. Your legacy lives on in me, and I carry your light within me as I continue to pursue knowledge and strive for a better tomorrow.*

*Forever in my heart.*

*With love and eternal gratitude,*

**Argyro**

## Table of Contents

|                                                                                                  |           |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Validity Page.....</b>                                                                        | <b>i</b>  |
| <b>Student Declaration .....</b>                                                                 | <b>ii</b> |
| <b>Acknowledgements .....</b>                                                                    | <b>iv</b> |
| <b>Dedication .....</b>                                                                          | <b>v</b>  |
| <b>Chapter 1 .....</b>                                                                           | <b>1</b>  |
| <b>Introduction.....</b>                                                                         | <b>1</b>  |
| <b>1.1 Background of the Study.....</b>                                                          | <b>1</b>  |
| <b>1.2 Problem Statement.....</b>                                                                | <b>1</b>  |
| <b>1.3 Research Objectives.....</b>                                                              | <b>2</b>  |
| <b>1.4 Research Hypothesis.....</b>                                                              | <b>2</b>  |
| <b>1.5 Significance of the Study .....</b>                                                       | <b>3</b>  |
| <b>1.5 Structure of the Thesis.....</b>                                                          | <b>3</b>  |
| <b>Chapter 2 .....</b>                                                                           | <b>5</b>  |
| <b>Cyprus and the EU – The Historical Context .....</b>                                          | <b>5</b>  |
| <b>2.1 The Cyprus conflict: Roots, causes and complexities.....</b>                              | <b>5</b>  |
| <b>2.1.1 From Ottoman Rule to British Domination .....</b>                                       | <b>5</b>  |
| <b>2.1.2 The Impact of Colonial Rule and Nationalism on the Cyprus Conflict.....</b>             | <b>7</b>  |
| <b>2.1.3 Nationalist Aspirations and Colonial Resistance: The EOKA Insurgency in Cyprus.....</b> | <b>9</b>  |
| <b>2.1.4 The London – Zurich agreements .....</b>                                                | <b>10</b> |
| <b>2.1.5 The Challenges Faced by Cyprus since Independence.....</b>                              | <b>13</b> |
| <b>2.1.6 International efforts and American mediation in resolving the Cyprus conflict.....</b>  | <b>14</b> |
| <b>2.1.7 The unlawful Turkish invasion and the division of Cyprus.....</b>                       | <b>15</b> |
| <b>2.1.8 The Aftermath of the invasion .....</b>                                                 | <b>17</b> |
| <b>2.1.9 The Five External Actors in the animosity .....</b>                                     | <b>18</b> |
| <b>2.2 Cyprus’ path to the EU membership: A strategy towards resolution? .....</b>               | <b>25</b> |
| <b>Chapter 3 – Theoretical Framework.....</b>                                                    | <b>28</b> |
| <b>The EU’s role in Conflict Resolution .....</b>                                                | <b>28</b> |
| <b>3.1 The EU’s Framework for Conflict Resolution: From Coal and Steel to Lasting Peace.....</b> | <b>28</b> |
| <b>3.2 The EU as a Normative Power: Redefining Global Politics.....</b>                          | <b>30</b> |
| <b>3.3 Integration and Association in Conflict Transformation.....</b>                           | <b>33</b> |

|                                                                                                |    |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 3.4 The EU as a Mediator: Normative Power or Self-Fulfilling Prophecy? .....                   | 34 |
| <b>Chapter 4 - Research Methodology</b> .....                                                  | 35 |
| 4.1 Introduction .....                                                                         | 35 |
| 4.2 Research design and Data collection .....                                                  | 35 |
| 4.3 Data analysis .....                                                                        | 36 |
| 4.4 Study limitations and Ethical Considerations .....                                         | 36 |
| <b>Chapter 5 – Data Presentation</b> .....                                                     | 38 |
| <b>Expectations and Realities</b> .....                                                        | 38 |
| 5.1 The EU Bid of Greek Cypriots: A New Era Packed with Exciting Prospects? .....              | 38 |
| 5.2 The Turkish Cypriot perspective: Skepticism and Security Concerns .....                    | 39 |
| 5.3 The EU’s perspective .....                                                                 | 40 |
| 5.4 The EU’s Normative Power in the Cyprus Conflict: A Double-Edged Sword? .....               | 41 |
| 5.5 Challenges and Compromises .....                                                           | 43 |
| <b>Chapter 6 – Findings and Results</b> .....                                                  | 46 |
| <b>Cyprus’ perception of the EU’s Role in the Cyprus conflict</b> .....                        | 46 |
| 6.1 Promoting a Sense of Common European Identity .....                                        | 46 |
| 6.2 EU’s approach for Human rights, Democracy and Conflict resolution .....                    | 48 |
| 6.3 The Catalytic effect of EU integration .....                                               | 49 |
| 6.4 The rising influence of Greek Cypriots in the EU .....                                     | 50 |
| 6.5 The EU as a mediator and facilitator in the Cyprus conflict .....                          | 51 |
| 6.6 EU’s participation in the Cyprus conflict .....                                            | 53 |
| 6.7 The EU’s actions and policies on Peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus .....                     | 54 |
| 6.8 Perspectives of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on the EU’s role in the Conflict ..... | 55 |
| 6.9 The Current and Future Expectations .....                                                  | 56 |
| <b>Chapter 7</b> .....                                                                         | 58 |
| <b>Conclusion</b> .....                                                                        | 58 |
| <b>Lessons to be learned</b> .....                                                             | 59 |
| <b>References</b> .....                                                                        | 60 |
| <b>Bibliography:</b> .....                                                                     | 67 |
| <b>Appendices</b> .....                                                                        | 71 |
| <b>Appendix A – Dr. Andreas Mavroyiannis’ Interview</b> .....                                  | 71 |
| <b>Appendix B – Demetris Papadakis’ Interview</b> .....                                        | 74 |
| <b>Appendix C – J.D’s Interview</b> .....                                                      | 78 |

## List of maps and images

**Map 1** ..... *page 5*

**Image 1**..... *page 16*

# **Chapter 1**

## **Introduction**

### **1.1 Background of the Study**

Cyprus is a Mediterranean island with a rich history marked by ethnic strife and periods of foreign rule. Prompted by the idea of enosis (union with Greece), a Greek Cypriot coup broke out, which resulted in the Turkish invasion in 1974, forcing thousands of people to flee their homes and to the establishment of a de facto state in the northern part of the island, controlled by Turkey. Since, an UN-patrolled Green Line, separates the two communities while the Cyprus conflict remains unresolved for nearly half a century.

The ongoing deadlock and the dream of reunification, has prompted the international legally recognized Republic of Cyprus (RoC) strongly supported by Greece, to seek European integration. Cyprus expected that the EU's normative power would have a significant impact to the ongoing deadlock, positively contributing in the peace efforts and act as a catalyst and as a driving force towards Turkey, ultimately leading to the island's reunification.

Although the European integration had leveraged the RoC's status in the international community, due to a significant number of challenges and limitations, failed to meet the initial hopes and aspirations. Its limited ability to directly influence the parties involved, the competing interests of the communities in dispute, the lack of consensus among the member states as well as the Turkish intransigence, have dramatically influenced its capacity in fostering peace in the island.

### **1.2 Problem Statement**

The EU's role in the conflict in Cyprus has been a topic of ongoing discussion, with differing perspectives on its effectiveness and impact. This study seeks to critically analyze the EU's involvement in the Cyprus conflict from the perspective of Cyprus itself between 2004 and 2023, exploring historical context, past interventions, and stakeholder views to assess the alignment between initial expectations and actual outcomes. By examining official statements, policies, and agreements, as well as gathering insights from various stakeholders, this research aims to identify the reasons for which the EU failed to serve as a catalyst for resolution and meet Cyprus' initial hopes and aspirations and discover the areas for potential improvement in the EU's engagement

to address the ongoing challenges in Cyprus effectively. To evaluate the EU's efficacy as a mediator and facilitator, the thesis will explore the Union's capabilities as a normative power in shaping the conflict's dynamics through integration and association. Additionally, it will delve into the obstacles and constraints that hindered the EU's efforts to meet the RoC's high expectations, including external influences, internal divisions within the EU, limitations in foreign policy capabilities, and conflicting interests in the dispute.

### **1.3 Research Objectives**

In this research, we will be examining the EU's involvement in the ongoing conflict in Cyprus, with a particular focus on Cyprus' perspective. Our main goals are to explore the historical background of the conflict and analyze how the EU has been involved in peace efforts. We will be studying official statements, policies, and agreements to understand Cyprus' initial expectations of the EU in resolving the conflict.

We also aim to critically assess the effectiveness of the EU's interventions in addressing the Cyprus conflict, looking at both successful initiatives and existing limitations. Our study will seek to gather insights from various stakeholders in Cyprus, including diplomats, politicians and government officials involved in the reunification talks in order to understand their views on the EU's role in conflict resolution and their current (and future) expectations.

By collecting feedback and suggestions from the Cypriot community, we hope to identify areas where the EU's engagement could be improved. Additionally, we will conduct a comparative analysis to compare the expected roles of the EU in Cyprus with the actual functions performed, highlighting any discrepancies or areas of alignment in the context of the conflict.

Ultimately, through this research, we aim to provide a comprehensive assessment of the EU's involvement in the Cyprus conflict and offer insights on how its contributions can be enhanced to better address the ongoing challenges in the region.

### **1.4 Research Hypothesis**

The main hypothesis of this thesis is to discover how the actions or decisions of the EU impacted the perceptions of Cypriots regarding the EU's role in the Cyprus conflict. As perceived by the people of Cyprus, the EU's role in the Cyprus conflict, does not align with the initial expectations

of promoting peace and reunification, but instead reflects a more complicated and nuanced reality shaped by political interests, historical contexts, and power dynamics within the European Union. This hypothesis suggests that while there may have been hopes or beliefs about the EU being a neutral mediator and facilitator of peace in the Cyprus conflict, the actual outcomes and perceptions among the people of Cyprus may reveal a different story. By exploring the gap between expectations and realities, the thesis can analyze the complexities of how the EU's involvement has influenced the ongoing conflict in Cyprus and shed light on the various factors at play.

### **1.5 Significance of the Study**

The purpose of this study is to better understand from Cyprus's perspective, the EU dynamics related to the Cyprus conflict. By examining the Union's involvement in promoting peace in the island, this study will assist in determining the EU's actual impact in conflict resolution and whether the Union's influence as a normative power, aligns with the initial expectations and needs of the Greek Cypriot community. By doing so, this research will shed light into the complexities define the Cyprus conflict and indicate the gaps or contradictions between the EU's stated goals and its actual effects on the ground. The identification of the challenges and limits, might contribute further in providing guidance for future implementation of policies and initiatives related to the Union's peace efforts in other conflicts dealing with similar difficulties and particularly, in addressing national conflicts within its framework.

### **1.5 Structure of the Thesis**

This study comprises seven chapters, addressing various aspects of the EU's role in the Cyprus conflict. The first Chapter provides the background of the Cyprus conflict and the RoC's aspirations of the EU's influence to shape the conflict's dynamics, followed by the problem statement and the reasons for carrying out this research. This section includes also the research objectives as well as the significance of the study.

Chapter 2, provides the historical context of the Cyprus' conflict by examining its root causes and key events that led to the island's division. This Chapter includes also the role of the external actors shaping the conflict's dynamics and Cyprus' path to European integration.

Chapter 3, provides the theoretical framework of the EU mechanisms and strategies employed for conflict resolution and provides a comprehensive analysis of its capabilities to transform conflicts as a normative power and by the means of integration and association.

Chapter 4, presents the research methodology that was followed for conducting this thesis, providing further information in concern to the research design, the data collection, the data analysis, the study limits and the ethical considerations.

Chapter 5, examines the Greek Cypriots' hopes and expectations by European integration and presents the communities' perspectives as per the EU' involvement in the conflict. In similar context, this Chapter address additionally the Union's perspective and delves into the organization's power and capabilities to transform the conflict in Cyprus and to foster a sustainable resolution.

Chapter 6, evaluates the discrepancies between the expectations and realities of the EU's involvement in the Cyprus conflict and assess its role as a mediator and facilitator in promoting a United Cyprus. This Chapter also presents an assessment in concern to the EU's impact on both communities in the dispute and examines the current (and future) expectations of Cyprus.


This research concludes with chapter seven, summarizing the findings and providing lessons learned for the future.

## Chapter 2

### Cyprus and the EU – The Historical Context

#### 2.1 The Cyprus conflict: Roots, causes and complexities

Although, numerous attempts have been made in order to find a sustainable resolution, the Cyprus conflict remains unsolved for nearly half a century. The island's important geographic strategic position, further complicates the already complicated situation as it is heavily influenced by other regional conflicts in near proximity. In addition, the influence of external actors such as the United Kingdom (UK), Turkey and Greece followed by their own interests, not only hindered any past efforts for resolution but added more to the conflict's complexity. The ongoing deadlock, pushed the RoC to seek European integration, hoping that the EU's global stance and dynamics, would serve as a catalyst for resolution. This Chapter aims to examine the root causes and intricate the dynamics contributing to the conflict by delving into the island's rich history past, followed by Cyprus' path to European integration.



##### 2.1.1 From Ottoman Rule to British Domination

The island of Cyprus has a long history of strategic significance for major global powers due to its ideal location at the intersection of Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. This special geographic location, has significantly influenced how complicated the Cyprus conflict has become.

Cyprus was first colonized by the Greeks, and over the ages, it has been ruled by a number of powerful nations, each of which, left its lasting imprint on the island (Fisher, 2001).

Greek influence in Cyprus dates back to the Mycenaean period, demonstrating their significant contribution to the unique cultural legacy of the island. The Greek people and language have been essential in helping the Cypriots to forge a strong sense of identity. The Venetian era came to an end with the Ottoman invasion and a three-century period of Ottoman supremacy (Hill, 2010). It is crucial to acknowledge however, that during that period, the integration between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, was limited.

By the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish Wars in 1877–1878, Turkey sought to offset Russia's growing sway by seeking the British support (Medlicott, 1940). The strategic move of the Ottomans, led to the signing of the Treaty of Defensive Alliance, commonly known as the Cyprus Convention. It is worth noting that the Treaty was viewed as a breach of the Treaty of Paris, an integral part of international Christendom law, generating criticism from Conservatives for tarnishing the Empire's reputation among European powers (Medlicott, 1940). By granting Britain, administrative and governance responsibilities over Cyprus while affirming Turkey's independence, the Treaty served as a response to Russia's increasing dominance, positioning Britain as the primary European power in the Middle East with the objective of supporting the Sublime Porte against any potential Russian aggression (Hussain, 2020). Moreover, the treaty faced opposition, with Gladstone denouncing it as an illogical pact, questioning also the necessity and financial burden of establishing Cyprus as a significant naval station (Panayiotou, 2010).

At the time, the local population of Cyprus expressed a strong preference for integration with Greece rather than being under British rule (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). This sentiment was driven by the belief of the Greek Cypriots that Cyprus was qualified to be a part of the Greek state (Hussain, 2022). Despite these strong desires for integration, Britain formally annexed the island in 1914 in accordance with the provisions outlined in the Treaty of Lausanne and Turkey officially relinquished all rights and claims to Cyprus, in 1923 (American journal of international law, 1915).

The annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain had a profound impact on the island's history marking a significant development (American journal of international law, 1915), driven by the broader strategic importance of Cyprus for the British Empire, particularly in response to the perceived threat posed by the Italian Empire during the interwar period (Xypolia, 2016).

### 2.1.2 The Impact of Colonial Rule and Nationalism on the Cyprus Conflict

Following Cyprus' annexation, the Greek Orthodox Church diminished its administrative authority maintained during the Ottoman rule. British colonial administrators, on the other hand, showed a preference for appointing Turkish Cypriots to new local bodies in disproportionate numbers (Kyriakou & Kaya, 2011). In October 1931, a rebellion by Greek Cypriots was suppressed, leading to a period of authoritarian rule known as Palmerokratia<sup>1</sup>. The uprising of the Greek Cypriots against the British rule was a response to Cyprus' desire for unification with Greece (Enosis) reflecting the strong nationalist sentiment among the Greek Cypriot population and marking a significant shift in the British colonial policy in Cyprus. As a result, the British applied increasingly strict and intolerant measures towards signs of nationalism, attempting to suppress and control the nationalist movements in the island (Hussain, 2022; Panayiotou, 2010). Hundreds of people were imprisoned while the Communist Party of Cyprus (AKEL) suffered the grave consequences of being outlawed, with its leaders forcibly exiled. In addition, Greek history was banned from teaching, silencing a significant part of the nation's cultural heritage. The British colonial policy was impacted by various factors, including the socio-economic and legitimacy crises experienced by the British colonial rule, the adoption of policies from Italian rule, and the influential role of nationalism in the interactions between the colonial authorities and the colonized population (Rappas, 2015).

Nonetheless, the Greek Cypriots' struggle continued and after the end of the World War II. In 1946, the British government unveiled its proposal to extend an invitation to Cypriots, urging them to assemble and engage in a constructive dialogue for drafting a new constitution. Recognizing the importance of inclusivity, the British administration also granted permission for the repatriation of Cypriots who had been exiled since 1931. The British invitation however, was declined by the Greek Cypriots (unlike Turkish Cypriots), as their sole political objective was "enosis", a sentiment that was strongly approved by the Cypriot Orthodox Church. The Orthodox Church of Cyprus, and thus the Ethnarchy which enjoyed a significant social, economic, and political power in the Ottoman era, acted as the impetus for Greek nationalism and pro-enosis sentiments on the island in the late 18th and early 19th centuries (Kıralp & Güneyli, 2021). AKEL, despite supporting the Greek national aspiration of enosis, stood in opposition to the Church. However, the British

---

<sup>1</sup> Palmerocracy, named after the British Governor Sir Richmond Palmer.

military forces and colonial administration in Cyprus did not consider the pro-Soviet communist party as a viable partner (Rappas, 2022).

It is crucial to recognize that throughout the years, Greek governments have been mindful of maintaining positive relations with both Britain and the US, leading them to exercise caution in fully embracing the cause of Cyprus. The position of Greek Prime Minister Tsaldaris on May 17, 1946 is characteristic “Regarding the issue of Cyprus, no confusion is allowed [...] It is a matter that concerns our great friend, Great Britain, and Greece, and its desired settlement only concerns the two of us” (Ηλιόπουλος, 2018). The following day, the President of Greece Kanellopoulos clarified “Our hope is expressed towards the great and superior benefactor of Greece, Great Britain” (Ηλιόπουλος, 2018). Similarly, Greek Prime Minister Papandreou stated “Today Greece breathes with two lungs; one British, the other American. Therefore (Greece) cannot afford to be suffocated because of the Cyprus problem” (Asmussen, 2011).

The decision to refrain from raising the issue of Cyprus was influenced by two primary considerations: the realities of the Cold War and Greece’s strategic requirements. During the period of the Greek civil war between 1946 and 1949, the US and the UK provided assistance to Greece in order to secure a victory. Consequently, Greece was hesitant to take any actions that could displease Britain, which sought to maintain control over Cyprus, or the US, which aimed to prevent division among its allies by raising the issue of Cyprus. After the conclusion of the civil war, the British and American allies continued to offer assistance to Greece due to the ongoing threat from the north, which was a combination of historical regional rivalries with other Balkan countries and the overarching tension of the Cold War (Asmussen, 2011). This rationale led the Greek government to reject the appeal of the Cypriots to bring the Cyprus issue to the United Nations General Assembly for registration and deliberation. Archbishop Makarios, who later became a key figure in advocating for Cyprus, faced resistance from the Greek government in his efforts to involve the UN. Foreign Minister Sophocles Venizelos informed Makarios that he would not allow him to influence Greece’s foreign policy decisions (Asmussen, 2011). This reluctance from Greece to fully support the Cyprus cause highlights the complexities and factors at play during this period. In 1954, Greece eventually succumbed to pressure from Makarios and public opinion in Greece, emphasizing the right to self-determination (Jacovides, 2011), yet this yielded no favourable outcome. The UN General Assembly, ultimately aligned with the positions advocated by Great Brit-

ain. On March 23, 1955, Resolution 814 was adopted, aiming at establishing a bi-communal government in Cyprus with equal representation of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities (Hadjipavlou, 2007).

### **2.1.3 Nationalist Aspirations and Colonial Resistance: The EOKA Insurgency in Cyprus**

The Greek failure at the UN, was followed by the formation of EOKA<sup>2</sup> in 1955, marking a milestone in the Cypriot struggle against the British rule with a profound impact in the island's history and geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean. The EOKA struggle was a complicated and multi-faced phenomenon gaining political and social dimensions, rather than just an armed resistance. EOKA at the time, represented the Greek Cypriots' aspirations for unification with Greece and their broader manifestation for self-determination and independence, posing a significant challenge to the island's British authority.

According to Antonsich (2013), this period was marked by a strong nationalist attachment of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to their respective "motherlands", Greece and Turkey. The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, led by Archbishop Makarios<sup>3</sup> and Georgios Grivas Digenis<sup>4</sup>, sought to achieve enosis and put an end to the British colonial rule (Sirin, 2012). On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots, strongly supported and encouraged British. AKEL, continuously supported political measures over direct military conflict with the British, in accordance with its communist principles (Papastephanou, 2014).

At the time, there were concerns that the campaign of terror would eventually be directed against the Turkish Cypriot community despite EOKA's initial promise not to target Turkish Cypriots (Loizides, 2007). Moreover, the recruitment of economically disadvantaged Turkish Cypriots by the British administration to protect against EOKA attacks deepened the animosity between the

---

<sup>2</sup> Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).

<sup>3</sup> Archbishop Makarios III was a Cypriot clergyman and politician. He served as the Archbishop and Head of the Church of Cyprus from 1950 until his death in 1977. Makarios played a significant role in the politics of Cyprus and was the first President of Cyprus from 1960 to 1974. He was a prominent figure in the struggle for Cypriot independence from British rule and in advocating for the rights of the Greek Cypriot majority on the island.

<sup>4</sup> Georgios Grivas Digenis, also known as Colonel Grivas was a Greek Cypriot military officer and fighter. Grivas played a significant role in the Cypriot national struggle for independence from British colonial rule. He is considered a national hero by many Greek Cypriots for his leading role in the struggle for independence. However, he is a controversial figure, as his actions and methods also led to tensions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, contributing to the ultimate division of the island in 1974.

Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, exacerbating the existing tensions (Yalkin et al., 2023). In response to the threat posed by EOKA and the desire for Cyprus to be united with Greece, the “taksim”<sup>5</sup> policy which aimed to divide Cyprus between the Greek and Turkish communities was implemented. Further, the Turkish Cypriots, seeking to counteract the actions of the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, set up a paramilitary group named TMT<sup>6</sup> which was supported by the Turkish military (Hadjipavlou, n.d.).

The conflict ended in 1959 and resulted in the loss of more than 500 lives, including civilians and partisans from both sides with many Greek Cypriots being targeted by EOKA for opposing the nationalist cause (Demetriou, 2012).

#### 2.1.4 The London – Zurich agreements

The Greek attempts to advocate for enosis proved to be ineffective due to their weak position. Despite Greece’s efforts in the UN to obtain resolutions in their favor, these endeavors were ultimately futile. This was mainly due to Britain’s ability to block any such measures. Moreover, the UN strategy proved to be ineffective as it lacked the power to issue legally binding decisions, making it insufficient in resolving the dispute “[...] *After the escalation in Greek Cypriot protest which followed the end of the 1954 General Assembly session, the British government grasped that metropolitan and Cypriot Greeks believed that once Cyprus got lodged in the United Nations’ machinery, self-determination, and, therefore, Enosis, would surely follow [...]*” (Thomas, 2001). To counterbalance Greece’s claims, Britain cleverly brought Turkey into the equation as an interested party. This strategic move transformed the issue into a fully-fledged international dispute, expanding its complexity. Consequently, Britain began relying heavily on Turkey to hold its position in Cyprus, further undermining the Greek Cypriots’ demand for Enosis. As a result, Britain started making concessions to the Turkish side, significantly weakening the Greek Cypriot cause. Ultimately, these concessions completely overshadowed the efforts of the EOKA struggle, leaving Greece outmaneuvered and unable to achieve their goals for enosis. The Colonial Secretary, Lennox-Boyd, addressing the House of Commons on 19 December 1956, delivered a statement of utmost significance regarding double self-determination “*Any exercise of self-determination*

---

<sup>5</sup> Taksim, partition.

<sup>6</sup> Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı – Turkish Resistance Organization.

*should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty's Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options"* (Asmussen, 2011). The introduction of the concept of double self-determination dealt a fatal blow to the idea of enosis for two crucial reasons. Firstly, it undermined the demand for enosis by presenting the possibility of partition as a result of applying the principle of self-determination. This weakened the EOKA struggle and rendered its continuation counterproductive as it was more likely to lead to partition rather than the desired enosis. Moreover, Britain's acknowledgment that partition could be a potential outcome for Cyprus, even if it was merely a tactical move rather than a genuine intention, encouraged Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to actively pursue this objective (Sirin, 2012). Following the release of Makarios in the spring of 1957, Turkey progressively adopted a hardened stance on the Cyprus issue and began demanding partition as the only possible resolution to the dispute. Simultaneously, the Turkish Cypriots launched their own campaign in favor of partition, significantly complicating the already complex political situation on the island (Asmussen, 2011).

The possibility of a civil war between the two communities became more probable, raising concerns about a potential conflict between Greece and Turkey (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). A war between Athens and Ankara, both NATO allies, would have devastating repercussions as it would create an opportunity for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the eastern Mediterranean (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). In March 1957, the US officially acknowledged its involvement in the Cyprus issue. During the negotiations between the US and Britain, it was decided that Cyprus would be handled within the framework of NATO. The primary goal was to directly resolve the dispute between Greece and Turkey and put an end to the internationalization of the Cyprus issue (II, 1999). In 1958, NATO recommended that the Greek government should accept the British Macmillan Plan, proposed by the British Prime Minister. This plan essentially supported the partition of Cyprus and acknowledged Turkey as an involved party. Negotiations between the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, Konstantinos Karamanlis and Adnan Menderes, respectively, began in Zurich on February 5, 1959. On February 11, it was announced that an agreement had been reached to establish the Cypriot state. Further discussions took place in London after the Zurich agreements. As part of the agreements, Britain secured the unrestricted right to maintain military

aircraft in Cypriot airspace and establish its bases under NATO's control. Britain, Greece, and Turkey were designated as guarantor powers with military forces present on the island. Britain was also granted two significant areas of Cyprus for the permanent establishment of British and, therefore, NATO bases (II, 1999). In a secret protocol, Karamanlis and Menderes committed to supporting Cyprus' entry into NATO and the establishment of NATO bases on the island. They also agreed to exert pressure on the President and Vice President of Cyprus to outlaw the AKEL party. The existence of this protocol was revealed several years later, between 1979 and 1980 (II, 1999). Against this backdrop, Makarios declared in September 1958 that independence, rather than enosis, would be a viable resolution for Cyprus (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The tipping point for the Greek side, which prompted the move towards independence as a compromise to prevent a potentially worse situation, was the introduction of the Macmillan plan. The Macmillan plan was announced to be implemented on October 1, 1958, with an intention to strongly influence the progress made towards the Zurich and London agreements. This strategic move successfully yielded the desired outcomes.

The significant negotiations that began in Zurich on February 5, 1959 aiming to address the Cyprus issue, involved the Greek and Turkish Prime ministers, Karamanlis and Menderes. Along with other diplomatic officials as well as military experts, they fine-tuned the details and solidify the final arrangements of the agreements concerning Cyprus. Though the foundational structure had been secretly reached through ongoing negotiations, this was done with the awareness and involvement of the US and Britain (II, 1999). By mid-January 1959, the two countries had reached an agreement on the key issues. A few days later, on January 29, Makarios was informed of the progress during a meeting at the Greek Prime Minister's residence. The published meeting minutes revealed that he appeared satisfied with the outcome. This made the task of Karamanlis and Menderes in Zurich relatively easy, and on February 11th, the agreement was officially announced. However, the final step remained: the agreement needed to be signed by the UK, the Greek Cypriots, and the Turkish Cypriots (II, 1999).

A few days later, on February 17th, the London Conference commenced after an invitation from the British Prime Minister Macmillan “[...] *Britain used its authority to force the Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives to come together to discuss a common solution* [...]” (Richmond, 2002). The conference included the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the UK, Greece, and

Turkey as well as representatives from the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The conference spanned three days and concluded with the signing of the agreements by all parties involved. While there were some objections from Makarios and the Greek Cypriots initially, these concerns were swiftly resolved and did not impact the content of the Zurich agreement.

The signing of the agreements marked the beginning of a new chapter in Cyprus' history, striking by the tragedy that continues to this day. The first agreement, known as the Treaty of Establishment, granted Great Britain sovereign power over two bases in the island while retaining training privileges. The second agreement, the Treaty of Guarantee, involved Britain, Greece, and Turkey and pledged to respect and safeguard Cyprus' sovereign independence, territorial integrity, and security, explicitly prohibiting both enosis and taksim. The third treaty, the Treaty of Alliance, was signed by Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, aiming to ensure appropriate measures would be taken to counteract any assault or hostile action threatening the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of Cyprus (Moore, 2001). Following the enforcement of the London – Zurich agreements, the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus became effective, leading to Cyprus' attainment of independence on August 16, 1960 (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). This significant event resulted in Cyprus' membership in the UN, the Council of Europe, and the Commonwealth. Additionally, the election of Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios as the first President of the RoC marked the nation's commitment to democratic principles and self-determination.

### **2.1.5 The Challenges Faced by Cyprus since Independence**

With this limited form of independence overseen by Greece, Turkey, and the UK as guarantor powers, it quickly became apparent that achieving stability and tranquility for the newly formed Republic would be challenging. The dissatisfaction of the Greek Cypriot population stemmed from the failure to achieve unification with Greece and the excessive privileges granted to the Turkish Cypriots, who represented a minority. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly supported the formation of the new republic. They acknowledged the significant power they were granted in shaping the government of the state and were reassured by Turkey's commitment to

safeguard their position on the island (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). Archbishop Makarios' request for constitutional amendments<sup>7</sup> to address these concerns was denied by Britain, leading to inter-communal violence (Hadjipavlou, 2007).

The crisis in Cyprus in December 1963 was a result of Turkish Cypriots' withdrawal from the government, leading to the perception of an intentional effort to partition Cyprus (Kyriacou, 2000). This crisis motivated Turkish Cypriots to propose for a separate administration for both communities while they were fearful of a potential military intervention by Turkey. The RoC managed to sustain its operations by implementing the doctrine of necessity, authorized by the UN Security Council Resolution 186 in March 1964. Subsequently, Turkish planes conducted bombings in various parts of Cyprus, leading to the deployment of a Greek military contingent to protect the island from Turkish military intervention but the situation was soon escalated. As a result, a United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) was established in Cyprus aiming to prevent further clashes (Erickson & Uyer, 2020).

#### **2.1.6 International efforts and American mediation in resolving the Cyprus conflict**

Although the primary responsibility for peacemaking was assigned to the UN, the US also undertook the task of brokering an agreement. President Johnson issued a strong warning to prevent Turkish intervention in early June 1964 (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). Dean Acheson, former secretary of state under the Truman administration, led an independent effort initiated by Washington. In July, Acheson proposed the unification of Cyprus with Greece, on the condition that Turkey would be granted a sovereign military base on the island, similar to the arrangement made with Britain in 1960. Additionally, the Turkish Cypriots would receive significant minority rights, overseen and protected by a resident international commissioner (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). However, Makarios swiftly rejected the US proposal, arguing that a sovereign Turkish base would impede enosis and grant Ankara excessive influence over the island's affairs. A revised version of the plan was later presented, offering Turkey a fifty-year lease on a base instead of full sovereignty. However, both Greek Cypriots and Turkey rejected the revised offer. Following multiple unsuccessful attempts to refine the plan, Washington eventually abandoned its efforts (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

---

<sup>7</sup> The 13 amendments, also referred to as the "13 points," were put forth by Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus, on 30 November 1963. These proposed changes aimed to modify the representation of the two communities within the government structure.

Despite the formal mediation effort's failure, U Thant, the UN Secretary General, continued to demonstrate unwavering dedication to resolve the issue in Cyprus. In 1966, he enlisted the help of Carlos Bernades, a Brazilian diplomat, to facilitate direct dialogue between the two sides (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). However, Bernades' initial efforts were hindered by political chaos in Greece, including a military coup. Initially, there was optimism that the coup might lead to a settlement in Cyprus, but talks between the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers were a failure (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). In November 1967, the intercommunal fight intensified, prompting Turkey to prepare for invasion. In response, Greece recalled General Grivas and agreed to reduce its forces on the island. The Turkish Cypriots took this opportunity to announce their own provisional administration. Archbishop Makarios and other Greek Cypriots were convinced that Turkish Cypriots needed political autonomy. Makarios also acknowledged that enosis was not possible and Cyprus would remain independent (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). Talks resumed in May 1968 under UN auspices, with the Turkish Cypriots appearing positive to make constitutional concessions and Makarios struggling to grant more autonomy for them. Nevertheless, negotiations continued for six more years, with a potential agreement on the horizon at one point. However, hopes were shattered by the tragic events of 1974.

### **2.1.7 The unlawful Turkish invasion and the division of Cyprus**

The violent confrontations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots after 1967 were declined, however, a crucial internal strife within the Greek Cypriot community, emerged. By the time, Makarios has abandoned the idea of enosis in pursuing a more practical approach, however, a large number of Greek Cypriots were still attached to the concept (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). Grivas, in 1971, upon his return to Cyprus, established an organization, commonly known as EOKA-B, strongly supporting the unification with Greece. The group was engaged in a terrorist campaign against Makarios administration and on several occasions, attempted to assassinate him (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). Following Grivas death in early 1974, the situation escalated and EOKA-B was left under the direct control of the oppressive new leader of the Greek military junta, Brigadier Dimitrios

Ioannidis<sup>8</sup>. Makarios, who feared an impending overthrow by the Greek army, with a letter addressed to the military dictatorship, appealed for the removal of the Greek officers from Cyprus. Ioannidis instead, commanded the Greek forces stationed on the island, to expel the archbishop (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

On 15 July, following the directives of the Greek military Junta, the Cypriot National Guard, orchestrated a coup d'état aiming to assassinate Makarios and install pro-enosis nationalist Nikos Sampson as the new leader (Kiratli, 2012). Consequently, Makarios was forced to leave the island. The rise of Sampson in the leadership of Cyprus, witnessed also the rise of a pro-Greek government advocating for enosis. On 20 July, Turkey, viewing these developments as a violation of the Treaty of Guarantee, used its power and seized the opportunity to militarily intervene in Cyprus, occupying 5% of the island's territory and establishing Turkish administration in the northern part. The Greek Junta and the putschist regime in Nicosia experienced their downfall on July 23-24 (Theofanous, 2023).

The UN Security Council's Resolution 353 appeals did not stop Turkey's aggressive measures in defiance of the ceasefire agreement signed on July 22. On 14 August, Turkey unilaterally terminated negotiations and entered into a second, more substantial assault on Cyprus. As a result, thousands of Greek Cypriots were forced to flee from their homes and approximately 37% of the island, occupied by Turkey (Theofanous, 2023). It is crucial to acknowledge that at the time by which Turkey invaded in Cyprus, the UNFICYP was already stationed in the island. The international community condemned Turkish actions solely by mere statements and resolutions, emphasizing the respect of Cyprus' independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Since, the Green Line has emerged as a Demilitarized Zone under the administration of the UN to divide the two communities.

---

<sup>8</sup> Dimitrios Ioannidis, also known as "The Invisible Dictator," was a prominent figure in the military junta that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. While he held no official position within the junta, he exercised significant influence behind the scenes.



Image 1 – Cyprus Green Line (Source: <https://meanderingminimalists.com/green-line/>)

### 2.1.8 The Aftermath of the invasion

The consequences for Cyprus following Turkey's invasion, were devastated as approximately 200,000 Greek-Cypriots and 45,000 Turkish-Cypriots were forced to abandon their homes and displace in the south and north parts of Cyprus, respectively (Zembylas, 2011). The implications for the conceptual and constitutional status of the island were profound as for once more, the island was left in uncertainty (Papadakis, 2007). The Greek Cypriots, although feeling a strong sense of betrayal towards Greece attributed to the actions of the Greek junta, sought political support from their country (Theophanous, 2023). On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots initially welcomed the Turkish troops in the island, however, gradually they grew uneasy with Turkey's military and political control in the north, given also the influx of Turkish settlers (Papadakis, 2007).

In this complex landscape, the RoC remained the solitary state in Cyprus to be internationally recognized. Conversely, the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, established in 1983, failed to attain international recognition. As a result, the Greek Cypriot economy underwent a remarkable recovery and even experienced a period of significant growth in the years following, while the Turkish Cypriot side endured stagnation and its inhabitants were plunged into isolation and poverty (Papadakis, 2007). These circumstances prompted numerous Turkish Cypriots to leave the island, while individuals from Turkey, continued to settle in the northern region.

Under the circumstances, the Greek Cypriot community was forced to change its policy and agreed to negotiate aiming to reach a resolution in the form of a federal state. The High – Level Agreements between the two in the dispute during 1977 and 1979, marked a significant milestone as both communities agreed on a framework of a bi-zonal, bi-communal republic which would grant both equal political rights. The proposed framework provided the establishment of two constituent states within the context of a future federated state. However, as of 2023, the international community's extensive efforts to reach a mutual agreement, the Cyprus issue remains unresolved due to the competing interests of the two communities.

### **2.1.9 The Five External Actors in the animosity**

Fisher (2001), acknowledges the competing desires for enosis and taksim by the Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively, to have distinguished the conflict as an “identity” one. Given the Orthodox Christian or Muslim identification between the inhabitants prior to British colonial rule, the communities aligned themselves with Greece and Turkey, respectively, leading in separate self-views and the absence of a unified Cypriot national identity. As Novosseloff cites (2021) prior 1974, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots referred to each other as Greeks or Turks in Cyprus. However, following the tragic events, they began to identify themselves as Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. It is important to highlight that while the Greek Cypriots have gradually moved from the concept of enosis, Turkish Cypriots remain attached to the idea of partition. This would explain the reasons of which the Cyprus conflict remains one of the longest-standing instances of competing nationalisms in the Mediterranean and Middle East regions, persisting for nearly 50 years, despite the numerous attempts at diplomatic negotiations. Fisher (2001) supports that this lasting nature, is attributed to the deep-seated nature of the identity-based tensions combined with the influence of loyalties and perspectives of both communities, due to Cyprus' turbulent history. Such, would explain why Greek Cypriots view the conflict as an international issue occurred by Turkey's unlawful invasion to an independent state and Turkish Cypriots perceive it as an inter-communal conflict due to Greek Cypriot's ethnic clashes (Şahin, 2013). The contrasting narratives of the communities, contribute to the complexity of the Cyprus problem.

### ***The Guarantor Powers***

The primary issue is that both communities, have been unable to freely negotiate the future of Cyprus without external interference since the beginning. They were not even permitted to draft their own Constitution, and the Guarantor powers have consistently meddled in the island's internal affairs. Through the 1960 Treaty of Guarantees, these powers established a balance among themselves, creating a unique system with "Guarantors" attached which has led to an overabundance of external involvement in the Cypriot conflict. The UK, as a former colonial power, Turkey as a neighboring country, and Greece as the ancestral heritage of the majority of the island's population all share some responsibility for perpetuating the conflict. Some stakeholders believe that the Guarantors, along with the involved parties, are not genuinely motivated to resolve the Cyprus problem. The involvement of foreign powers in Cyprus, has been highlighted as a means to achieve their own ends, further emphasizing the strategic importance of the region (Katsos & Forrer, 2014). Both the Greek Cypriots and the UN, now regard this system as outdated.

### ***The Ambiguous UK***

The UK's role in Cyprus has always been extensively ambiguous from the outset as the country's strategic interests in the region, have shaped its approach to the conflict. It is important to note that the British colonial legacy has been positively related to both the frequency and intensity of ethnic conflicts, fostering competition between ethnic groups, which can readily spiral into conflict (Blanton et al., 2001). While engaging in discussions about the island's future with the Greek Cypriot community, Britain has extended an invitation to Turkey to partake in the discussions regarding the island's future, potentially disregarding the stipulations outlined in Article 16 of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne "[...] *Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty [...]*" as well as Article 21 "*Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the 5th November, 1914, will acquire British nationality [...] and will there upon lose their Turkish nationality [...] have the right to opt for Turkish nationality within two years [...] provided that they leave Cyprus within*

*twelve months after having so [...]”and reigniting the rivalry between Greece and Turkey. In a move that favored the Turkish Cypriot community disproportionately, they were given a blocking minority despite their smaller population. It became obvious that the main objective of the British was to prevent enosis. Consequently, Britain has used its position as a guarantor power to exert influence and mediate in the conflict, positioned itself as impartial referee in what appeared to be a Greek-Turkish dispute. However, its active involvement has diminished over the years.*

Since Cyprus gained independence, the primary focus of the UK has been to maintain its Sovereign Base Areas in Akrotiri and Dhekelia, emphasizing its deep-rooted interest in preserving stability and control on the island. Britain’s decision can be seen as a reflection of the evolving geopolitical landscape and strategic concerns of the British Empire. By establishing sovereign bases on the island, Britain potentially gained the advantage of strategic military benefits, including the ability to project power and protect maritime trade routes (Mainwaring & Aldrich, 2019). This strategic calculation follows a historical pattern where major powers have sought to establish military footholds in crucial regions to safeguard their geopolitical and economic interests. The Sovereign bases in Cyprus serving exclusively for military purposes, house the largest British military base outside of the UK.

### ***Turkey's Strategic Advantages***

As Novosseloff supports (2021), Turkey's return to Cyprus in 1954-1955, is motivated by a feeling of isolation stemmed from their experiences during World War II. Turkey’s concerns related mainly to Greece’s growing dominance in the Aegean Sea following the Dodecanese islands’ transfer from Italy and increased control over the Mediterranean in case in which the British, withdrew from Cyprus. These concerns however, were alleviated following Turkey’s NATO membership in 1952 along with Greece, its strong relationship with London and Washington and the presence of Northern Cyprus. The military base established in the occupied territory of Cyprus, pro-

vides Turkey with a strategic advantage and enables the country not only to exert pressure in negotiations but also to control over the northern territorial waters<sup>9</sup>. The TRNC recognition by Turkey gained wide criticism by the international community to the extent that many concerns were raised regarding the legitimacy of Turkey's military presence on the island.

It should be noted that under Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, both Greece and Turkey accepted the annexation of Cyprus to Britain. The major inclusion within the treaty under Article 21, recognizes the island's Turkish inhabitants as British citizens availing them the chance for opting citizenship of Turkey and their settlement in Turkey. However, it is worth mentioning, though, that less than 3.000 out of 9.000 Turkish residents opted Turkish nationality had actually left the island by 21 October 1927. This raised tension within the Foreign Office at the time, with the remaining 6,000 Turkish residents being a possible source of trouble to higher authorities (Πούλλαδος, n.d).

The geostrategic location of Cyprus holds immense significance for Turkey in the Mediterranean region. Historically, the issue of Cyprus has continued to be a critical concern for the Turkish military mostly through substantial mobilization troops. However, this drew lesser attention from the civilians and managed not to heavily affect public opinions despite the stable funding made by Turkey to TRNC. As Novosseloff (2021) had suggested during time of Denktash, President Erdoğan was not directly involved with Turkish Cypriot administration. President Erdoğan's support for the Turkish Cypriots was not especially empathetic until he spotted a chance to enhance Turkey's clout in the region. This has renewed the interest of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the Cypriot situation after the failure of the "Annan Plan". Observers have noted that recently, Turkey has renewed its domination over the Turkish elements on the island (Novosseloff, 2021). This involves pressurizing citizenship towards people of Turkish-origin, intervention in

---

<sup>9</sup> Turkey's exertion of pressure in the geopolitical disputes over the Eastern Mediterranean has raised significant concerns and sparked criticism from the global community. The country has asserted its extensive rights over the region, which include laying claim to maritime territories surrounding Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. Turkey argues that its interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea grants jurisdiction over these waters due to its proximity to the mainland and numerous islands. In order to reinforce its claims, Turkey has actively pursued exploration and drilling activities in the disputed waters, often employing its navy to safeguard its vessels. These actions have stirred strong objections from countries, Greece and Cyprus in particular who argue that Turkey's moves violate their sovereign rights. As a result, tensions have escalated, leading to confrontations and an escalation of military postures in the region.

education provided to the Turkish Cypriot youth, restricting freedom of expression, trying to modify laws, constructing larger mosques, and unlawfully running Quran courses for discriminating against the Turkish Cypriot authorities (Novosseloff, 2021).

### ***Greece: Silence Speaks Volumes***

In the 1960s, Athens made attempts to establish a hierarchical relationship between Greek Cypriots and Greece, using Hellenism as a pretext. These efforts though, proved to be largely ineffective as Greece was unable to assert control over the Cypriots and in particular Makarios, who pursued an increasingly independent path, rejecting the influence of the Guarantor powers and opting for a policy of “non-alignment”. The special bond between Cyprus and Greece, mainly due to the shared heritage, is commonly known. However, Greece can be said to have a rather a cautious approach towards Cyprus, due to the fact that Turkey, is one of Greece’s primary trade partners (Novosseloff, 2021). It is also important to highlight that Greece’s involvement in the conflict goes far beyond what has been publicly acknowledged. Initially, Greece failed to oppose Britain and Turkey when violating the Articles 16, 20 and 21 of the Treaty of Lausanne. These articles not only outline the important international legal framework for the island but also bring to light the catastrophic events that took place in Cyprus in the years followed. Thus, one can argue that silence on behalf of Greece, marked a turning point in Cyprus’ history. Although the Greek nation has consistently shown strong support towards Cyprus over the years and reinforced the RoC’s efforts of European integration, its crucial role at the London-Zurich agreements, cannot be disregarded. The substantial concessions and transfer of authority of Cyprus, marked the largest “sell off” of the island. Afterall, Greece and Cyprus are separate countries, despite their special bond. Unlike Ankara, Athens doesn’t seem to be content to let Cyprus handle its own problems and doesn’t have the power to influence the Greek Cypriots’ bargaining position. Despite the cultural and socioeconomic similarities between the two countries, Cyprus is not as strategically important to Greece as it is to Turkey. Greece is therefore unlikely to have a major impact or to be a barrier in this situation. About 30,000 Turks, according to Novosseloff (2021), applied for refuge in Greece after the failed coup attempt in Ankara, in July 2016.

## *The Soviets*

Sakkas and Zhukova (2013) conducted a study on the Soviet Union's role in the Cyprus conflict between 1960 and 1974. They focused on the strategic objectives of the Soviet Union in the eastern Mediterranean and its impact on regional actors such as Turkey and Greece. The Soviet Union aimed to increase its influence in the region and disrupt NATO's southeastern flank, which is why they strongly opposed the partition of Cyprus and supported a unified and demilitarized state. During the 1964 crisis, the Soviet Union provided arms and equipment to the island and established diplomatic, commercial, and cultural relations with Cyprus. They also played a significant role in organizing Cyprus' state security and protecting Makarios from assassination attempts through the Cyprus Communist Party AKEL.

Apart from strategic considerations, the Soviet Union's support for Cyprus was also influenced by economic and geopolitical factors. The island's geographical location made it an attractive potential base for the Soviet Navy, allowing them to challenge NATO's dominance in the region. Additionally, the Soviets wanted access to Cyprus' rich copper reserves to secure vital raw materials. On the other hand, Turkey perceived the Soviet Union's involvement in Cyprus as a threat to its national security. The division of Cyprus in 1974, further complicated the relationship between the two countries particularly following the island's independence where Cyprus established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and their cooperation increased. Russia, as the former Soviet Union's successor, has persisted in supporting attempts to find a sustainable solution for Cyprus, mutually acceptable.

Russia and Cyprus have established a tight economic and commercial relationship, with the island acting as a hub for Russian investments and corporate ventures. Cyprus' economy and in particular the travel and hospitality sectors, have been greatly benefited from Russian tourists. However, when Cyprus followed other EU member states and imposed sanctions on Russian ships and aircraft following Russia's invasion in Ukraine, the special bond between the two, has weaken.

Moscow as a response to Cyprus' sanctions, hinted at the possibility of direct flights to the Turkish Cypriot Ercan airport, fueling the rumors of may be seeking closer ties with Northern Cyprus. Some nationalist groups in Turkey and Northern Cyprus interpret this move as Russias' shift of focus from the Greek Cypriot Administration to the TRNC, potentially leading to Russia's recog-

dition of a Turkish Cypriot state (2023). Although Russian officials did not confirm such intentions, the development along with the announcement of plans to provide consular services for Russian nationals in Northern Cyprus (2023), has caused anxiety among Greek Cypriots. In any case, the bond and diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey grew stronger, driven by shared interests and a desire to balance against Western influence.

### ***The Americans***

It is important to acknowledge that the US involvement in the Cyprus conflict, is a topic of debate. Wenzke and Lindley (2009), listed some of the conspiracy theories ranging from ulterior motives to direct accusations of explicit support of Greek and Turkish intervention by the US. Several authors cited in this study such as Christopher Hitchens, John L. Scherer and Laurence Stern, have questioned complacency of the US in their respective books, suggesting that the US was wayward in curbing the Greeks and Turks effectively and might have even fundamentally supported their action.

Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig (Wenzke and Lindley, 2009) charge the US with complete knowledge of the Greek coup and Turkish invasion plans. The authors believe the US plotted in a strategic manner, devising one of the first plans actually to divide the island of Cyprus between Greek and Turkish Cypriot regions, with an eye for military and intelligence and in addition to concerns of communist influence and possible withdraw from British forces. This is well proven by the interviews and official documents from the State Department, shown that the US had all the means and knowledge required to intervene and prevent the situation but it deliberately did not. These hypotheses have not been without their own equal share of controversy. Critics argue that for ten years, the US efforts on the island were not guided by a single, coherent strategy or goal. Rather, the US formed its position on Cyprus, following the tragic events in 1974, with the only constant goal to keep its NATO members, Greece and Turkey, out of conflict.

What is more, is the indication that the US did not focus on the military or strategical value of the island but rather to contain the Soviet bloc and strengthen NATO's south-eastern flank in front of the perceived Communist threat (Wenzke and Lindley, 2009). The US facilities in the island before Cypriot independence and agreement with Cypriot government to extend their functions, confirm that the US was more interested in preservation of the status quo on the island so that its facilities

should function properly, rather than encouraging a coup or invasion. While there are conspiracy theories to the suggestions of US complicity in the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the counter-arguments emphasize lack of coherent US policy and focus on containment exercise, concerning the Communist threat in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Adding to the fact that history does matter, the frozen conflict in Cyprus is five decades long and its unresolved status reaffirms the deep-rooted causes and complex dynamics contributing to its unresolved status. Geographically, the position of Cyprus is also vital in the sense that it plays a bridge role between East and West Mediterranean with strategic proximity to various regional conflicts. The involvement of external actors further complicates the situation significantly. Generally, the Cyprus conflict is complex and it needs a meaningful understanding and approach in dealing with its complexities effectively while searching for a sustainable resolution.

## **2.2 Cyprus' path to the EU membership: A strategy towards resolution?**

It is essential to acknowledge the recognition that Greece, the UK, the US, and other Western nations faced backlash for their involvement in the tragic events of Cyprus in 1974. Given this prevailing sentiment, Greece made efforts to persuade the leadership of Greek Cypriots that fostering a stronger relationship with the EC and eventually becoming a member may result in a potential resolution of the Cyprus issue. Consequently, despite any prevailing bitterness or disappointment, Cyprus had to adopt a pragmatic approach and focus on the future. In this new era, it was crucial for Cyprus to establish closer ties with nations that shared similar values, ensuring alignment with countries that uphold fundamental principles such as democracy and human rights (Theophanous, 2023). With this perspective in mind, Cyprus aimed to develop a Customs Union Agreement with the EC, building on their existing Association Agreement which was ratified in 1972.

Despite the concerns from some European countries related to the island's political situation and the agreement's potential implications for Turkey, the Customs Union Agreement, strongly supported by Greece, was ratified in 1987 and came into effect on January 1st, 1988. This agreement, held significant political importance as it could potentially pave the way for Cyprus' integration into the EU even in the absence of a resolution to its de facto division, setting a precedent for potential accession in unresolved conflicts. The implementation of the agreement resulted in a

decline in the significance of the primary and secondary sectors of the Cypriot economy, while the tertiary sector continued to grow (Theophanous, 2023).

The significance of the EU for Cyprus grew when the RoC applied for EU membership on 4 July 1990 (Tocci, 2003). The initial opposition of AKEL to the RoC's application, was a significant factor in the country's political landscape. However, the opposition to EU membership was not limited to AKEL, as strong opposition also came from the Church and other political parties. The reasons for this opposition to EU membership were multifaceted. The perceived cultural threat posed by EU membership was identified as an important factor that had been overlooked in explanations of hostility towards the European Union (McLaren, 2002). Furthermore, the impact of the Eurozone crisis on national foreign policy, particularly in the case of Cyprus, also influenced the stance of political parties towards EU membership (Christou & Kyris, 2017). In addition, a perceived cultural threat was a powerful explanation for opposition to EU membership (Swami et al., 2017). Moreover, the impact of EU membership conditionality and socialization by international institutions was also a relevant factor in shaping the attitudes of political parties towards EU membership (Kelley, 2004). The change in AKEL's stance, from opposition to support for EU membership, created a positive atmosphere in the Republic of Cyprus (Grigoriadis & Felek, 2018). However, it is important to note that at the time, the UK, as one of the guarantor powers of Cyprus, expressed concerns about the application and advised President Vassiliou to prioritize resolving the Cyprus issue through negotiations before pursuing EU accession (Theophanous, 2023). On the other hand, Greece and the majority of Greek Cypriots favored the application which influenced President's Vassiliou final decision to proceed (Theophanous, 2023).

The RoC's application initially gave hope for a possible solution to the Cyprus problem, as the EU was offering incentives for reunification talks and providing the necessary political and legal framework for a new bi-communal Cypriot state (Tocci, 2003). However, this application sparked a strong reaction from Turkey and Turkish Cypriots (Tocci, 2003). As a direct response, on 12 July 1990, the Turkish Cypriot leadership closed the crossing point on the green line and dispatched a memorandum to the Italian Prime Minister who held the EC Presidency, Gianni de Michelis, strongly denouncing the application on behalf of the entire island. Along with Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot contended the RoC's application for EU membership invalid as it did not represent the Turkish Cypriots and violated the 1960 Constitution and the Treaty of Guarantee (Tocci, 2003). They further claimed it contradicted the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements and

the UN Security Council's call to refrain from unilateral actions that could impede negotiations. Nonetheless, in September 1990, the Council of Ministers urged the Commission to provide its assessment of the application (Tocci, 2003). It is important to note that up to the time, previous attempts at mediation, mainly by the UN, have continuously been unable to achieve a resolution that would allow the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to repair their fragile political bond (Fisher, 2001). At the time, various factors, including the relations within the EU-Greece-Turkey triangle and the two Cypriot communities, deteriorate the inter-communal relations in Cyprus. The Greco-Turkish relations during this period were also particularly turbulent (Rumelili, 2003). In the late 1990s, as Turkey sought candidacy status in the EU, the tensions between the two nations escalated over the deployment of a surface-to-air missile system in Cyprus (Rumelili, 2003). The Greek opposition to Turkey's entry was significant in shaping the EU's stance on further cooperation with Turkey (Kassimeris & Tsoumpanou, 2008). The European Court of Justice's ruling to impose an embargo on exports from Turkish Cypriots to EU member states dealt a significant blow to the Turkish Cypriot economy and strained inter-communal relations as it has restricted opportunities for and actual intergroup contact between Turkish Cypriots and EU member states (Ioannou et al., 2015). The Greek Cypriot community's concerns about Turkey's accession to the EU were primarily focused on aspects relevant to their community, reflecting the deep-seated ethnic nationalism and identity issues (Loizides, 2007).

The Helsinki European Council in 1999 declared that the political resolution of the Cyprus dispute would facilitate Cyprus' accession to the European Union. However, it also stated that if no settlement had been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession would not be conditional upon a resolution (Basheska & Kochenov, 2015). To ensure a smooth accession process for Cyprus, Greece played a crucial role, expressing its readiness to veto the entire enlargement process if any Member State attempted to exclude the potential inclusion of a divided Cyprus (Basheska & Kochenov, 2015). Greece's primary goal was to ensure Cyprus' full membership in the EU, regardless of the political challenges the country faced. Cyprus' accession to the EU, marked a significant milestone in the island's history as it did not only offer new prospects for resolving the protracted Cyprus conflict but also brought about the transformative power of EU membership, providing an impetus for increased EU involvement in peace negotiations (Casaglia, 2018).

## **Chapter 3 – Theoretical Framework**

### **The EU's role in Conflict Resolution**

The EU's engagement in support for peacekeeping and mediation worldwide, transformed it into a significant conflict resolution actor. The EU will therefore play a notably important role in this chapter with attention on its theoretical framework. Through an analysis of the fundamental principles and strategies been employed by EU, this particular chapter seeks to unwrap the inner workings of the organization and determine the factors enhancing its efficacy in conflict resolution. Understanding the theoretical framework of the EU helps in understanding how it tries to resolve the conflicts and whether it is capable of leading towards establishing a lasting peace process causing stability.

#### **3.1 The EU's Framework for Conflict Resolution: From Coal and Steel to Lasting Peace**

Robert Schuman advocated the idea of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, which should encourage lasting peace as well as solidarity in Europe. By integrating the economic production of France and Germany, Schuman wanted to make war, permanently impossible between the two nations. Interestingly, this initiative was successful to have prevented conflicts between the states who participated and had laid the foundation for building a stronger unified European Union. During the course of the years, the EU has made quite a big leap in enhancing the integration process, becoming an influential global player in international politics. The influence of the EU to conflict resolution is not confined within a specific region or an issue but spans across diverse challenges of the world. This ability firmly solidifies the role of EU in conflict resolution and peace keeping and proves its dedication not only for preventing conflicts within its own borders but additionally to promote stability and peaceful relationships beyond its borders.

Initially, integration had been largely focused on economics from where foreign relations had worked mostly in an intergovernmental vein. That started to change slowly over to what it is today, with higher coordination placed on foreign relations. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was established in 1970 aiming to realize these potentials. The EPC would essentially have a role of promoting informal consultation between EU member states aimed at enhancing the creation of

common foreign policies. This pivotal step marked a significant advancement towards greater co-operation and coordination in foreign affairs.

A major breakthrough towards this development lays in the creation of the EPC which in turn facilitated the emergence of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the EU framework (Sjursen, 2011). This transformation was eventually crystallized in the Treaty of Maastricht 1992, further solidified by the Treaty of Lisbon 2009 (Sjursen, 2011). The Treaty of Lisbon established the position of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with a ready-to-use European diplomatic corps known as the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Henökl, 2016). It also gave the EU its own legal personality, making it capable to conclude agreements with other countries and international bodies (Henökl, 2016). Article 21, according to the Treaty of the EU, identifies the objectives of the CFSP targeting the following as elements: preservation of peace and ensuring security, strengthening the international security scenario, promotion of international cooperation underpinned and the application of democratic principles such as human rights, the rules of law, fundamental freedoms recognition (Huff, 2015).

To achieve these objectives, the EU builds partnership and political dialogues with the main international actors according to reciprocal interests and advantages. This takes into account regular summitry with strategic partner countries and meetings at different levels with the countries and regional organisations across the continents. Besides, as an essential element of the CFSP, the Union has also established the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The policy has granted the EU the power to carry out civilian missions and military operations in third states under the umbrella of its action outside the Union's borders (Irrera, 2021).

The EU recognized the need for better policy coherence and enhancing the relationships with other countries as well as international organizations including the UN, NATO, and the African Union. In 2017, the Permanent Structured Cooperation on Defence (PESCO) was launched during the European Council as an enhanced cooperation mechanism to enhance coordination and increase defense investment in developing defense capabilities as had been stipulated by the Articles 42.6 and 46 of the EU Treaty and Protocol 10. The creation of PESCO is viewed as a very crucial step toward deepening force cooperation between member states that gives the opportunity to help the process of developing the profile and contribution of security and defense of the EU (Irrera, 2021). PESCO is also being viewed as a way to attend the capability shortfalls and better coordinate in defense investment which is entwined with the objective of the EU in order to further lift up their

investment liberalization and amplify their defense capabilities (Irrera, 2021). Moreover, the initiative is considered as a positive force of integration in the EU that further highlights its potential towards supporting development of the capabilities that are related to defense within EU.

The EU employs various instruments and mechanisms to effectively support conflict resolution efforts. The operation of the EU is thus operated on the basis of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) by which it authorizes its member states to execute humanitarian, peacekeeping operations and civilian as well as military missions wherever required in the crisis management. Besides, the EU also deploys European Union Special Representatives (EUSRs) who serve as facilitators of dialogue, mediation, and conflict resolution to fine-tune conflict resolution processes on certain regions or conflicts. Financial support regarding the EU applies instruments such as the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and the European Peace Facility (EPF). IcSP provides a reinforced capacity in relation to partner countries and organizations with the capacity regarding root causes of conflicts, to promote dialogue additionally peace processes. On the other hand, the EPF strengthens the EU capabilities in military training, assistance to equipment and support to peace operations in third countries. In addition, the EU carries out civilian missions called Civilian CSDP Missions that are sent to conflict areas to support local institutions and the rule of law. Among other approaches, the EU also uses sanctions, humanitarian aid, and conflict prevention measures in its peace resolution program.

### **3.2 The EU as a Normative Power: Redefining Global Politics**

In other words, it would have been asserted that the definition of global actorness for the EU is naturally bound with the establishment of a distinct role which would set it apart from the other power or at best as being something different from the existing status quo. The discourse on the EU as a “normative power” suggests that it is not only a major player but also a potentially re-definer and shaper of the prevailing norms of the international community. Firstly, introduced by Manners (2002), this idea stressed the specific ability of the EU to influence, through exportations of its principles, others’ behavior and values. Manners (2002) purports that the power of the EU is normative, setting it apart from military power traditionally used, as it does not rely on military force or self-interest, but instead on universal goods and norm leadership.

In fact, even where military power might complement normative power, the EU as a normative power does not necessarily have to rely on military force by influencing international politics. However, in contrast to previous conceptualisations of the power of the EU as a “civilian power”, its strength is essentially derived from the power of example and persuasive norms on others (Diez & Pace, 2011).

A key issue at the center of diffusion of norms and values from the EU towards the rest of the countries, entail the use of the tools and principles of “soft power”. Illustrating this influence is demonstrated above through various initiatives employed by the EU to transform non-democratic states into democratic nation-states. Therefore, it is obvious that the EU’s global influence is conditioned upon a certain defined set of assumptions regarding the kind of power, it wields globally. This power is characterized by the normative nature and deep links to identity, security and characteristic uniqueness that define Europe. For Diez and Pace (2011), this idea of the normative power Europe has its roots in the identity it provides to others and the subsequent change that is imposed on other units. Moreover, the normative aspect of the EU’s global force, expresses as well its genesis as a continental solution for peace and stability amid a war-torn continent, just like the inherent material limitations and political opportunities. Diez and Pace (2011) highlight the reputation of EU as an active constructive agent in global politics, outlining its normative influence in conflict transformation. They state that self-construction of the EU as a normative power, has an ability to bring about positive effects related to conflict resolution.

The described intervention of the EU in conflict resolution so far is identified as consisting of the two strands. One of them is represented by the use of traditional foreign policy tools, such as peacekeeping missions, diplomacy or sanctions. The second strand involves offering accession and association as means of conflict resolution (Diez & Pace, 2011). The first approach has been reflected in the foreign policy objectives of the EU as regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the EU has directed its peacebuilding efforts towards some form of conflict resolution (Persson, 2011). This is in line with the argument that EU, has conceptualised peace and security and aims towards contributing to international peace and security (Stivachtis et al. 2013., p.). Moreover, Diez and Pace (2011) further highlight the crucial role for successful mediation when a conflict reaches an impasse, underlining how the power, respect, and impartiality remain determinant factors for favorable outcomes. This assertion is in line with the idea that the successful measurement of the peace-making mediation should not be based only on the peace agreement

signed but must be incorporated by broader changes in attitude and societal reforms. Since early 2000s, the EU has played its significant role of third-party mediation with both active and supportive involvement by mediating peace in both interstate to intrastate conflict negotiations. It has been implemented actively in many parts worldwide where it deployed peacekeeping missions and supporting democratic transitions.

For instance, it has played an integral part in supporting the Western Balkans as they facilitated the negotiations, the promotion of reconciliation and added to the stability and security of the region. As Kovačević (2021) makes it clear, the role of EU in the region is distinctive by using the array of foreign policy instruments from diplomacy, trade, financial assistance through to civilian and military missions and enlargement. Moreover, the EU has also been involved in conflict resolution in states such as Colombia, Ukraine and the Horn of Africa (Popescu, 2010). The EU's involvement is evident by its participation in conflict resolution, for example, in ceasefire negotiations during the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 and the rather low profile of the Union in international diplomatic frameworks targeted at frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space (Natorski, 2018). The EU has further played a major role in the enforcement of conflict prevention policies with special attention to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Central America, South Africa and Eastern Europe (Manners, 2006).

In spite of this, the EU has identified and addressed extant conflicts in regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh utilizing conflict resolution and crisis management tools albeit with differing effectiveness (Brown, 2015). More recently, the EU has played a vital and multifaceted role in facilitating the negotiations process between Ukraine and Russia with the overarching objective of achieving a peaceful resolution to the ongoing conflict. Apart from diplomatic engagements, the EU has shown commitment through decisive economic sanctions implementable against Russia, showing its displeasure with regard to Russia's actions in Ukraine. These sanctions are guided carefully with the aim of pressurizing Russia, and thereby cultivating an environment that can lead towards a peaceful resolution. Moreover, the EU has been actively extending both financial and political support to the government of Ukraine- not only for purposes of aiding with reform and reconstruction problems but also facilitating the country to deal with the devastating after-effects of conflict. The role of EU in conflict management had been studied within a range of contexts that included the Georgian case, where structural and conceptual factors influenced the EU approach with respect to conflict management (Whitman & Wolff,

2010). Such a potential of the EU to resolve conflicts has been replicated in various sectors such as in early warning systems and prevention, resulting in positive outcomes at conflict resolutions (Eralp & Beriker, 2005).

However, there is no denying that EU intervention in conflict resolution, does not always turn out to be successful. The EU sometimes fails to bring a meaningful change or sometimes its actions, aggravate a situation and even spark new off conflicts. Though, it is crucial to admit that power can also lend itself towards productive results and thus, power is not inherently negative (Diez & Pace, 2011).

### **3.3 Integration and Association in Conflict Transformation**

The EU's role in conflict resolution as a traditional third-party player and the institutional framework for conflict transformation are examined in great detail in the voluminous literature. Integration and association are the mechanisms used according to Diez and Pace (2011). The EU is widely acknowledged to have a major role in providing an institutional framework and acting as a mediator in order to achieve conflict transformation (Diez & Pace, 2011). However, the EU's capacity to promote and foster peace sparked doubts as some argue that it is a theoretical construct rather than a tangible entity (Manners, 2002). Recent research by Tocci (2021), however, indicates that the EU makes a concrete contribution to building positive peace and hence, reducing chances of war amongst European nations. Moreover, the EU's role as a normative power can hold a crucial place in determining the success of third-party interventions on the basis of how the conflict parties adopt the EU's construction and how they comply with the EU's norms (Diez & Pace, 2011). Higashino (2004) on the other hand, gives an opposing position according to which the impact of EU in conflicts – using as reference, the case of Northern Ireland – was very limited. According to the author, both integration and association were not viable alternatives until the conflicts ceased to be violent subordination conflicts. This counterargument challenges the prevailing notion that the EU's role in conflict transformation through integration and association, consistently yields positive outcomes.

### 3.4 The EU as a Mediator: Normative Power or Self-Fulfilling Prophecy?

As Diez and Pace (2011) indicate, the EU proactively represents itself as a mediator of border conflicts radiating its image as a bringer of good and influence, that is bound to be linked with the concept of normative power Europe. This is through international socialization where conflict parties are considered to get absorbed within the norms of EU as well as its rules. EU, in its operation, uses instruments such as association agreements to bring conflicting parties closer to its vision in general. Though this self-representation, the Union, holds the potential of a self-fulfilling prophecy as conflict parties may demand the promised benefits or negotiate for the better terms with EU (Diez & Pace, 2011).

One crucial element on the foreign policy of the EU, is its representation as a “force for good”, mostly associated with its transformative and normative bias (Barbé & Morillas, 2019). Nevertheless, such claim has lacked critics. Some scholars have contended that EU’s military involvement will weaken the distinct identity of the EU as a civilian international actor while others argue that acquisition of military power by the EU, would symbolize completion of a “state-building” epoch (Manners, 2002). Additionally, the portrayal of a EU as a “force for good”, led to expectations of a universal normative way of political engagements in the global politics that the EU was still struggling to contain (Noureddine, 2021). This positive construction of the EU, comes out both externally as well as internally, with a spread self-representation within the Commission, Parliament, and Council (Diez & Pace, 2011). While the European Parliament may hesitate to embrace this narrative, it adds to the EU’s self-conception as a “force for good”.

## **Chapter 4 - Research Methodology**

### **4.1 Introduction**

The Greek Cypriot community had a rather idealistic view of the EU and also had high expectations. As they were convinced that the rule of law in the Union prevailed and a democratic value system reigned supreme, they believed that solidarity between Member States is a lived value, both in theory and in practice. This implied that once Cyprus joined the EU, the Union would not tolerate Turkey's occupation of the northern part of the island, since it was after all, a European territory. However, nearly two decades after the accession, the Greek Cypriots are mainly disappointed as the EU, has failed to meet their expectations and the conflict remains unresolved.

### **4.2 Research design and Data collection**

This thesis will be based exclusively on qualitative methods. It focuses on relevant secondary sources such as books, published journals, articles and media sources in order to provide a comprehensive analysis related to the historical context of Cyprus and the roots and causes, as well as complexities of the Cyprus conflict. Utilizing secondary sources, this research will also provide the historical context related to Cyprus' integration to the EU. Secondary sources will also be used to identify the EU's mechanisms for conflict resolution and its role and capabilities in successfully resolving conflicts in other regions than Cyprus. Following a mixed method approach, using primary sources such as interviews with Greek Cypriots stakeholders and secondary sources, this study aims to shed light on the challenges and limitations that hinder the EU's role in conflict resolution, subsequently applied in the case of Cyprus. The extent of EU's effectiveness in resolving the Cyprus' conflict will be drawn upon the same method. To identify the initial expectations of both communities, mainly on part of the Greek Cypriot community, both primary and secondary sources are used. However, to identify Cyprus' current and future expectations, this study focuses only on primary sources. All data will be used to assess the impact of the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU concerning the Cyprus conflict and be used to address the island's future expectations in order to determine whether the EU can still play a catalytic role in resolving the Cyprus problem.

### 4.3 Data analysis

The data collected for this research will be analyzed using content methods in order to assess the expectations and realities existed in relation to the EU's involvement in the Cyprus conflict, from the perspective of Cyprus. This, therefore, sets the basis for this study to look into the extent where the EU has been able to fulfill its envisioned role in the resolution of the long-standing conflict that defines the island. The analysis will involve scrutinizing EU mechanisms, policies and initiatives implemented for conflict resolution and other relevant documents, perspectives and opinions of key stakeholders including a Greek Cypriot diplomat and politician who previously served as a UN Ambassador and negotiator of the Greek Cypriot community in the Cyprus reunification dialogues, a Member of the European Parliament and a senior Government official, currently involved in Cyprus' reunification talks. By this comprehensive approach, the research aims at shedding light on the extent of the effectiveness of the EU's role in addressing the Cyprus conflict as well as the challenges and limitations in facilitating a resolution.

### 4.4 Study limitations and Ethical Considerations

Limitations of the study may arise due to the space limit of this research. The Cyprus' conflict is a multifaced one, with many complexities and persist for nearly 50 years. As such, it has a long historical context. Therefore, this study may not include all details pertaining the conflict. In addition, limits as to the EU's policies and initiatives implementation in Cyprus may also arise. In any case, the research focuses on presenting a comprehensive analysis of the key events and facts related to the purposes and objectives of this study.

The basis of this research includes the existing available literature related to the topic and personal interviews specifically conducted for the purposes of this thesis. Therefore, participants might have restrictions in disclosing certain information, limiting the accuracy and reliability of the gathered information.

In addition, the specific timeframe of this thesis, may oppose limitations in fully capturing the entire aspects and intricacies of the EU's role in the Cyprus conflict. Thus, time constraint, may not give justice on the complexity of the political dynamics and the contextual changes.

It is important to acknowledge that the participants of this research, provided their consent to participate upon being informed for the aim and methodology of the study and the reasons for doing this research. Their personal information obtained during this research were taken into account,

thus anonymity is maintained in some cases upon request in order to respect the identity of the participants and avoid any consequences that may emanate from their participation.

## Chapter 5 – Data Presentation

### Expectations and Realities

Membership in the EU in May 2004, was an important achievement for Cyprus and indeed, it was an event of top priority given the expectations held by the Greek Cypriot community. The decision to join the EU, outlined general expectations that were generally united under one issue - the resolution of the Cyprus problem. The Greek Cypriots had in their minds that EU membership would be the catalyst and the impetus for progress leading eventually to achievement of unification of the island. Although marred with divided opinions, Turkish Cypriots felt that EU integration created a renewed impetus for negotiations and shared an increasing burden to seek a viable solution. This chapter instead will tackle the objective of Cyprus upon its entrance to the EU such as their aspirations and hopes for conflict resolution with the EU being a mediating normative power. This chapter will also delve into the challenges and constraints presented and hindered the efforts for sustainable resolution.

#### 5.1 The EU Bid of Greek Cypriots: A New Era Packed with Exciting Prospects?

The EU's expansion is commonly viewed as a means to promote unity and resolve disputes. In this light, the governments of Cyprus and Greece actively supported the RoC's accession into the EU as a means of employing the Union's established practices of linking various issues in order to reach agreements. This was, in turn, seen to have significant positive political implications. The immediate implication took effect by the opening of accession negotiations for Cyprus which urgent forcing Turkish policy and objectives concerning Cyprus to be rethought. Further, the EU involvement and the possibility of a Cyprus membership, was believed to would serve as a catalytic factor to remedy the conflict and reunite the island. In the longer term, based on the Greek and Greek Cypriot thinking, this could enshrine that membership, would ensure and guarantee a united federal Cyprus and would secure the island against any possible Turkish move in the future (Hutchence & Georgiades, 2018). Though not regarded as a panacea<sup>10</sup>, the EU support to UN initiatives was also projected to be instrumental. Cyprus as a member state, had an extremely sophisticated relationship with the EU among its associated countries and, moreover, the desire for a safe climate and monetary stability played their part in the application for EU membership

---

<sup>10</sup> The term "panacea" represents the meaning of a solution or remedy.

(Christou, 2002). The Greek government harped on the aspect of EU involvement in terms of security as well, stating that these would speed up over the conflict.

In addition, the EU membership would assure the existence and progress of the RoC, with the Turkish presence in the northern part of the island, not to be considered as a threat. This option is also regarded as saving the prospect in the future that the Turkish Cypriots may would like to join the EU, therefore Turkey itself, would demonstrate an improved position as short of full-membership, but only if it allowed a reunification of Cyprus (Hutchence & Georgiades, 2018). This was particularly because UN involvement had proved futile. By joining the EU, Greek Cypriots would introduce another influential player, sealing the feeling of security, the key aspect in the Greek Cypriot government's broader strategy.

## **5.2 The Turkish Cypriot perspective: Skepticism and Security Concerns**

In a nutshell, while the Greek Cypriots saw in the EU a credible mediator and an input factor in its capacity to substantiate their stance on important issues of the Cyprus conflict that would, in the end, deliver reunification of the island, it was the Turkish Cypriot leadership that held the highly skeptical view towards developments in EU-Cyprus relations. Cyprus' application to join the EU, was considered as both illegitimate and illegal (Tocci, 2003). This is due to the fact that Turkish Cypriots had not been a part of the engagement during the application process and that the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee, provided that Cyprus could not join an international organization if only one of the motherland countries (Greece) is a member (Christou, 2002). However, the EU defended by arguing that organizations *sui generis*<sup>11</sup>, like the EU, are not subject to such restrictions (Christou, 2002). Therefore, Cyprus became a candidate for enlargement in 1994 and the negotiations began during 1995 and 1998, with the Turkish Cypriot position to have gotten harder.

Rauf Denktash, the former leader of the self-declared TRNC, saw the EU accession process as a major obstacle for progress and imposed additional conditions such as the recognition of the illegal TRNC and a confederal solution. Position taken by Denktash was contrary to the recognized UN agreed framework for solution on a basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal state. Denktash refused to attend direct inter-communal talks unless his set conditions were met and refused also an invitation in 1998 to take part in the Cypriot negotiating team (Theophanous, 2023). Between 1998

---

<sup>11</sup> *Sui generis*, of their own kind.

– 2001, the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot continued to maintain a hardened position of veto on talks and of keeping restrictions in place on UN forces movement. This showed that the EU's economic and political security incentives, did not suffice to change its position of seeking a settlement.

### 5.3 The EU's perspective

The advantages of Cyprus's accession, have always been known to the EU. Despite small in size, Cyprus has a sophisticated and active economy and has strong connections with the former Soviet Republics, Russia, and the nations of the southern Mediterranean and Middle East (Hutchence & Georgiades, 2018). Within this perspective, the membership of Cyprus would encourage not only the maintenance of the North-South balance within the Union but also the facilitation of the realization of the political and economic objectives of EU in these regions, making the island a useful EU partner. Following the decision to begin the negotiation process, a consensus appears to have formed within the EU and its member states, as well as within the US, which was and still is, a significant player in the European political scenery, regarding how this problem could be tackled, even though these benefits were somewhat overshadowed by the island's division (Hutchence & Georgiades, 2018).

Similarly with the Greeks and Greek Cypriots, this consensus of opinion, therefore, saw the new landscape of relations and commitments of the EU with Cyprus and Turkey as providing a unique opportunity to achieve a resolution of the Cyprus problem and ease relations between Greece and Turkey (Hutchence & Georgiades, 2018). During the period before the accession negotiations with Cyprus began, the EU had a significant influence over both the Greek and Turkish sides. This allowed the EU to apply pressure and push them towards reaching a resolution (Hutchence & Georgiades, 2018). In particular, while the EU would be extending full membership to the RoC, it would clarify also that this was “conditional upon flexibility and goodwill” (Hutchence & Georgiades, 2018) in their efforts to reach a resolution. At the same time, all the benefits of EU-membership would be extended to Turkish Cypriots and Turkey itself offering an improved position towards its membership but only if it allowed a reunification of Cyprus. It soon became clear that, at least in the short term, everyone felt that there was a need for a major push in the direction of resolving the Cyprus issue, leading to the establishment of a federal state. Meanwhile, the UN

acknowledged that the European presence could be seen as having a positive and complementary impact, possibly more beneficial than their own (Hutchence & Georgiades, 2018).

#### **5.4 The EU's Normative Power in the Cyprus Conflict: A Double-Edged Sword?**

The EU thought that the integration was to the benefit of both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, but believed as well that the pressure must be placed on Turkey to change its policies boosting the chance of joining the EU thereafter. Furthermore, membership was expected to redefine island identities and protect everybody's fundamental rights. It was under this respect that the EU was supposed to act as a normative power, something which would create an incentive for both parties and push them towards meaningful reunification negotiations.

Cyprus was controversially accepted as a membership candidate in 1994, and the Commission originally demanded that the two governments resolve their conflict before acceptance of membership consideration would be given (Eralp & Beriker, 2005). Eventually this was, though part of a larger framework agreement between the Greece and the EU which included among other things, the lifting of Greece's veto on the customs union with Turkey. And in this decision, both the pragmatic and normative strands were essential as the EU sought to be seen as a "good international citizen" that respects the international law which backed the position of Greek Cypriots over the dispute (Diez & Pace, 2011). In fact, everything, from Security Council resolutions to the rulings by the European Court of Human Rights unequivocally favored the Greek Cypriots and placed blame for both the conflict and the island's partition, on Turkey. This rendered it hard to the critics of conditioning Cyprus' entry on the resolution of the conflict to counter-argue that Greek Cypriots were to be penalized due to Turkey's violation of international law (Diez & Pace, 2011).

The EU outlined that Cyprus should, henceforth, be united in its entirety as a condition for Cyprus to become a member state. This enabled Greek and Turkish Cypriots to negotiate with each other and make their contributions towards a comprehensive settlement. In fact, initiating the negotiations for Cyprus' EU accession in 1998 proved to be catalytic in terms of revitalizing efforts towards resolving the dispute and providing a new impetus to the negotiation process by placing both parties under pressure for reaching an acceptable settlement (Kyriz, 2013). Moreover, Turkey's more flexible stance towards the Cyprus problem in part, stemming from the EU accession perspective, also added its color in the revitalizing of efforts towards a resolution. The significance

of Turkey's role in the reconciliation process was further enhanced due to its important position. This can be attributed to Turkey's central role, either as a direct protagonist in the dispute or indirectly, as the country had the influence to persuade Turkish Cypriots to align with one side of the agreement. (Kyriss, 2013). In this quadro, the success of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the parliament elections held in December 2003, marked a significant shift in Turkey's approach to Cyprus and significantly impacted the ongoing negotiations between the communities.

The EU's decision to refrain from acting as a mediator in the traditional sense and entrust the task to the UN, showed its commitment to be an unbiased third-party in the conflict. Instead of being a mediator, the EU concentrated in supporting the efforts of the UN and moved actively on both sides. Within this perspective, the EU wanted to encourage the acceptance of the proposed solution without getting engaged directly as a mediator. This approach allowed the EU to maintain neutrality and prevent potential biases that could arise if it took on the role of a mediator. The negotiation led to the establishment of the "Annan Plan" a significant achievement in the history of the Cyprus issue. The plan proposed the formation of a United Cyprus Republic as a confederation of two equally sovereign states, providing a potential path towards resolving the long-standing problem. The reception to the plan, however, was highly disparate on the two sides involved. Despite UN's attempts at presenting a fair and balanced document, the members of the Greek Cypriot community met it with lots of resistance, as 76 percent voted overwhelmingly against it. In contrary, 65 percent of the Turkish Cypriots supported the plan. It is important to note though, that initially, the Greek Cypriots accepted the proposed plan but following Tassos Papadopoulos' leadership in the RoC and his unyielding position on the Cyprus issue, they ultimately rejected it (Kyriss, 2013). The Greek Cypriot rejection caused the failure of the UN's effort to negotiate a cease-fire and observe the situation, thus proving the inevitable failure of the Annan peace plan (Edmonds & Palmore, 2012). As Kyriss (2013) points out, the positive impact of EU's normative power must be traced in the Turkish Cypriot as they have gradually recognized the benefits of EU integration, despite Denktash's different viewpoint.

The general elections of December 2003 were important for the reconciliation movement in the Turkish Cypriot community. For the first time in the history of the community, pro-solution parties came into power showing a strong determination on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots seeking a settlement and henceforth, a future inside the EU (Diez & Pace, 2011). This determination was further

reinforced by their decision to open the borders in 2003 and the subsequent significant negotiations between both sides. These developments paved the way for referenda and showcased the Turkish Cypriot community's commitment to pursue a resolution and an EU-oriented future (Den et al, 2008).

Conversely, the Greek Cypriots saw the accession to the EU as a strategic means to play their way politically in the conflict (Fisher, 2001). The Union's normative power in this case did not play a positive role but was considered as an advantage that strengthened their position in the conflict. This is in line with the argument that Greek Cypriots' used EU membership tactically to enhance their political position in the conflict (Diez & Pace, 2011). Cyprus became a member of the European Union as a divided country, with the Republic of Cyprus having political representation over the entire island. Despite hopes that joining the EU would help bring about a resolution to the division, particularly through the "Annan Plan", this did not happen. Commissioner Günter Verheugen felt betrayed by the government of the RoC due to the failure to fulfill the trust placed in them by the EU. *"[...] I personally feel that I have been cheated by the government of the Republic of Cyprus [...]"* (Welle, 2004). It is noteworthy to mention that prior Cyprus' accession, EU's involvement in the conflict as a normative power was limited. Its initial involvement, dates back to 1977, when the Union issued a statement recognizing the Turkish Cypriot administrative authorities. However, due to the sensitive nature of the conflict and the geopolitical challenges of the region, the EU's role was primarily supportive towards the UN efforts to find a resolution.

## 5.5 Challenges and Compromises

While the EU has promised to extend its tentacles as well as norms towards the northern part of the island with an ultimate goal of contributing in the process of reunification, the failure of the "Annan Plan" presented massive challenges for the EU in delivery of the promises. EU's actions in order to address the conflict and to empower a united Cyprus, have largely been restricted due to an imbalance of power between both sides and the lack of diplomatic relations with Turkish Cypriot's administration. The Greek Cypriots, representing the internationally recognized RoC, have significantly more power or sway with the EU than the Turkish side does. This power imbalance therefore, makes it impossible for the EU to ensure that the interests and the concerns of both communities are represented properly and taken into consideration.

Kyris (2013) states that those difficulties come from the restricted incentives for conciliation among Greek Cypriots and the limited pro-European position of Turkish Cypriots. Equally, Diez and Pace (2011) refer to the Greek Cypriot's public approach on resolving the inter-communal dispute as not highly affected by the EU membership. Instead, following Cyprus' EU membership, it seems that Greek Cypriots have lost their motivation for seeking a resolution.

With its normative power, the EU has actively lent support to the UN-led negotiations and encouraged both sides towards the negotiation table. The election of Dimitris Christofias back in 2008, and the following election of Nicos Anastasiades, did lead to a re-engagement of talks between the estranged parties of Cypriots regarding the Cyprus problem. However, according to Kyris (2013), the progress made in Cyprus cannot simply be attributed solely to EU membership.

The UN-sponsored talks in 2017 during the summit of Crans Montana collapsed since both parties in the dispute, could not form a comprehensive solution. The Crans Montana summit meeting was particularly crucial and presented a critical opportunity to finalize a deal. Despite the participation of top diplomats and UN Secretary General António Guterres, the negotiation process collapsed due to a series of challenges and disagreements. Key obstacles included power-sharing, territory disputes, security guarantees, and the presence of Turkish troops on the island. These contentious issues highlighted the conflicting interests of the two communities involved, illustrating the intricate nature of the Cyprus problem. As a result, finding common ground and fostering a shared perspective between the parties, proved particularly challenging for the EU.

The failure of the negotiations at the Crans Montana, increased public disappointment on both sides and enhanced the mistrust and skepticism about the possibility of reaching on a mutual agreement in the near future. This is because such attempts have been sporadic and not yielded substantive progress. Indeed, while the UN and the EU continue to support and encourage a resumption of talks, the deep-seated mistrusts and divergent goals between the two communities, clearly remain significant hurdles. Further, the overwhelmingly complex geopolitical dynamics and historical grievances between the external actors involved in the conflict, must be recognized. It is therefore reasonable to acknowledge that the EU, as an outsider body, may not have the total comprehension and control over all stakeholders, in order to effectively evoke and eventually lead to the island's reunification. The efforts of the EU, require adherence to international law, political realities and the UN Security Council resolutions, considering also the interests of all stakeholders involved. During this period, the EU has been focusing on addressing burning issues and other

significant challenges such as the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, the energy crisis as well as the climate change's growing threat (Papadakis, 2023). Therefore, it is compelled to temporarily abstain from interfering on the Cyprus issue and divert its attention from progressing agreements related to the dispute.

Furthermore, the limited capability foreign policy and the internal divisions, challenge the effective mediating capacity of the EU in the case of Cyprus. It is hard to reach a consensus given that the 27 Member States have different national interests and priorities, which make them unable to form a united front. In addition, the extent of support and connections with either the Greek or Turkish Cypriots to certain extent, also complicates the situation towards a harmonized approach. The EU's restricted control over foreign policy and the lack of a centralized powerful executive branch present substantial obstacles for the EU in presenting a cohesive and unified stance in addressing the Cyprus conflict. As effective foreign policy actor as EU may seem, its inadequacies in this respect are certainly well-trodden, conceptually summarized over a decade ago as "Capability-Expectations Gap" (Nielsen, 2013). This gap is characterized by the disconnection between the expectations that the EU engenders and its limited capacity to pursue policies actually required for fulfilling their envisaged roles in world politics. The absence of political and military capabilities as well as the unwillingness from the member states to transfer authority for foreign and security policy to EU level, has led to a lacunae stabilization and international presence on the part of EU in its foreign policy (Dryburgh, 2008).

## **Chapter 6 – Findings and Results**

### **Cyprus' perception of the EU's Role in the Cyprus conflict**

The EU's role in the Cyprus conflict is intricate with a distinctive relationship of both sides to the dispute. To this effect, this chapter critically analyses the EU's involvement in the conflict through reviewing of existing literature, interviews with a variety of Greek Cypriot stakeholders that specifically have been conducted for the purposes of this thesis and drawing upon personal experiences and observations, given consideration the developments as of 2023.

#### **6.1 Promoting a Sense of Common European Identity**

Shortly before the RoC's EU accession, the EU General Affairs Council expressed its intention to end the isolation of Turkish Cypriot community caused by military invasion of Turkey in 1974 and the subsequent division of the island. In encouraging economic growth among Turkish Cypriots, the EU's objective was reunification of Cyprus. These declarations by International Community and especially EU were an acknowledgement of Turkish Cypriots' need for economic assistance as well as their isolation (Den et al, 2008).

Since April 23, 2003, individuals from both sides, have been able to cross to the other side. Still, the opening of the borders brought along with-it legal complications for the EU as Cyprus would join the EU as a divided country - in which certain fiscal and customs union rules would be suspended in the Northern part. To address these legal issues and terminate the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community, the Council adopted the Green Line Regulation on 29 April 2004, only a few days before the formal accession of the RoC. The Green Line Regulation, aimed to regulate the people flow and the movement of goods and services from the Northern Cyprus to the South (Den et. al, 2008). The ultimate goal was to allow Turkish Cypriots to sell their products in the South and additionally to export to EU markets through the ports and airports of the RoC. Subsequently, the Commission proposed two other Regulations, the Financial Aid Regulation and the Direct Trade Regulation.

The "EU Aid Programme" has been instituted for Turkish Cypriots in an effort to promote the confidence-building measures and reunification process (Kyriz, 2013). The EU budget-funded programme focuses on three primary areas: economic development, infrastructure, and human resources development.

The “Direct Trade Regulation” aimed to foster economic integration and development by increasing trade flows and business opportunities (Kyris, 2013). However, the Greek Cypriot government has utilized its veto power to prevent the establishment of trade links between the EU and Turkish Cypriots and to extract concessions from Turkey as an EU candidate (Akşit, 2012). By blocking trade links, the Greek Cypriots hoped to advance their own political agenda and gain more favorable terms in negotiations. Nonetheless, the initiatives such as the “EU Aid Programme” and the “Green Line Regulation” are perceived as positive steps that support reunification (Mavroyiannis; D, 2023). The development of programs and policies by the EU that facilitate engagement with the Turkish Cypriot community, highlight the political significance of the benefits offered to Turkish Cypriots, given consideration that the RoC, as an EU member state, is the only legal entity in Cyprus, clarifying that the *acquis* in the occupied areas is suspended until the Cyprus issue is resolved (D, 2023).

The significance of EU assistance in Cyprus is widely acknowledged by EU officials and Greek Cypriot stakeholders, although Turkish Cypriots hold a different viewpoint on the matter. The Greek Cypriot diplomat and politician Dr. Andreas Mavroyiannis, highlights the notably positive impact of the EU’s involvement on the prospects for reconciliation and reunification between the two communities. The allure of EU membership for Turkish Cypriots should not be underestimated, as it not only grants them European citizenship but also creates numerous opportunities for collaboration with the Greek Cypriot community (Mavroyiannis, 2023). The argument is that EU participation serves as the most effective unification catalyst owing to its capacity in addressing issues at the supranational level that, on a national scale, are shown to be irreconcilable. Of relevance is the transfer of important competences especially to EU bodies. Furthermore, EU membership, accompanied by trust and security, can enhance intrastate engagement, enabling communities and regions to prosper (Mavroyiannis, 2023). The Greek Cypriot Member of the European Parliament Demetris Papadakis supports this view, noting that the EU’s involvement has indeed had a positive impact on the prospects for reconciliation and reunification between the two communities in Cyprus. The EU provides the necessary framework to ensure the rule of law, within which the solution to the Cyprus issue can be sought while preserving the essential constitutional and territorial unity and capacity for effective functioning of the RoC (Papadakis, 2023).

However, Turkish Cypriots still feel disconnected from the benefits of EU membership (Kyriacou & Kaya, 2011). The complex politic situation, including the non-recognition of Turkish Cypriots

administration by Brussels, imply considerable challenges of the EU's mission on the ground and limit its possibilities to assist the Turkish Cypriots. The continuous international isolation thus, makes EU integration very attractive to Turkish Cypriots as well as the domestic political actors seeking far greater access into the EU environment.

Although the EU's role as a normative power initially had a beneficial effect on the Turkish Cypriot community, as noted by Diez and Pace (2011), the enthusiasm and support for European integration among Turkish Cypriots have gradually diminished. Christou (2010) presents competing evidence, suggesting a decrease in support for the EU as a "force for good" in the Turkish Cypriot community. This decline in popularity is attributed to the unfulfilled promises of the EU to end international isolation and the limited aid provided in comparison to Turkey's assistance (Kyriz, 2013; Kyriacou & Kaya, 2011). It is crucial to highlight that Northern Cyprus has grown increasingly reliant on Ankara's support and guidance. While the EU has aided the development of the Turkish Cypriot community and preparations for implementing EU law, the Turkish Cypriots continue to face frustration. This frustration stems from several factors, including the accession of the RoC to the EU and the lack of progress in addressing the quick needs and desires of the Turkish Cypriots, such as economic benefits and an end to their international isolation (Novvosselof, 2021).

The Greek Cypriots' reluctance to acknowledge Turkish Cypriot control in the north, hampers progress in the twelve technical committees that have been created in the past to facilitate collaboration between the two. The EU initiatives often encounter lengthy delays due to disputes over terminology that either party disagrees with which further contribute to the decrease in EU's popularity. Furthermore, the EU-funded environmental endeavors are hindered by their limited scope, as they tend to focus on only the parts of the island controlled by the RoC, despite the fact that the issues they aim to resolve, are island-wide.

## **6.2 EU's approach for Human rights, Democracy and Conflict resolution**

In congestion to the Cyprus conflict, the EU adopted an approach characterized by promoting the human rights, democracy, and the resolution of the dispute. Being a supranational organization founded on rules and values, EU follows the treaties, the international Human Rights' conventions and the Charter of Fundamental Rights as guiding its actions. While the main focus of the EU in

regard to the engagement on the Cyprus problem is not necessarily human rights, all their actions are premised to be contingent to the respect of human rights. (Mavroyiannis, 2023). The EU's attempts to promote these principles in Cyprus, are evident. A salient engagement is under facilitation of a dialogue and cooperations between the two community (Mavroyiannis, 2023).

EU provides the financial support to various technical committees such as the Committee of Culture Heritage and the Committee of Missing persons. Moreover, the European Commission has recently funded the recent trip of 20 political personalities from both communities to Northern Ireland, aiming at fostering dialogue and reconciliation (Mavroyiannis, 2023). However, despite the firm stand of the EU on human rights, democracy and conflict resolution, some concerns which arise in relation to the effective promotion of these principles in the case of the Cyprus conflict, are expressed. Within this content, these principles should assume a more dynamic role on the part of the EU in order to form the basis of a compromise viable resolution to the Cyprus issue, as they are integral to the “*acquis Communautaire*<sup>12</sup>” and the values of the Union itself (Papadakis, 2023). D, (2023) acknowledges that the “*EU's engagement and the acquis Communautaire are reinforcing factors in the efforts to secure respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democratic governance within the resolution of the Cyprus issue*” (Papadakis, 2023). This suggests that, while there is space for improvement, the EU has made progress and continue to play a significant role in advancing these principles in its engagement with Cyprus (D, 2023).

### 6.3 The Catalytic effect of EU integration

Though, the initial expectations of the RoC joining the EU have not yet to be fully realized, the Greek Cypriot community is generally satisfied by the EU's involvement in the conflict. At the same time, they do acknowledge the limitations and challenges, presented. The EU's role in addressing the Cyprus conflict is seen as positive, although it seems to have more a supportive character than catalytic. Dr. Mavroyiannis (2023), clarifies that the EU's role is often misunderstood, even by the current government of Cyprus. He emphasizes that the EU has always been hesitant to directly involve itself in efforts towards a negotiated settlement “*This is not due to lack of interest, but rather to avoid being perceived as an impartial mediator. Therefore, the EU limits its*

---

<sup>12</sup> The term “*acquis communautaire*” is a concept commonly used in European Union law and refers to the body of EU laws, rules, standards, and practices that member states are required to adopt and implement as part of their EU membership obligations.

*involvement to a supportive role*". However, he does acknowledge the potential of the Union and refers to the RoC's accession as its "*greatest achievement*". He particularly highlights the fact that the EU, recognizes the entire island as the RoC territory Cyprus. Dr. Mavroyiannis (2023), emphasizes that for the very first time, following the 1974 tragedy, "*Cyprus has managed to counter-balance the effects of the invasion and occupation, providing a sense of security and creating conditions conducive to reunification*". Within this context, Dr. Mavroyiannis (2023), evaluates the EU's role as "*a significant catalyst, albeit primarily objective due to the legal and material situation at hand, rather than the result of specific policies*".

The Government official J.D (2023), also highlights the importance of Cyprus' membership "*As a member state, the RoC holds a crucial position and the EU has a strong interest in ensuring a long-lasting and effective solution*" clarifying that "*Cyprus' EU membership has already played a pivotal role in bringing about meaningful progress during the Cyprus talks, and this cooperation can be further enhanced in the future*". Papadakis (2023), additionally recognizes the effective approach that the EU offers in resolving the Cyprus problem, due to "*its robust institutional framework, legal order, and constitutional structure*". However, he acknowledges that "*initial hopes for the EU's influence and political power to drive progress towards a resolution have not been fully met*". Nevertheless, Mavroyiannis (2023) and Papadakis (2023) still believe in the potential of a well-defined set of principles within a suitable framework to ultimately contribute in the conflicts' resolution.

#### **6.4 The rising influence of Greek Cypriots in the EU**

Despite the inter-communal negotiations failed to reach a mutual agreement, the Greek Cypriots have utilized their EU membership to exert influence at the EU level (Kyris, 2013) This strategy has allowed them to seek concessions from the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as well, both involved in the conflict but the latter outside the dispute itself. According to Kyris (2013), although the RoC's list of demands to Ankara did not gain support from other EU partners, the start of Turkey's accession negotiations still necessitated the ratification of the Additional Protocol which established a customs union between Turkey and all EU member states, including the RoC. The Turkish government signed the Protocol but made it clear that ratification did not imply recognition of the RoC or the opening of Turkish ports to it. Even years following the beginning of Turkey's accession negotiations, the implementation of the Protocol remains a condition for progress and the EU

has frozen negotiations on several chapters until Turkish ports are opened to the RoC. Additionally, the internalization of the conflict has allowed Greek Cypriots to leverage their EU membership in various diplomatic arenas that go beyond the formal process of accession (Kyris, 2013). This behavior has been observed when they have utilized their influence to hinder Turkey's participation in EU-Syria negotiations concerning the Middle East crisis and to their efforts to constrain Turkey's objecting stance against Greek Cypriot endeavors to exploit gas reserves (Kyris, 2013). Diez and Pace (2011), also acknowledge the strengthening of the Greek Cypriot position following the RoC's accession.

The exploitation of Cyprus' offshore hydrocarbon deposits in the Mediterranean, remains one of the many complications stemming from the island's division which further fuels tensions both regionally and within the island. Turkey continuously challenges the RoC's authority to make decisions in regards to its natural gas resources if the Turkish Cypriots are not recognized as co-owners, in accordance with the 1960 constitution. While the RoC agrees to share the revenues, it does not grant Turkish Cypriots a voice in natural resource management. Ankara, as it does not recognize the RoC, refuses to engage in talks regarding the delimitation of the seabed between Turkey and Cyprus and threatens to impede the Greek Cypriots' access to the benefits of natural gas extraction unless a mutual agreement is reached with the Turkish Cypriots (2023).

## **6.5 The EU as a mediator and facilitator in the Cyprus conflict**

In regards to the extent in which the EU has fulfilled its role as a mediator and facilitator in the Cyprus conflict, the Government official (2023) acknowledges the importance of the EU's role in the efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue, as a third-party mediator *"by providing legal and technical assistance to the UN team in matters related, such as the implementation of the four European freedoms in Cyprus after resolution"*. Dr. Mavroyiannis (2023) clarifies that almost twenty years from the RoC's accession, *"the catalytic role is there but it has not yet proved sufficient in giving a decisive push to the efforts for the settlement"*. Using as an example the last round of negotiations that led to Crans Montana, he acknowledges that *"EU membership offers solutions to great number of problems that the Greek Cypriot community faced in the negotiations"*. Demetris Papadakis (2023) identifies that the EU has made *"significant progress in fulfilling its role, but there remains much work to be done in order to effectively resolve the Cyprus issue"*. According to Papadakis

(2023), *“the European Parliament consistently highlights the importance of finding a solution to the problem, in line with the European Acquis and the principles and values of the Union, as a crucial step for the advancement of Euro-Turkish relations”*. Within this context he notes *“the recent progress report underlines the significance of restarting the intercommunal talks in Cyprus and urges the EU to enhance its involvement in order to contribute to a comprehensive resolution”*, emphasizing further that the report *“highlights the necessity of the EU’s intervention, along with other international actors, to prevent tensions in the region”*. Although the collective efforts of the EU and other stakeholders have played a pivotal role in encouraging the UN to appoint a new Special Representative for the Cyprus issue, *“further action is required to achieve the ultimate goal of resolving the Cyprus issue”* (Papadakis, 2023).

The EU’s role in the Cyprus conflict has been indeed a topic of interest and debate for many. As an individual who closely follows the developments on the ground, Dr. Mavroyiannis (2023) assess that *“there have been discrepancies between my expectations of the EU’s role and the actual realities”* providing as an example the EU’s ability to replace the UN in the Cyprus conflict. *“While some may argue that the EU can play a more active role in resolving the conflict, it is important to recognize that the EU’s primary role is to assist the UN within the framework of the Good Offices Mission of the Secretary General”* (Mavroyiannis, 2023) According to Dr. Mavroyiannis (2023) the EU plays a supportive role by offering political support to the efforts of the UN and additionally, provides expertise on EU-related matters, runs programs on the ground, builds capacity, provides lectures and learning opportunities to the Turkish Cypriot community about how the EU operates, and promises important financial and technical support for the implementation of a settlement agreement if and when it is reached. However, he notes, *“some people, including the current government of Cyprus, may have different expectations of the EU’s role such as to portray the EU as having more power and influence to solve the Cyprus conflict than it actually does”*. Therefore, he says, *“while the EU’s role in Cyprus may not always align with everyone’s expectations, it is crucial to understand that the EU’s primary function is to assist the UN and provide support within its designated framework. By recognizing these realities is essential for a comprehensive understanding of the EU’s role in Cyprus”*. Papadakis (2023) emphasizes that the EU interventions in pressuring Turkey to demonstrate good intentions or differentiate its intentions for resolving the Cyprus issue *“have been disappointing”*. He expected stronger actions, such as

the imposition of restrictions or suspension of funds and economic sanctions similar to those imposed on Russia, following its unlawful invasion in Ukraine. For instance, he suggests a ban on European defense industries sending know-how to Turkey to limit its aggressive rhetoric and actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and along the ceasefire line in Cyprus. *“Regrettably, these measures were not observed in the EU's plans”* (Papadakis, 2023) J.D (2023) asserts that no discrepancies have come to their attention. The evidence strongly suggests that *“a more active role and contribution from the EU in resolving the Cyprus issue would yield a more favorable solution and be advantageous for all parties concerned”*.

The effectiveness of the EU in resolving the Cyprus conflict has been influenced by various factors. One major limitation according to Dr. Mavroyiannis (2023), is the influence of Turkey, as it seeks to counter the progress made by the EU in Cyprus membership. This creates a constant struggle between the appeal of EU membership and Turkey's objectives in Cyprus. Additionally, the failure of previous settlement efforts has led to disappointment and skepticism within the Turkish Cypriot community (Mavroyiannis, 2023).

There are also inherent limitations and challenges faced by the EU in this regard. Papadakis (2023) highlights the impact of external factors on the EU's effectiveness, particularly the absence of a Common Foreign Policy and Security Policy. The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, along with issues like the energy crisis, climate change, and environmental agreements, have diverted the EU's attention and resources away from the Cyprus issue (Papadakis, 2023). Furthermore, political reservations from certain factions within the Turkish side, pose a significant inhibitory factor (D, 2023) These reservations stem from disagreement regarding the strategic role that the EU can play in overcoming the division of Cyprus and achieving reunification (D, 2023).

## **6.6 EU's participation in the Cyprus conflict**

The perceptions of EU participation in the Cyprus conflict, highlight its role in shaping the dynamics of the conflict and its potential for resolution. The incentives and values provided by EU membership, as its influence to depart from previous mediators has contributed to increase likely finding a solution. The perspective of a developed European society is seen as the best guarantee for the future of Cyprus. J.D (2023) posits that the prospect of a reunited Cyprus continuing as an EU member is a strong pouring incentive to encourage and galvanize civil society dynamics towards the resolution of the Cyprus issue.

According to Papadakis (2023), the EU participation has catalyzed the process setting the political framework and values that was vital for the ultimate resolution of the Cyprus conflict. Further, Papadakis (2023) implies the involvement of the EU has reverberated into altering the changing dynamics of the conflict most notably based on negating the undertakings of mediators of past like of the UK and of the US. These past powers tended to push for the recognition and legalization of the de facto situation created by the Turkish invasion, something that it wasn't acceptable for the majority of Greek Cypriots (Papadakis, 2023). The influence of the EU as an organization, has thus raised the potential for reaching the island's reunification (Papadakis, 2023). Dr. Mavroyiannis (2023) believes that EU participation has had a significant impact on the Cyprus conflict. He quite rightly emphasizes that EU framework makes the settlement of the conflict more likely, as the dynamics created by EU membership hard to resist indefinitely by the division. According to Dr. Mavroyiannis (2023) a perspective of a developed European society with robust safety nets and a thriving democratic society, provide the best guarantee for all Cypriots.

#### **6.7 The EU's actions and policies on Peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus**

The involvement of commission officials during the negotiating process in collaboration with the UN, is perceived as a significant positive contribution of the EU's engagement in the peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus (Mavroyiannis, 2023). Additionally, the EU's presence at high political levels, such as in the meetings held at Mont Pelerin and the conferences in Geneva and Crans Montana, has further demonstrated their commitment to peacebuilding in Cyprus (Mavroyiannis, 2023).

The appointment of a new Special Representative for the Cyprus issue by the UN, attributed to the EU's involvement, is also evaluated as a positive impact that illustrates the Union's influence in facilitating diplomatic initiatives and promoting dialogue between the conflicting parties (Mavroyiannis; Papadakis, 2023) The fact that the Protocol of accession of Cyprus to the EU acknowledges the occupied area as part of the RoC, although the Cypriot government does not exercise effective control over this region due to the presence of Turkish troops, is seen as a positive step in promoting inclusivity and legitimacy within the peacebuilding process (Papadakis, 2023).

In terms of less constructive or potentially counterproductive instances, it is important to note that no specific examples have been identified thus far. The stakeholders interviewed, Dr. Mavroyiannis (2023), Demetris Papadakis (2023) and J.D(2023), did not recall any such instances where the EU's involvement in Cyprus was detrimental to the peacebuilding efforts.

## 6.8 Perspectives of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on the EU's role in the Conflict

For the majority of the Greek Cypriots, the EU's role can be mainly considered to have been political, crucial in reinstating the rule of law, to undo the repercussions following the Turkish invasion, to regain the independence of the RoC and to ease the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island. The EU thus, provides the ideal ground for the Greek Cypriots in seeking justice and regaining their sovereignty. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots view the role of EU as mainly in economic dimensions. For Turkish Cypriots, the Union is seen as an opportunity to secure recognition for the de facto situation in the occupied territories. Given by the presence and influence of Turkey in the conflict, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, aim to legitimize the occupied territories and demand from other parties to accept it as part of the solution. Turkish Cypriots also seek to access the EU funds with the purpose to develop and maintain vital infrastructure in the occupied areas. It is essential to note that the perspectives, mainly reflect the views of political leadership of both communities. In regards to the civil society, it is generally assumed that for Turkish and Greek Cypriots, the EU creates conditions under which the two communities can coexist peacefully (D; Mavroyiannis; Papadakis, 2023). Yet it is important to acknowledge that within both communities, there are minorities who do hold more divisive and extreme views (Novosseloff, 2021).

The majority of the Greek Cypriots feel that the EU membership is a major benefit conferred upon all citizens of the Republic. Therefore, they believe that Turkish Cypriots should be grateful for, though they do not represent the legally entity of Cyprus and were not involved in to the integration process. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots are unsatisfied for the RoC's EU membership and their international isolation. They argued EU bias against Greek Cypriots, that hampers their acceptance for EU mediation in settling the conflict. However, they continue to benefit from Cyprus' EU membership without making political or financial contributions (Novosseloff, 2021).

In summary, while there is a common perception among both communities that the EU has a constructive role and offers important opportunities for everyone, there are significant divergences at the political leadership level. Turkish Cypriot leaders perceive the EU as a hindrance in achieving a final resolution and cementing the division. It is crucial to understand and take these differing perspectives into account when considering the role of the EU in the Cyprus conflict.

## 6.9 The Current and Future Expectations

The government and the Greek Cypriots continue to believe that the EU has the duty as well as the ability to play a constructive role in mediating the conflict, even though the community's initial expectations have not been fully realized (Mavroyiannis; Papadakis, 2023). They perceive the EU as a supranational body with the power to support diplomatic initiatives, negotiations and mediation (Mavroyiannis, Papadakis, 2023). The primary goal of Cyprus is to unite the island and to establish a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation based on the agreed framework for resolution. It is important to note, however, that neither Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots pursue a resolution based on the agreed framework. Instead, they hold onto the idea of partition, highlighting both communities' sovereign equality and equal standing in international relations.

According to Dr. Mavroyiannis (2023), the EU ought to keep up its proactive and constructive involvement. Despite the obstacles presented by separatist groups and the current leadership of Turkish Cypriots, he believes that the EU's involvement will be helpful, potentially bringing the Turkish Cypriots closer to the EU. He suggests that *"the EU-Turkey relationship can serve as a catalyst for progress"*, stressing that Turkey must show a willingness to cooperate and work towards a settlement in order to forge closer ties with the EU. In a similar vein, Government Official J.D (2023) highlights the crucial and undeniable role of the EU in attaining a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus issue. *"The greater the EU's active and extensive participation, the greater the benefits for all parties involved"* (D, 2023). Papadakis (2023) also acknowledges the necessity on behalf of the EU to take more proactive measures in the future and to propose specific recommendations that might serve as a road map for Turkey. These suggestions will outline the requirements and criteria Turkey must fulfill in order to proceed with establishing a special partnership with the EU (Papadakis, 2023). These requirements include the settlement of the Cyprus problem, the promotion of amicable neighborly relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, the renunciation of Aegean claims, adherence to the Lausanne Treaty and the preservation of human rights within its own populace (Papadakis, 2023). Papadakis (2023) recommends that unless Turkey makes substantial progress in these areas, the EU should likewise reevaluate providing funds to it, to note that such decisions shall be made in consultation with EU partners. Furthermore, he anticipates that the EU will take the lead and suggest policies to encourage close collaboration between young people from the two communities. This according to him, might entail carrying out more research

on particular topics associated with the negotiation talks or the Cyprus issue's resolution *"Encouraging young people to take responsibility for finding solutions can help propel the initiative of resolving the conflict forward"* (Papadakis, 2023).

## Chapter 7

### Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be said the EU, has been unable to meet Cyprus' initial expectations. Although the EU policies and initiatives implementations aimed to promote reconciliation and reunification in the island, did have a positive effect on both communities, a mutual agreement between the two sides, is yet to be achieved. The Greek Cypriots, representing the internationally recognized RoC, have significantly more power or sway with the EU than the Turkish side does. This power imbalance therefore, makes it impossible for the EU to ensure that the interests and the concerns of both communities are represented properly and taken into consideration. Taking also into account that the UN efforts for resolution, are based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal state framework in which the Turkish Cypriots would have a considerable influence over the rights of Cypriots to move and settle within the territory governed by the prospective Turkish Cypriot administration, it can be concluded that the admission of a unified Cyprus into the EU, could potentially eliminate this control. Therefore, within this perspective and despite the UN's condemnation of the existence of two states in Cyprus and their efforts to establish a federation, the emergence of the EU, undermined these endeavors, given that the Turkish Cypriot leadership, seek to maintain the Turkish Cypriots' political existence rather than risk losing control, which they could have retained under an UN-brokered settlement. This appears to be the reason why the Turkish government, sought to resolve the Cyprus issue within the UN framework. However, following the collapse of the negotiations at Crans Montana, the Cyprus' conflict can be perceived as "mission impossible", given the Turkish sway away from the agreed framework in their opt for a two-state solution.

As observed, the EU efforts to address the ongoing Cyprus conflict, both as a normative power and mediator, have been met with significant challenges and limitations, despite the Union's commitment to uphold democratic values, human rights, and the rule of law while its ability to effectively mediate the conflict, it has been hindered by the complexities of historical grievances, conflicting national interests, and the lack of consensus among its member states. It is also important to acknowledge that the EU and its member-states, failed to consider a Plan B upon Cyprus' accession as they appear to had no alternative strategy in place and the success of the diplomatic effort in Cyprus, hinged almost entirely on Turkey's cooperation. As subsequent events have

demonstrated, Turkey has been reluctant to align with the EU's objectives which has further complicated the diplomatic landscape.

Nonetheless, the Greek Cypriot community, still holds on to the EU perspective and believe that its supranational identity and ability to support the diplomatic initiatives, negotiations and mediation, can allow the Union to play a constructive role in mediating the conflict and act as a catalyst in the future. Within this context, it is crucial for the EU to continue engaging with all parties involved in the conflict, seeking creative solutions, and enhancing its mediation efforts to foster lasting peace and reconciliation in Cyprus. After all, the Cyprus issue is a European one.

### **Lessons to be learned**

**Complexity and Interconnectedness:** The Cyprus conflict is a multifaceted issue with historical, political, social, and cultural dimensions. The involvement of the EU in this conflict highlights the complexities of international relations and the interconnectedness of various actors and interests in resolving such conflicts.

**Power Dynamics:** The EU's role in the Cyprus conflict underscores the power dynamics at play in international politics. The influence of larger states within the EU, as well as geopolitical considerations, can shape the outcomes of mediation and conflict resolution efforts.

**Sovereignty and Autonomy:** The Cyprus conflict raises important questions about sovereignty and autonomy for states and regions. The tensions between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, as well as the involvement of external powers, highlight the challenges of balancing national interests with international norms and agreements.

**Dialogue and Cooperation:** The EU's involvement in the Cyprus conflict emphasizes the importance of dialogue and cooperation in resolving long-standing disputes. Peaceful negotiation, compromise, and a willingness to engage in constructive dialogue are essential for achieving sustainable solutions to conflicts.

**European Integration:** The Cyprus conflict also offers insights into the broader process of European integration and the challenges of incorporating diverse member states with differing histories and interests. It underscores the need for inclusive decision-making processes and mechanisms for addressing conflicts within the European Union.

## References

### Legislation:

The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, 04 April 1960, available from [http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p\\_lang=en&p\\_isn=47927](http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=47927)

*The Cyprus Convention*, Constantinople, 04 June 1978, available from [http://kypros.org/Kyrenia/Documents/items/cyprus\\_convention\\_1878.htm](http://kypros.org/Kyrenia/Documents/items/cyprus_convention_1878.htm).

*The Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus*, Nicosia, 16 August 1960, *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5476, p. 8, available from <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002801388ac&clang=en>

*The Treaty of Alliance*, Nicosia, 16 August 1960, *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 397, No. 5712, p. 287, available from <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002801373ef&clang=en>

*The Treaty of Guarantee*, Nicosia, 16 August 1960, *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475, p. 3, available from <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002801388a2&clang=en>

*The Treaty of Lausanne*, Lausanne, 24 July 1923, available from <https://jusmundi.com/en/document/treaty/en-treaty-of-peace-treaty-of-lausanne-1923-treaty-of-peace-treaty-of-lausanne-tuesday-24th-july-1923>

*The Treaty of Lisbon*, 01 December 2009, available from <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/5/the-treaty-of-lisbon#:~:text=The%20Treaty%20of%20Lisbon%20formally,Council%20has%20no%20legislative%20functions>.

*The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)*, 07 February 1992, available from <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/in-the-past/the-parliament-and-the-treaties/maastricht-treaty>

Security Council resolution 186, *The Cyprus Question*, S/RES/186 (04 March 1964), available from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/112185?ln=en>

Security Council resolution 353, *Cyprus*, S/RES/353 (20 July 1974), available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/353>

### Primary Sources:

D, J. (2023). Interviewed by Argyro Avgousti. 18 December, Cyprus

Dr. Mavroyiannis A. (2023). Interviewed by Argyro Avgousti. 2 December, Cyprus

Papadakis, D. (2023). Interviewed by Argyro Avgousti. 20 December, Cyprus

### Secondary Sources:

‘Annexation of cyprus by Great Britain’ (1915) *American Journal of International Law*, 9(1), pp. 204–205. doi:10.2307/2186866.

Akşit, S. (2012) ‘The Turkish cypriot presidential election of April 2010: Normalisation of Politics’, *South European Society and Politics*, 17(2), pp. 175–194. doi:10.1080/13608746.2011.615647.

Antonsich, M. (2013) ‘“occupybufferzone”: Practices of borderline resistance in a space of exception’, *Area*, 45(2), pp. 170–178. doi:10.1111/area.12005.

Asmussen, Jan. (2011). *Conspiracy theories and Cypriot history: The comfort of commonly perceived enemies*, 2019, 23. 127-145. Available at: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/294189510\\_Conspiracy\\_theories\\_and\\_Cypriot\\_history\\_The\\_comfort\\_of\\_commonly\\_perceived\\_enemies](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/294189510_Conspiracy_theories_and_Cypriot_history_The_comfort_of_commonly_perceived_enemies)

Barbé, E. and Morillas, P. (2019) ‘The EU Global Strategy: The dynamics of a more politicized and politically integrated foreign policy’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 32(6), pp. 753–770. doi:10.1080/09557571.2019.1588227.

Basheska, E. and Kochenov, D. (2015) ‘Thanking the greeks: The crisis of the rule of law in EU enlargement regulation’, *Southeastern Europe*, 39(3), pp. 392–414. doi:10.1163/18763332-03903006.

Blanton, R., Mason, T.D. and Athow, B. (2001) ‘Colonial style and post-colonial ethnic conflict in Africa’, *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(4), pp. 473–491. doi:10.1177/0022343301038004005.

Brown, J.E. (2015) ‘Europeanization postponed: The role of veto players in shaping convergence with the EU’s conflict resolution and Internal Market Integration Policies in Moldova and Georgia’, *Eastern Chessboard: Geopolitical Determinants and Challenges in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus*, pp. 143–155. doi:10.12797/9788376386706.12.

Casaglia, A. (2018) ‘Northern Cyprus as an “inner neighbour”: A critical analysis of european union enlargement in cyprus’, *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 26(1), pp. 37–49. doi:10.1177/0969776418756933.

- Christou, G. (2002). *The European Union and Cyprus: the power of attraction as a solution to the Cyprus issue*. JEMIE - Journal on ethnopolitics and minority issues in Europe, 2, 1-25. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssolar-62118>
- Christou, G. (2010) 'The European Union, Borders and conflict transformation: The case of cyprus', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 45(1), pp. 55–79. doi:10.1177/0010836709347213.
- Christou, G. and Kyris, G. (2017) 'The impact of the eurozone crisis on national foreign policy: Enhancing europeanization in the case of cyprus\*', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 55(6), pp. 1290–1305. doi:10.1111/jcms.12557.
- Crisis Group (2023) *An island divided: Next steps for troubled cyprus*, Crisis Group. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/cyprus/268-island-divided-next-steps-troubled-cyprus> (Accessed: 04 December 2023).
- Demetriou, C. (2012) 'Political radicalization and political violence in Palestine (1920–1948), Ireland (1850–1921), and cyprus (1914–1959)', *Social Science History*, 36(3), pp. 391–420. doi:10.1017/s0145553200011871.
- Den, H.T. van, Tiryaki, S. and Akgün, M. (2008) A promise to keep: Time to end the international isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. Istanbul, Turkey: Tesev Yayınları (7).
- Diez, T. and Pace, M. (2011) 'Normative Power Europe and conflict transformation', *Normative Power Europe*, pp. 210–225. doi:10.1057/9780230305601\_11.
- Dryburgh, L. (2008) 'The EU as a global actor? EU policy towards Iran', *European Security*, 17(2–3), pp. 253–271. doi:10.1080/09662830802481549.
- Eralp, D.U. and Beriker, N. (2005) 'Assessing the conflict resolution potential of the EU: The cyprus conflict and accession negotiations', *Security Dialogue*, 36(2), pp. 175–192. doi:10.1177/0967010605054647.
- Erickson, E.J. and Uyer, M. (2020) *Phase line attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974* [Preprint]. doi:10.56686/9781732003088.
- Fisher, R.J. (2001) 'Cyprus: The failure of mediation and the escalation of an identity-based conflict to an adversarial impasse', *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(3), pp. 307–326. doi:10.1177/0022343301038003003.
- Grigoriadis, I.N. and Felek, C. (2018) 'Hype, disillusionment and capacity problems: Turkish Cypriot Media and the European Union', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 55(1), pp. 111–126. doi:10.1080/00263206.2018.1504779.
- Hadjipavlou, M. (2007) 'The cyprus conflict: Root causes and implications for peacebuilding', *Journal of Peace Research*, 44(3), pp. 349–365. doi:10.1177/0022343307076640.

- Hadjipavlou, M. (no date) 'The contribution of bicomunal contacts in building a civil society in cyprus.', *The social psychology of group identity and social conflict: Theory, application, and practice.*, pp. 193–211. doi:10.1037/10683-011.
- Henökl, T. (2016) 'Conflict and continuity in European Diplomatic Cultures: Accountability, scrutiny and control in EU External Affairs', *International Relations and Diplomacy*, 4(5). doi:10.17265/2328-2134/2016.05.002.
- Higashino, A. (2004) 'For the sake of "peace and security"?', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 39(4), pp. 347–368. doi:10.1177/0010836704047579.
- Hill, G. (2010) *A history of cyprus* [Preprint]. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511751738.
- Huff, A. (2015) 'Executive privilege reaffirmed? parliamentary scrutiny of the CFSP and CSDP', *West European Politics*, 38(2), pp. 396–415. doi:10.1080/01402382.2014.990697.
- Hussain, N. (2020) 'The Cold War and the retention of British rule in cyprus, 1945-1947', *European Proceedings of Social and Behavioural Sciences* [Preprint]. doi:10.15405/epsbs.2020.10.02.50.
- Hussain, N. (2022) 'The Cold War tension in Greece and the continuation of British rule in cyprus, 1945-1950', *SEJARAH*, 31(1), pp. 106–124. doi:10.22452/sejarah.vol31no1.6.
- Hutchence, J., & Georgiades, H.C. (2018). The European Union and the Cyprus problem: Powerless to help? *Semantic Scholar*. Available at <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/THE-EUROPEAN-UNION-AND-THE-CYPRUS-PROBLEM%3A-TO-HELP-Hutchence-Georgiades/c510fd82a73de956346744f7f3b8aa8bea3967c0>
- Ioannou, M., Hewstone, M. and Al Ramiah, A. (2015) 'Inducing similarities and differences in imagined contact: A mutual intergroup differentiation approach', *Group Processes & Inter-group Relations*, 20(4), pp. 427–446. doi:10.1177/1368430215612221.
- Irrera, D. (2021) 'Managing African conflicts: Using CSDP missions to cope with terrorism and organized crime', *Revisiting EU-Africa Relations in a Changing World* [Preprint]. doi:10.4337/9781839109829.00009.
- Jacovides, A. (2011) 'The cyprus problem and the United Nations', *International Law and Diplomacy*, pp. 271–287. doi:10.1163/ej.9789004201675.i-390.66.
- Kassimeris, C. and Tsoumpanou, L. (2008) 'The impact of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on Turkey's EU candidacy', *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 12(3), pp. 329–345. doi:10.1080/13642980802069617.

- Katsos, J.E. and Forrer, J. (2014) 'Business practices and peace in post-conflict zones: Lessons from cyprus', *Business Ethics: A European Review*, 23(2), pp. 154–168. doi:10.1111/beer.12044.
- Kelley, J. (2004) 'International actors on the domestic scene: Membership conditionality and socialization by international institutions', *International Organization*, 58(03). doi:10.1017/s0020818304583017.
- Ker-Lindsay, J. (2011) *The cyprus problem: What everyone needs to know*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kıralp, Ş. and Güneyli, A. (2021) 'Ousting the cyprriot ethnarch: President Makarios' struggle against the greek junta, Cypriot bishops, and terrorism', *Religions*, 12(11), p. 944. doi:10.3390/rel12110944.
- Kiratli, O.S. (2012) 'Greece', *International Studies*, 49(3–4), pp. 263–284. doi:10.1177/0020881714534027.
- Kovačević, M. (2021) 'The EU's stability-democratisation dilemma in the western balkans: The case of serbia', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies*, 10(3). doi:10.30722/anzjes.vol10.iss3.15201.
- Kyriakou, N. and Kaya, N. (2011) *Minority rights: Solutions to the cyprus conflict*. London: Minority rights Group international.
- Kyris, G. (2013) 'Europeanisation and conflict resolution: The case of cyprus', *SSRN Electronic Journal* [Preprint]. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2509894.
- Loizides, N.G. (2007) 'Ethnic nationalism and adaptation in cyprus', *International Studies Perspectives*, 8(2), pp. 172–189. doi:10.1111/j.1528-3585.2007.00279.x.
- Mainwaring, S. and Aldrich, R.J. (2019) 'The secret empire of signals intelligence: GCHQ and the persistence of the colonial presence', *The International History Review*, 43(1), pp. 54–71. doi:10.1080/07075332.2019.1675082.
- Manners, I. (2002) 'Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), pp. 235–258. doi:10.1111/1468-5965.00353.
- Manners, I. (2006) 'Normative Power Europe reconsidered: Beyond the crossroads1', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), pp. 182–199. doi:10.1080/13501760500451600.
- McLaren, L.M. (2002) 'Public support for the European Union: Cost/benefit analysis or perceived cultural threat?', *The Journal of Politics*, 64(2), pp. 551–566. doi:10.1111/1468-2508.00139.
- Medlicott, W.N. (1940) 'The Gladstone Government and the Cyprus Convention, 1880-85', *The Journal of Modern History*, 12(2), pp. 186–208. doi:10.1086/236457.

- Natorski, M. (2018) 'EU mediation practices in Ukraine during revolutions: What Authority as a Peacemaker?', *International Negotiation*, 23(2), pp. 278–298. doi:10.1163/15718069-23021159.
- Nielsen, K.L. (2013) 'EU soft power and the capability-expectations gap', *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 9(5). doi:10.30950/jcer.v9i5.479.
- Novosseloff, A. (2021) *Assessing the effectiveness of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Office of the Special Adviser to the secretary- general on cyprus (OSASG), Epon*. Available at: <https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/assessing-effectiveness-of-unficy-and-osag/> (Accessed: 10 December 2023).
- Panayiotou, M. (2010) 'The role of cyprus in the Arabi Revolt and the resulting Egyptian campaign of 1882', *European History Quarterly*, 40(2), pp. 266–287. doi:10.1177/0265691410358837.
- Papadakis, Y. (2007) *Divided cyprus: Modernity, history, and an island in conflict*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press.
- Papastephanou, M. (2014) 'The cyprus problem: What everyone needs to know', *The European Legacy*, 19(5), pp. 664–665. doi:10.1080/10848770.2014.943514.
- Popescu, N. (2010) *EU foreign policy and Post-Soviet conflicts* [Preprint]. doi:10.4324/9780203834787.
- Rappas, A. (2015) 'The Transnational Formation of imperial rule on the margins of europe:1 british cyprus and the Italian Dodecanese in the interwar period', *European History Quarterly*, 45(3), pp. 467–505. doi:10.1177/0265691415587684.
- Rappas, A. (2022) 'The fascist temptation: British and Italian imperial entanglements in the Eastern Mediterranean', *Contemporary European History*, pp. 1–18. doi:10.1017/s0960777322000728.
- Richmond, O.P. (2002) 'Decolonisation and post-independence causes of conflict: The case of cyprus', *Civil Wars*, 5(3), pp. 163–190. doi:10.1080/13698240208402511.
- Rumelili, B. (2003) 'Liminality and perpetuation of conflicts: Turkish-greek relations in the context of community-building by the EU', *European Journal of International Relations*, 9(2), pp. 213–248. doi:10.1177/1354066103009002003.
- Sakkas, J. and Zhukova, N. (2013) 'The Soviet Union, Turkey and the Cyprus Problem, 1967-1974', *Les cahiers Irice*, 10(1), pp. 123–135. doi:10.3917/lci.010.0123.
- Sirin, C.V. (2012) 'Examining the role of identity in negotiation decision making:the case of cyprus', *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 23(4), pp. 413–439. doi:10.1108/10444061211267281.

- Sjursen, H. (2011) 'Not so intergovernmental after all? on democracy and Integration in european foreign and security policy', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18(8), pp. 1078–1095. doi:10.1080/13501763.2011.615194.
- Stivachtis, Y.A., Price, C. and Habegger, M. (2013) 'The European Union as a peace actor', *Review of European Studies*, 5(3). doi:10.5539/res.v5n3p4.
- Theophanous, A. (2023) 'The Cyprus problem, the Eu and the UN: An overall assessment and the way forward ', *Horizons* [Preprint], (23). doi:<https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-spring-2023---issue-no23/the-cyprus-problem-the-eu-and-the-un>.
- Thomas, M. (2001) 'France accused: French North Africa before the United Nations, 1952–1962', *Contemporary European History*, 10(1), pp. 91–121. doi:10.1017/s0960777301001059.
- Tocci, N. (2021) 'The European Union and Peacebuilding', *The Oxford Handbook of Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, and Peace Formation*, pp. 288–299. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190904418.013.19.
- Tocci, N. (2003) *EU accession dynamics and conflict resolution: The case of Cyprus, 1988-2002*. PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science. Available at <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/1719>
- Welle, D. (2004) Verheugen feels 'cheated' by Greek Cypriot government – DW – 04/21/2004, dw.com. Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/verheugen-feels-cheated-by-greek-cypriot-government/a-1176506> (Accessed: 01 January 2024).
- Wenzke, C., & Lindley, D.A. (2009). Dismantling the Cyprus Conspiracy: The US Role in the Cypriot Crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974.
- Whitman, R.G and Wolff, S. (2010) 'The EU as a conflict manager? the case of Georgia and its implications', *International Affairs*, 86(1), pp. 87–107. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00870.x.
- Xypolia, I. (2016) 'Frommare nostrumtoinsula nostra: British colonial cyprus and the Italian imperial threat', *The Round Table*, 105(3), pp. 287–296. doi:10.1080/00358533.2016.1180047.
- Yalkin, C., Kahveci, H. and Uygur, K. (2023) 'Advertising as discursive reflections of the political realm: Turkish-cypriot advertisements between 1940-1974', *Journal of Historical Research in Marketing*, 15(1), pp. 25–51. doi:10.1108/jhrm-02-2022-0009.
- Ηλιόπουλος , Π. (2018) *Το Κυπριακό, οι ελληνικές κυβερνήσεις και οι ΗΠΑ - Μ. Βρετανία, Ριζοσπάστης* . Available at: <https://www.rizospastis.gr/story.do?id=10079844> (Accessed: 14 December 2023).
- Οι συμφωνίες ζυρίχης - λονδίνου* (1999) *Ριζοσπάστης* . Available at: <https://www.rizospastis.gr/story.do?id=3764028> (Accessed: 14 December 2023).

Πούλλαδος, Μ. (no date) *Η ρίζα του κυπριακού προβλήματος*. Available at: <https://simerini.sigma-live.com/article/2015/5/30/e-riza-tou-kupriakou-problematos/> (Accessed: December 11, 2023).

### Maps and Images:

(No date) *The island of cyprus before and after division showing social ...* Available at: [https://www.researchgate.net/figure/The-island-of-Cyprus-before-and-after-division-showing-social-segregation\\_fig2\\_344450490](https://www.researchgate.net/figure/The-island-of-Cyprus-before-and-after-division-showing-social-segregation_fig2_344450490) (Accessed: 12 January 2024).

Meandering Minimalists (2023) *Cyprus' green line, Meandering Minimalists*. Available at: <https://meanderingminimalists.com/green-line/> (Accessed: 18 January 2024).

### Bibliography:

#### Legislation:

General Assembly resolution 814 (IX), *Application under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus*, A/RES/814 (IX) (17 December 1954), available from [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20814%20\(IX\).pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20814%20(IX).pdf)

General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI), *Question of Cyprus*, A/RES/1013(XI) (26 February 1957), available from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/207718?ln=en>

General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), *Question of Cyprus*, A/RES/3212(XXIX) (01 November 1974), available from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/189833?ln=en>

Security Council resolution 187, *The Cyprus Question*, S/RES/187 (13 March 1964), available from <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/112185?ln=en>

Security Council resolution 193, *The Cyprus Question*, S/RES/193 (09 August 1964), available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/193>

Security Council resolution 354, *Cyprus*, S/RES/354 (23 July 1974), available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/354>

Security Council resolution 357, *Cyprus*, S/RES/357 (14 August 1974), available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/357>

Security Council resolution 358, *Cyprus*, S/RES/358 (15 August 1974), available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/358>

Security Council resolution 359, *Cyprus*, S/RES/359 (15 August 1974), available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/359>

Security Council resolution 360, *Cyprus*, S/RES/360 (16 August 1974), available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/360>

Security Council resolution 361, *Cyprus*, S/RES/361 (30 August 1974), available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/361>

Security Council resolution 365, *Cyprus*, S/RES/365 (13 December 1974), available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/365>

Security Council resolution 541, *Cyprus*, S/RES/541 (18 November 1983), available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/541>

Security Council resolution 550, *Cyprus*, S/RES/550 (11 May 1984), available from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/550>

### **Secondary Sources:**

‘Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (Preparatory Committee)’ (1948) *International Organization*, 2(2), pp. 352–354. doi:10.1017/s0020818300019767.

- ‘Who intervenes?: Ethnic conflict and Interstate Crisis’ (2006) *Choice Reviews Online*, 44(03). doi:10.5860/choice.44-1773.
- Akgul, O. (2021) ‘Avrupa Birliği, pozitif Barış Kavramı ve Savaş Kuramları’, *Marmara Üniversitesi Avrupa Topluluğu Enstitüsü Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2(2), pp. 181–208. doi:10.29228/mjes.422.
- Charalambous, G. (2007) ‘The strongest communists in Europe: Accounting for Akel’s electoral success’, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 23(3), pp. 425–456. doi:10.1080/13523270701507071.
- Christou, G. (2004) ‘The European Union and Cyprus’, *The European Union and Enlargement*, pp. 61–95. doi:10.1057/9780230501751\_3.
- Edmonds, M. and Palmore, J. (2012) ‘Editorial’, *Defense & Security Analysis*, 28(3), pp. 199–201. doi:10.1080/14751798.2012.708592.
- Green Line Regulation (no date) European Commission. Available at: [https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/departments-and-executive-agencies/structural-reform-support/green-line-regulation\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/departments-and-executive-agencies/structural-reform-support/green-line-regulation_en) (Accessed: 11 January 2024).
- Henökl, T. (2014) ‘Conceptualizing the European Diplomatic Space: A framework for analysis of the European External Action Service’, *Journal of European Integration*, 36(5), pp. 453–471. doi:10.1080/07036337.2013.865731.
- Kovras, I. (2012) ‘De-linkage processes and grassroots movements in Transitional Justice’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 47(1), pp. 88–105. doi:10.1177/0010836711434477.
- Kyriacou, A.P. (2000) ‘A “just and lasting solution” to the cyprus problem: In search of institutional viability’, *Mediterranean Politics*, 5(3), pp. 54–75. doi:10.1080/13629390008414736.
- Kyris, G. (2018) ‘The European Union in Northern Cyprus: Conceptualising the avoidance of contested states’, *Geopolitics*, 25(2), pp. 346–361. doi:10.1080/14650045.2018.1552945.
- Lamnisos, T. (2022) ‘Hyphenated identities: Voices from the watchtower during the Cypriot Civil War’, *Nationalities Papers*, pp. 1–21. doi:10.1017/nps.2021.66.
- Menelaou, I. (2019) ‘A historical account of the cyprus problem and the Annan Plan: A unique opportunity or an unwelcome solution?’, *Akropolis: Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 3, pp. 29–61. doi:10.35296/jhs.v3i0.17.
- Moore, G. (2011) ‘Federalism and the “one-person one-vote principle”: Political accommodation in cyprus and the Annan plan’, *Federal Governance*, 8(2). doi:10.24908/fg.v8i2.4375.
- Müftüler-Bac, M. and Güney, A. (2005) ‘The European Union and the cyprus problem 1961–2003’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 41(2), pp. 281–293. doi:10.1080/00263200500035462.

- Noureddine, R. (2021) 'Normative Power Europe and in field of human rights: Is the EU a force for good in the world?', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies*, 8(2). doi:10.30722/anzjes.vol8.iss2.15169.
- Pace, M. (2007) 'The construction of EU Normative Power\*', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(5), pp. 1041–1064. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00759.x.
- Persson, A. (2011) 'To manage, resolve or transform? The way forward for the eu in the Middle East Peace process', *New Middle Eastern Studies*, 1. doi:10.29311/nmes.v1i0.2603.
- Reid, A. (2021) 'Heritage, reconciliation and cross-border cooperation in cyprus', *Anthropological Journal of European Cultures*, 30(1), pp. 144–152. doi:10.3167/ajec.2021.300111.
- Rothman, J. (1991) 'Conflict research and resolution: Cyprus', *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 518(1), pp. 95–108. doi:10.1177/0002716291518001008.
- Rumelili, B. (2007) 'Transforming conflicts on EU borders: The case of greek-turkish relations\*', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(1), pp. 105–126. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00705.x.
- Şahin, S. (2013) 'Diverse Media, uniform reports: An analysis of news coverage of the cyprus problem by the Turkish Cypriot Press', *Journalism*, 15(4), pp. 446–462. doi:10.1177/1464884913486399.
- Support for the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (2024) European Commission Representation in Cyprus. Available at: [https://cyprus.representation.ec.europa.eu/news/support-committee-missing-persons-cyprus-2024-01-10\\_en](https://cyprus.representation.ec.europa.eu/news/support-committee-missing-persons-cyprus-2024-01-10_en) (Accessed: 11 January 2024).
- Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage (2021) European Heritage Awards / Europa Nostra Awards. Available at: <https://www.europeanheritageawards.eu/winners/technical-committee-cultural-heritage/#:~:text=The%20Technical%20Committee%20on%20Cultural,and%20diverse%20cultural%20heritage%20of> (Accessed: 11 January 2024).
- Tocci, N. (2003) 'Incentives and disincentives for reunification and EU accession in cyprus', *Mediterranean Politics*, 8(1), pp. 151–158. doi:10.1080/13629390308010009.
- Ulug-Eryilmaz, B. (2014) 'The myth of "europeanization" of Turkish foreign policy: The cyprus debacle as a litmus test', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 14(3), pp. 431–462. doi:10.1080/14683857.2014.924676.
- Ulusoy, K. (2008) 'The europeanization of Turkey and its impact on the cyprus problem', *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 10(3), pp. 309–329. doi:10.1080/14613190802493634.

Zervakis, P.A. (2004) 'Defense Academy Excellence Cyprus in Europe: Solving the cyprus problem by europeanizing it?', *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 03(1), pp. 107–132. doi:10.11610/connections.03.1.09.

## Appendices

### Appendix A – Dr. Andreas Mavroyiannis' Interview

#### **1. How do you perceive the European Union's role in the Cyprus conflict, and what were your initial expectations of the EU's involvement?**

The role of the European Union is often misunderstood, including by the current government of Cyprus. The European Union has always been very reluctant to get directly involved in the efforts

for a negotiated settlement. It is not because of lack of interest, but it could not be perceived as an honest broker. Therefore, it confines its involvement in a supportive role

Having said that:

The accession of Cyprus to the European Union was the biggest achievement of the Republic of Cyprus and more so since the accession covers the whole island, the totality of the territory of the country, including the currently under Turkish occupation part of the island. For the first time since 1974 Cyprus managed to counterbalance the effects of the invasion and occupation, to have a feeling of security and to create the conditions which are expected to lay the ground for reunification. Accession to the EU is the strongest catalyst for the settlement of the Cyprus problem. It is key, however, to understand that this role is to a great extent objective, by the nature of things, by the legal and material situation created, and not the result of particular policies. Of course, particular actions like the regulations for the Turkish Cypriot community (financial and green line trade) are positive actions supporting reunification, or at least this was their rationale.

**2. In your opinion, to what extent has the EU fulfilled its role as a mediator and facilitator in the Cyprus conflict? Please elaborate on any specific initiatives or actions taken by the EU that have had an impact.**

My assessment almost twenty years after accession is that the catalytic role is there but it has not yet proved sufficient in giving a decisive push to the efforts for the settlement.

Furthermore, as we have seen in the recent round of negotiations which led to Crans Montana, membership to the European Union offers solutions to great number of problems that we faced in the negotiations

**3. Have you noticed any discrepancies between your expectations of the EU's role and the actual realities on the ground? If so, can you provide examples and explain their significance?**

For me the EU plays the role I was expecting it to play. If discrepancies there, are they are between what is happening on the ground and the realities and what some people in Cyprus including the current government are trying to portray. The EU cannot replace the United Nations. The EU can assist the United Nations within the framework of the Good Offices Mission of the Secretary General by offering political support to the efforts, by providing expertise on EU related matters, by running programs on the ground, by building capacity, by providing lectures and learning to the Turkish Cypriot community about how the EU is operating, and by promising important financial and technical support for the implementation of a settlement agreement if and when it is reached

**4. From your perspective, how has the EU's involvement affected the prospects for reconciliation and reunification between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities?**

It has certainly positively affected the prospects for reconciliation and reunification. The Turkish Cypriot community is much more attracted by the prospect of being part of the EU, the fact that through accession they became also European citizens means a lot and opened a lot of avenues for cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Participation in the EU is the best cement of reunification. Issues that might seem intractable at the national level can be dealt with at the supranational level, in particular bearing in mind that important competences have been transferred

to EU bodies. Furthermore, EU membership can in conditions of trust and security make more relevant the intrastate level and allow communities and regions to thrive

**5. In your view, what factors (or lack thereof) have influenced the EU's effectiveness in resolving the Cyprus conflict? Are there any inherent limitations or challenges faced by the EU in this regard?**

The inherent limitations are mainly the influence of Turkey which tries to counter the dynamics created by membership of the EU. It is a constant fight between the attraction of the European Union and the objective of Turkey in Cyprus. Furthermore, the failure of the efforts for the settlement so far creates disappointment and disbelief in the Turkish Cypriot community

**6. Can you describe any specific instances where the EU's actions or policies have positively contributed to peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus? Similarly, are there any instances where the EU's involvement has been less constructive or even counterproductive?**

The EU had commission officials working with the team of the UN in Cyprus during the negotiating process. They played a very positive role. The EU was also present at high political level, making a very positive contribution in the meetings in Mont Pelerin and in the Conferences in Geneva and Crans Montana. I do not recall any instance where the EU involvement was counter-productive

**7. How would you assess the EU's approach towards addressing issues related to human rights, democracy, and conflict resolution in the context of the Cyprus conflict? Do you believe the EU has effectively advanced these principles in its engagement with Cyprus?**

The EU is a rules and values based supranational organisation. All its action has to be consistent with the treaties, the international Human Rights convention and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Though this was not the main focus of the action of the EU in the efforts for the settlement of the Cyprus problem, all it does is conditional on respect of human rights. Therefore, one could say that by the very nature of its engagement it promotes human rights and democracy. As for conflict resolution, in various instances bringing together members of the two communities was a major contribution. The EU finances the work of technical Committees, including the committee on cultural heritage, the committee on missing persons and is behind many other actions. For instance, the recent trip to Northern Ireland by 20 political personalities from both communities was financed by the European Commission

**8. What is your perception of the impact of EU membership on the Cyprus conflict? Has EU membership played a significant role in shaping the dynamics of the conflict and the possibilities for resolution?**

Certainly. This was my reply in the first question. Yes, the EU framework makes things more prone to the settlement and I believe that division will not be able to indefinitely resist the dynamic created by the EU membership. The perspective of a developed European society with important safety nets and a thriving democratic society is the best guarantee for all Cypriots.

**9. From your personal experience or observations, how have the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities perceived the EU's role in the Cyprus conflict? Have there been any notable differences in these perceptions?**

Yes, there are notable differences. Many Greek Cypriots believe that membership to the EU is the dowry bestowed by the Republic to all its citizens and the Turkish Cypriots need to appreciate that without making any effort themselves they are finding themselves benefiting from membership. The Turkish Cypriots were very reluctant and unhappy that the EU accepted Cyprus as a member despite division and despite the negative vote of the Greek Cypriots in the Annan plan. They also consider that since Cyprus is a member, the EU is biased and this is why they do not want the EU to mediate in any way in the settlement of the problem. At the same time Turkish Cypriots reap already benefits from the fact that Cyprus is an EU member without having made any political or financial contribution.

**10. Looking ahead, what are your hopes and expectations regarding the future involvement of the EU in resolving the Cyprus conflict? What measures or actions would you like to see from the EU to promote reconciliation and reunification?**

I want the EU to stay the course. I believe its contribution is extremely positive and constructive and slowly slowly it is bearing fruit. It does not mean that the dynamic for reunification will easily prevail as it has to strive against negative forces and mainly the separatist agenda of Turkey and the current Turkish Cypriot leadership. I hold that the catalytic effect is there both in terms of bringing the Turkish Cypriots closer to the EU but also in the context of the EU -Turkey relation where Turkey has to come to grips with the fact that in order to build a closer relation with the EU, it has to be forthcoming when it comes to the efforts for the settlement of the Cyprus problem, creating conditions for cooperation and a win-win situation.

## **Appendix B – Demetris Papadakis' Interview**

**1. Πώς αντιλαμβάνεστε το ρόλο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στην κυπριακή διένεξη και ποιες ήταν οι αρχικές σας προσδοκίες για τη συμμετοχή της ΕΕ;**

Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση λόγω του θεσμικού της πλαισίου, της νομικής τάξης που την διέπει και της συνταγματικής της διάρθρωσης, προτείνει ένα ισχυρό πρότυπο λειτουργίας για την λύση του Κυπριακού προβλήματος. Μέσα από τις αρχικές μας προσδοκίες, αναμέναμε ότι το κύρος της ΕΕ και το πολιτικό της εκτόπισμα, θα μπορούσε να επηρεάσει τις εξελίξεις και να πιέσει προς την επίλυση του Κυπριακού ζητήματος, μέσα από ένα σωστό πλαίσιο αρχών.

**2. Κατά τη γνώμη σας, σε ποιο βαθμό η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση έχει εκπληρώσει το ρόλο της ως μεσολαβητής στην κυπριακή διένεξη; Παρακαλώ αναλύστε οποιεσδήποτε συγκεκριμένες πρωτοβουλίες ή ενέργειες που έχει αναλάβει η ΕΕ και έχουν επηρεάσει την κατάσταση.**

Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση έχει εκπληρώσει τον ρόλο της σε ένα ικανοποιητικό βαθμό αλλά υπάρχουν πολλά ακόμα που πρέπει να γίνουν για να φτάσουμε στον στόχο που είναι η επίλυση του Κυπριακού ζητήματος.

Το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο, σε όλες τις εκθέσεις προόδου της Τουρκίας, τονίζει ότι, προϋπόθεση, για να προχωρήσουν, ουσιαστικά οι Ευρώ-Τουρκικές σχέσεις, είναι η επίλυση του Κυπριακού προβλήματος, σύμφωνα με το Ευρωπαϊκό Κεκτημένο και τις αρχές και αξίες της Ένωσης. Εν προκειμένω, στην τελευταία έκθεση προόδου αναφέρθηκε, πόσο σημαντική είναι, η επανέναρξη των Διακοινοτικών Συνομιλιών στην Κύπρο και το γεγονός ότι η Ε.Ε θα πρέπει να αναβαθμίσει τον ρόλο της, ώστε να υποβοηθήσει την εξεύρεση περιεκτικής λύσης στο Κυπριακό ζήτημα. Επίσης αναφέρθηκε ότι η εμπλοκή της ΕΕ, θεωρείται εκ των ων ουκ άνευ, για την αποφυγή των εντάσεων στην περιοχή. Θεωρούμε ότι η παρέμβαση της Ε.Ε, μαζί με άλλους διεθνείς παράγοντες, διαδραμάτισε ρόλο, ώστε ο ΟΗΕ, να προχωρήσει στον διορισμό της νέας ειδικής απεσταλμένης του για το Κυπριακό.

**3. Έχετε παρατηρήσει κάποιες αποκλίσεις μεταξύ των προσδοκιών (δικών σας και ευρύτερα) για τον ρόλο της ΕΕ και των πραγματικοτήτων όπως καταγράφονται μέχρι και σήμερα; Αν ναι, μπορείτε να παράσχετε παραδείγματα και να εξηγήσετε τη σημασία τους;**

Αναμέναμε βέβαια ότι οι παρεμβάσεις της Ε.Ε θα ήταν περισσότερο καίριες και ουσιαστικές, ώστε να πιεστεί η Τουρκία, να προχωρήσει τουλάχιστον σε ενδείξεις καλών προθέσεων ή τουλάχιστον διαφοροποίησης των προθέσεων της, ως προς τις προοπτικές επίλυσης του Κυπριακού. Αναμέναμε π.χ. ότι θα επιβαλλόταν κάποιου είδους περιορισμός ή και αναστολή στην αποδέσμευση κονδυλίων, προς την Τουρκία ή ότι θα επιβάλλονταν άλλες μορφές οικονομικών κυρώσεων, ανάλογες με τις κυρώσεις που επιβλήθηκαν στην Ρωσική Ομοσπονδία. Π.χ. η απαγόρευση αποστολής περεταίρω τεχνογνωσίας από ευρωπαϊκές αμυντικές βιομηχανίες προς της Τουρκία, για ευνόητους λόγους, π.χ. περιορισμός της επιθετικής ρητορικής και ενεργειών της Τουρκίας στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο και ιδιαίτερα στην γραμμή καταπαύσεως του πυρός στην Κύπρο. Δυστυχώς όμως δεν είδαμε να προβλέπονται τέτοια μέτρα, στην φαρέτρα της Ε.Ε.

**4. Από την οπτική σας, πώς έχει επηρεάσει η συμμετοχή της ΕΕ τις προοπτικές συμφιλίωσης και επανένωσης μεταξύ της ελληνοκυπριακής και της τουρκοκυπριακής κοινότητας;**

Η συμμετοχή της Ε.Ε έχει επηρεάσει πάρα πολύ εποικοδομητικά τις προοπτικές συμφιλίωσης και επανένωσης μεταξύ των δύο κοινοτήτων στην Κύπρο. Και αυτό διότι παρέχει το πλαίσιο που διασφαλίζει το κράτος δικαίου, εντός του οποίου, από την μια θα αναζητηθεί η επίλυση του Κυπριακού ζητήματος και από την άλλη θα διατηρηθεί η απαραίτητη συνταγματική και εδαφική ενότητα και ικανότητα αποτελεσματικής λειτουργίας, της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας.

**5. Κατά την άποψή σας, ποιοι παράγοντες (ή ελλείψεις) έχουν επηρεάσει την αποτελεσματικότητα της ΕΕ στην επίλυση της κυπριακής διένεξης; Υπάρχουν κάποιοι ενδότεροι περιορισμοί ή προκλήσεις που αντιμετωπίζει η ΕΕ σε αυτόν τον τομέα;**

Νομίζω ότι ο καθένας μπορεί να αντιληφθεί, ειδικότερα αυτή την περίοδο, τους εξωτερικούς παράγοντες, οι οποίοι έχουν επηρεάσει την αποτελεσματικότητα της Ε.Ε, στην επίλυση του Κυπριακού ζητήματος. Ξεκάθαρη, η απουσία Κοινής Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής και Πολιτικής Ασφαλείας, η οποία έχει αυτά τα αποτελέσματα. Ο πόλεμος στην Ουκρανία, ο πόλεμος στη Γάζα, η ενεργειακή κρίση, η κλιματική αλλαγή, η συμφωνία για το περιβάλλον, αλλά και διάφορα άλλα θέματα, θέτουν τις παρεμβάσεις της Ε.Ε, στο Κυπριακό ζήτημα, στην αναμονή.

**6. Μπορείτε να περιγράψετε κάποια συγκεκριμένα περιστατικά όπου οι ενέργειες ή οι πολιτικές της ΕΕ που έχουν συμβάλει θετικά στις προσπάθειες εδραίωσης της ειρήνης στην Κύπρο; Αντίστοιχα, υπάρχουν κάποια περιστατικά όπου η συμμετοχή της ΕΕ ήταν λιγότερο εποικοδομητική ή ακόμα και αντιπαραγωγική;**

Όπως σας έχω ήδη αναφέρει, τουλάχιστον στην παρούσα φάση, η παρέμβαση της Ε.Ε, διαδραμάτισε ρόλο, ώστε ο ΟΗΕ να προχωρήσει στον διορισμό της νέας ειδικής απεσταλμένης του για το Κυπριακό. Επίσης θετικό είναι το γεγονός ότι στο Πρωτόκολλο προσχώρησης της Κύπρου στην Ε.Ε, η κατεχόμενη περιοχή αναγνωρίζεται ως μέρος της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, επί της οποίας η Κυπριακή Κυβέρνηση δεν ασκεί αποτελεσματικό έλεγχο, γιατί βρίσκεται η περιοχή αυτή, υπό την κατοχή των Τουρκικών στρατευμάτων. Η τοποθέτηση αυτή της Ε.Ε είναι ξεκάθαρη. Όπως ξεκάθαρη ήταν και η πρόσφατη δήλωση του Αντιπροέδρου της Ε.Ε, ότι η λύση δύο κρατών δεν είναι αποδεκτή από την ΕΕ.

**7. Πώς αξιολογείτε την προσέγγιση της ΕΕ στην αντιμετώπιση θεμάτων που σχετίζονται με τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα, τη δημοκρατία και την επίλυση συγκρούσεων στο πλαίσιο της κυπριακής διένεξης; Πιστεύετε ότι η ΕΕ έχει προωθήσει αποτελεσματικά αυτές τις αρχές στην εμπλοκή της με την Κύπρο;**

Θεωρώ ότι η προσέγγιση της ΕΕ, σε θέματα που σχετίζονται με τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα, την δημοκρατία και την επίλυση συγκρούσεων, στο πλαίσιο της Κυπριακής διένεξης, ως προσέγγιση αρχών, είναι ισορροπημένη. Πιστεύω ότι, παρά το γεγονός ότι η θέση της ΕΕ είναι σταθερή, δεν έχει προωθηθεί αποτελεσματικά, η αντίληψη ότι οι αρχές αυτές θα αποτελέσουν τις αρχές, επί των οποίων θα βασισθεί η συνολική, περιεκτική και βιώσιμη λύση του Κυπριακού ζητήματος και ότι αυτές οι αρχές συνιστούν αναπόσπαστο μέρος του κεκτημένου, των αρχών και αξιών της ίδιας της Ένωσης.

**8. Ποια είναι η αντίληψή σας για την επίδραση της συμμετοχής στην ΕΕ στην κυπριακή διένεξη; Έχει η συμμετοχή στην ΕΕ παίξει σημαντικό ρόλο στον προσδιορισμό των δυναμικών της διένεξης και των πιθανοτήτων για επίλυση;**

Η επίδραση της συμμετοχής στην ΕΕ, έθεσε το πολιτικό πλαίσιο και το πλαίσιο αξιών για το ενδεχόμενο επίλυσης της Κυπριακής διένεξης. Υπό αυτή την έννοια υπήρξε καταλυτική. Στην συνέχεια φαίνεται η συμμετοχή στην ΕΕ, να έχει καθορίσει και τον προσδιορισμό των δυναμικών

της διένεξης, με την έννοια ότι έχει ενεργοποιήσει την Ε.Ε ως παράγοντα επίλυσης και εξισορρόπησης, απέναντι στις πρωτοβουλίες παλαιότερων δυνάμεων που διαμεσολαβούσαν στο Κυπριακό, πχ Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο και ΗΠΑ, οι οποίες πίεζαν κυρίως προς την κατεύθυνση αναγνώρισης και νομιμοποίησης της de facto κατάστασης επί του εδάφους που δημιουργήθηκε με την Τουρκική εισβολή, γεγονός που η Ελληνοκύπριοι στην πλειοψηφία τους, δεν θα έκαναν ποτέ αποδεκτό, Ως εκ τούτου αυξήθηκαν και οι πιθανότητες για επίλυση του Κυπριακού με την επίδραση της ΕΕ.

**9. Από την προσωπική σας εμπειρία ή παρατηρήσεις, πώς αντιλαμβάνονται οι Ελληνοκύπριοι και οι Τουρκοκύπριοι τον ρόλο της ΕΕ στην κυπριακή διένεξη; Υπάρχουν κάποιες αξιοσημείωτες διαφορές σε αυτές τις αντιλήψεις;**

Αν η ερώτηση αφορά τις ηγεσίες των 2 κοινοτήτων, υπάρχουν αξιοσημείωτες διαφορές. Η πλειοψηφία των Ελληνοκυπρίων, αντιλαμβάνονται τον ρόλο της ΕΕ ως πολιτικό, με την έννοια της αποκατάστασης του Δικαίου, την αναστροφή των τετελεσμένων της Εισβολής, την αποκατάσταση της ανεξαρτησίας της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας και την αποχώρηση των Τουρκικών στρατευμάτων. Οι Τουρκοκύπριοι από την άλλη αντιλαμβάνονται τον ρόλο της ΕΕ ως οικονομικό. Δηλαδή επιδιώκουν με το ειδικό βάρος της παρουσίας της Τουρκίας στην διένεξη, να εξασφαλίσουν ικανοποιητική αναγνώριση από ορισμένα κράτη, ώστε η de facto κατάσταση που δημιουργήθηκε στα κατεχόμενα, με την παράνομη εισβολή και κατοχή, να νομιμοποιηθεί και να αναγνωρισθεί ως μέρος της λύσης. Στην συνέχεια δια της πλαγίας, είτε μέσω Τουρκίας, είτε μέσω άλλων μηχανισμών που θα δημιουργηθούν, να απορροφούνται τα αναγκαία κονδύλια από την Ε.Ε, ώστε να δημιουργηθούν και να συντηρούνται οι απαραίτητες υποδομές. Αν η ερώτηση όμως αφορά την κοινωνία των πολιτών, κι αν εξαιρέσουμε κάποιες θλιβερές μειοψηφίες και στις 2 κοινότητες, η αντίληψη αφορά την ειρηνική συνύπαρξη μεταξύ των 2 κοινοτήτων.

**10. Στο μέλλον, ποιες είναι οι ελπίδες και οι προσδοκίες σας σχετικά με τη μελλοντική συμμετοχή της ΕΕ σε ό,τι αφορά στο κυπριακό ζήτημα; Τι μέτρα ή ενέργειες προσωπικά θα θέλατε να δείτε από πλευράς της ΕΕ σε σχέση με την προώθηση της ειρήνης και της επανένωσης της Κύπρου;**

Αναμένουμε ότι στο μέλλον η ΕΕ θα παρέμβει πιο δυναμικά, κάνοντας χρήση συγκεκριμένων προτάσεων, που θα θέτουν οδικό χάρτη στην Τουρκία, ώστε η πορεία της, προς την κατεύθυνση μιας ειδικής σχέσης με την ΕΕ, όπως την καθόρισε η ίδια, να διαπερνά μέσα από ειδικούς σταθμούς οι οποίοι θα ορίζουν προ-απαιτούμενα, τα οποία η Τουρκία θα διεκδικήσει, εφόσον κινηθεί προς την κατεύθυνση της προσαρμογής με τον εν λόγω οδικό χάρτη. Οι ειδικοί σταθμοί, θα αφορούν την επίλυση του Κυπριακού, την εφαρμογή των σχέσεων καλής γειτονίας στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο, την εγκατάλειψη των διεκδικήσεων στο Αιγαίο και την τελεσίδικη προσαρμογή με την συνθήκη της Λοζάνης και τον σεβασμό των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων απέναντι στον ίδιο τον λαό της. Βέβαια η πορεία αυτή θα πρέπει να προβλέπει και επιβράδυνση στην παραχώρηση κονδυλίων τα οποία ήδη έχουν αποφασιστεί να παραχωρηθούν στην Τουρκία, εφόσον η Τουρκία δεν κάνει γενναία βήματα προς την ορθή κατεύθυνση. Όλα αυτά βέβαια θα πρέπει να τα συναποφασίσουμε μαζί με τους εταίρους μας στην ΕΕ. Θα θέλαμε να δούμε στο μέλλον πρωτοβουλίες και προτάσεις εκ μέρους της ΕΕ, οι οποίες να προάγουν την στενή συνεργασία μεταξύ των νέων των δύο κοινοτήτων και ομάδων νέων από τις δύο κοινότητες, μέσα από έρευνα, για επί μέρους ζητήματα που ενδεχομένως να προκύψουν κατά την συζήτηση επίλυσης ή με την επίλυση του Κυπριακού. Θα

πρέπει οι νέοι και από τις δύο κοινότητες να συναισθανθούν το βάρος της ευθύνης, ώστε να «σηκώσουν» την πρωτοβουλία της επίλυσης του Κυπριακού στους ώμους τους.

### **Appendix C – J.D’s Interview**

**1. Πώς αντιλαμβάνεστε το ρόλο της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στην κυπριακή διένεξη και ποιες ήταν οι αρχικές σας προσδοκίες για τη συμμετοχή της ΕΕ;**

Η ΕΕ έχει σημαντικό ρόλο να διαδραματίσει για τη λύση του κυπριακού, εφόσον η Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία είναι μέλος της και η Ένωση έχει ζωτικό συμφέρον για μια λειτουργική και βιώσιμη

λύση. Μέχρι σήμερα η ιδιότητα της Κύπρου ως μέλος της ΕΕ άσκησε σημαντικό ρόλο στην επίτευξη σημαντικών συγκλίσεων στο πλαίσιο των συνομιλιών για το κυπριακό και αυτό μπορεί να ενισχυθεί ακόμα περισσότερο στο μέλλον.

**2. Κατά τη γνώμη σας, σε ποιο βαθμό η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση έχει εκπληρώσει το ρόλο της ως μεσολαβητής στην κυπριακή διένεξη; Παρακαλώ αναλύστε οποιεσδήποτε συγκεκριμένες πρωτοβουλίες ή ενέργειες που έχει αναλάβει η ΕΕ και έχουν επηρεάσει την κατάσταση.**

Η ΕΕ έχει διαδραματίσει πολύ σημαντικό ρόλο στις προσπάθειες για λύση του κυπριακού, όχι ως μεσολαβητής αλλά μέσω της παροχής νομικοτεχνικής βοήθειας προς την ομάδα των Ηνωμένων Εθνών, σε πτυχές που έχουν να κάνουν για παράδειγμα με την εφαρμογή των τεσσάρων ευρωπαϊκών ελευθεριών στην Κύπρο μετά τη λύση του κυπριακού.

**3. Έχετε παρατηρήσει κάποιες αποκλίσεις μεταξύ των προσδοκιών (δικών σας και ευρύτερα) για τον ρόλο της ΕΕ και των πραγματικοτήτων όπως καταγράφονται μέχρι και σήμερα; Αν ναι, μπορείτε να παράσχετε παραδείγματα και να εξηγήσετε τη σημασία τους;**

Δεν έχω παρατηρήσει κάποια απόκλιση. Τα δεδομένα υπογραμμίζουν ότι όσο πιο ενεργός είναι ο ρόλος και η συμβολή της ΕΕ στην προσπάθεια για λύση του κυπριακού τόσο πιο ευεργετικό θα είναι αυτό για το περιεχόμενο της λύσης και επωφελές για όλους τους εμπλεκόμενους.

**4. Από την οπτική σας, πώς έχει επηρεάσει η συμμετοχή της ΕΕ τις προοπτικές συμφιλίωσης και επανένωσης μεταξύ της ελληνοκυπριακής και της τουρκοκυπριακής κοινότητας;**

Η Κύπρος έχει γίνει μέλος της ΕΕ ως μία νομική οντότητα με το κεκτημένο να έχει ανασταλεί στις κατεχόμενες περιοχές μέχρι την εξεύρεση λύσης του κυπριακού. Στο μεταξύ η ΕΕ εφαρμόζει προγράμματα και πολιτικές που υποβοηθούν την προσέγγιση με την ΤΚ κοινότητα και υπογραμμίζουν την πολιτική σημασία των ωφελημάτων που προσφέρει η ΕΕ για τους Τουρκοκύπριους, για παράδειγμα μέσα από τον Κανονισμό της Πράσινης Γραμμής και το Χρηματοδοτικό Κανονισμό για την ΤΚ κοινότητα.

**5. Κατά την άποψή σας, ποιοι παράγοντες (ή ελλείψεις) έχουν επηρεάσει την αποτελεσματικότητα της ΕΕ στην επίλυση της κυπριακής διένεξης; Υπάρχουν κάποιοι ενδότεροι περιορισμοί ή προκλήσεις που αντιμετωπίζει η ΕΕ σε αυτόν τον τομέα;**

Ο βασικότερος ανασταλτικός παράγοντας συνίσταται στις πολιτικές επιφυλάξεις από μερίδα της τουρκικής πλευράς, οι οποίες ελαύνονται από τη διαφωνία της με το στρατηγικό ρόλο που μπορεί να διαδραματίσει η ΕΕ για την υπέρβαση της διαίρεσης της Κύπρου και την επίτευξη του στόχου της επανένωσης.

**6. Μπορείτε να περιγράψετε κάποια συγκεκριμένα περιστατικά όπου οι ενέργειες ή οι πολιτικές της ΕΕ που έχουν συμβάλει θετικά στις προσπάθειες εδραίωσης της ειρήνης στην Κύπρο; Αντίστοιχα, υπάρχουν κάποια περιστατικά όπου η συμμετοχή της ΕΕ ήταν λιγότερο εποικοδομητική ή ακόμα και αντιπαραγωγική;**

Όπως αναφέρεται και πιο πάνω: η συνδρομή της στην αντιμετώπιση πτυχών του κυπριακού όπως η εφαρμογή των τεσσάρων ευρωπαϊκών ελευθεριών και η βοήθεια προς την ΤΚ κοινότητα μέσω των δύο προαναφερόμενων κανονισμών.

**7. Πώς αξιολογείτε την προσέγγιση της ΕΕ στην αντιμετώπιση θεμάτων που σχετίζονται με τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα, τη δημοκρατία και την επίλυση συγκρούσεων στο πλαίσιο της κυπριακής διένεξης; Πιστεύετε ότι η ΕΕ έχει προωθήσει αποτελεσματικά αυτές τις αρχές στην εμπλοκή της με την Κύπρο;**

Ναι η ΕΕ και το κοινοτικό κεκτημένο αποτελούν ενισχυτικούς παράγοντες στην προσπάθεια για κατοχύρωση του σεβασμού των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων, των βασικών ελευθεριών και της δημοκρατικής διακυβέρνησης στο πλαίσιο της λύσης του κυπριακού.

**8. Ποια είναι η αντίληψή σας για την επίδραση της συμμετοχής στην ΕΕ στην κυπριακή διένεξη; Έχει η συμμετοχή στην ΕΕ παίξει σημαντικό ρόλο στον προσδιορισμό των δυναμικών της διένεξης και των πιθανοτήτων για επίλυση;**

Το γεγονός ότι με τη λύση του κυπριακού, η επανενωμένη Κύπρος θα συνεχίσει να είναι μέλος της ΕΕ, είναι ένα μεγάλο κίνητρο που συντηρεί και μπορεί να ενεργοποιήσει δυναμικές στο επίπεδο της κοινωνίας των πολιτών προς την κατεύθυνση της λύσης του κυπριακού.

**9. Από την προσωπική σας εμπειρία ή παρατηρήσεις, πώς αντιλαμβάνονται οι Ελληνοκύπριοι και οι Τουρκοκύπριοι τον ρόλο της ΕΕ στην κυπριακή διένεξη; Υπάρχουν κάποιες αξιοσημείωτες διαφορές σε αυτές τις αντιλήψεις;**

Μεταξύ των απλών Ελληνοκυπρίων και Τουρκοκυπρίων υπάρχει κοινή συνισταμένη ότι η ΕΕ έχει εποικοδομητικό ρόλο και προσφέρει πολύ σημαντικές ευκαιρίες για την Κύπρο και όλους του Κυπρίους. Σε επίπεδο πολιτικών ηγεσιών παρουσιάζεται μια απόκλιση στην πιο πάνω συναίνεση από τη μερίδα της Τουρκοκυπριακής ηγεσίας η οποία αντιλαμβάνεται την ΕΕ ως ανασταλτικό παράγοντα στην προσπάθεια της για εμπέδωση της οριστικής διαίρεσης.

**10. Στο μέλλον, ποιες είναι οι ελπίδες και οι προσδοκίες σας σχετικά με τη μελλοντική συμμετοχή της ΕΕ σε ό,τι αφορά στο κυπριακό ζήτημα; Τι μέτρα ή ενέργειες προσωπικά θα θέλατε να δείτε από πλευράς της ΕΕ σε σχέση με την προώθηση της ειρήνης και της επανένωσης της Κύπρου;**

Η ΕΕ είναι αναπόσπαστο κομμάτι και έχει αδιαμφισβήτητο ρόλο σε μια ανανεωμένη προσπάθεια για την επίτευξη συνολικής λύσης στο κυπριακό. Όσο πιο ευρεία και ενεργή είναι αυτή η συμμετοχή τόσο πιο επωφελές θα είναι αυτό για την προσπάθεια καθαυτή και για όλους τους εμπλεκόμενους.