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Greece and the Euro: The chronicle of an expected collapse

dc.contributor.authorGalanos, George
dc.contributor.authorPavlidis, George
dc.contributor.authorKotios, Angelos
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-11T10:56:21Z
dc.date.available2015-12-11T10:56:21Z
dc.date.issued2001-10
dc.identifier.issn0020-5346
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11728/6582
dc.description.abstractTen years after Greece’s accession to EMU, the venture has proved to be almost a complete failure. Obviously, the country joined EMU disappointingly unprepared. After EMU accession, Greece failed to seek the necessary adaptations. Its economic policy was inconsistent with the economic logic and rules of the game of a monetary union. EMU did not in itself lead to the Greek crisis. Nevertheless, the supervisory arrangements clearly failed to work. Moreover, the unfolding of the crisis was assisted by EMU’s inherent weakness in managing asymmetric disturbances and the absence of early warning and rapid intervention mechanisms.en_UK
dc.language.isoenen_UK
dc.publisherSpringer Linken_UK
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIntereconomics;Volume 46, Issue 5
dc.rights© Springer International Publishing AGen_UK
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_UK
dc.subjectResearch Subject Categories::LAW/JURISPRUDENCEen_UK
dc.titleGreece and the Euro: The chronicle of an expected collapseen_UK
dc.typeArticleen_UK
dc.doi10.1007/s10272-011-0390-7


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