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Interactions, Computations, and Experience: Interleaved Springboards of Cognitive Emergence

dc.contributor.authorDemetriou, Andreas
dc.contributor.authorRaftopoulos, Athanasios
dc.contributor.authorKargopoulos, Phillipos V.
dc.description.abstractThis rejoinder attempts to show that Bickhard's criticism is irrelevant to our theory and epistemologically one-sided. It is irrelevant because our theory is pragmaticist and interactivist at a number of levels ignored by Bickhard. It is epistemologically one-sided because it assumes that interactivism is the only proper model of mind. Thus, we try to show that different approaches can be used to model different levels or phrases in the organization and development of the mind. The discussion focuses on how interactivism, connectionism, computationalism and experientialism may complement each other as tools for modeling cognitive architecture and change. We also try to respond to various other, less central, criticisms that Bickhard leveled against our theory.en_UK
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDevelopmental Review;Volume 19, Issue 3, September 1999, Pages 389-414
dc.rightsCopyright © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserveden_UK
dc.subjectResearch Subject Categories::SOCIAL SCIENCES::Social sciences::Psychologyen_UK
dc.titleInteractions, Computations, and Experience: Interleaved Springboards of Cognitive Emergenceen_UK

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